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Computer security professionals and researchers are investigating proactive techniques
for studying network-based attack behavior. Attack modeling is one of these research areas. In this dissertation, we address a novel attack modeling technique called an exploitation graph (e-graph) for representing attack scenarios. The key assumption in this research
is that we can use exploitation graphs to represent attack scenarios, and methods involving e-graphs can be applied to provide vulnerability mitigation strategies. The modeling
process consists of three primary steps.
The frst step is the creation of a knowledge base of vulnerability graphs (v-graphs)
from known system vulnerabilities. Each v-graph shows necessary preconditions in order
to make the vulnerability exploitable, and post-conditions that denote effects after a successful exploitation. A template is used to facilitate the defnition of preconditions and
post-conditions.

The second step involves the association of multiple v-graphs to create an e-graph
specifc to a system being modeled. Network topology information and security policies
(e.g., fre wall rules) are encoded during the modeling process. A set of experiments were
designed to test the modeling approach in a cluster computing environment consisting of
one server node and eight internal computing nodes. Experimental results showed that egraphs can be used to evaluate vulnerability mitigation solutions, e.g., identifying critical
vulnerabilities and evaluating fre wall policies.
The third step of this process focuses on devising graph-simplifcation techniques for
large e-graphs. Effcient graph-simplifcation techniques are described based on host and
exploitation similarity. The most distinctive feature of these techniques is that, they help to
simplify the most complex graph-generation process and do not require excessive memory storage. Experimental results showed that these techniques can not only reduce the
size of e-graphs substantially, but also preserve most information needed for useful attack
scenario analysis.
The usefulness of the e-graph approach is shown in this dissertation. As a general
approach for system administrators, the proposed techniques can be used in, but is not
limited to, the cluster-computing environment in providing proactive Vulnerability Assessment (VA) strategies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Computer Security and Attack Modeling
Computer security has been studied extensively as a distinct research area during the
past several decades. Computer security refers to “preventing attackers from achieving
objectives through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and networks”
[29]. Computer security research often includes developing tools in three closely related
areas: prevention, detection, and reaction [73]. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between
these three areas. Within each feld, related techniques are identifed and listed.
In Figure 1.1, the modeling and simulation technique falls into all three areas and
is central to computer security research. These techniques are used to model complex
networks and information infrastructures, model and evaluate system architectures, and
provide information needed by decision systems to respond to attacks [73]. Modeling and
simulation tools provide organizations with an understanding of the state of security for
their network, intentions and actions of attackers, and alternatives for responding to attacks. Modeling and simulation has been identifed as one of the crosscutting technologies
for the next few years [73].
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Fi g ur e 1. 1 R el ati o ns hi ps b et w e e n pr e v e nti o n, d et e cti o n, a n d r e a cti o n t e c h n ol o gi es
M o d eli n g of att a c k a cti viti es is o n e p ossi bl e m o d eli n g a n d si m ul ati o n t e c h ni q u e. As
a pr o a cti v e a p pr o a c h, c o m p ut er s e c urit y pr of essi o n als a n d r es e ar c h ers ar e i n v esti g ati n g
t e c h ni q u es t o st u d y att a c k b e h a vi ors.

Att a c k m o d eli n g t e c h ni q u es ar e i m p ort a nt d u e t o

t h e i n cr e as e b ot h i n c o m pl e xit y of n et w or k- b as e d i ntr usi o ns/ att a c ks a n d i n t h e a v ail a bilit y
of t o ols t h at c a n b e us e d b y att a c k ers. T his a p pr o a c h r ef ers t o m et h o ds us e d t o f or m all y
m o d el p ossi bl e att a c k s c e n ari os b as e d o n i nf or m ati o n k n o w n t o d ef e n d ers. B as e d o n t h es e
m o d els, att a c k s c e n ari os c a n b e si m ul at e d, r e c or d e d, st u di e d, d et e ct e d, a n d r e a ct e d t o. T o
d at e, r es e ar c h i n t his ar e a h as b e e n l a c ki n g.
Att a c k m o d eli n g is diff c ult. T h e or eti c all y, all m et h o ds t h at c a n b e us e d b y att a c k ers
m ust b e c o nsi d er e d i n or d er t o h a v e a c o m pr e h e nsi v e m o d el of att a c ks. T h es e m et h o ds
m a y i n cl u d e s o ci al e n gi n e eri n g m et h o ds, t e c h ni c al m et h o ds or m et h o ds r el at e d t o m a n -
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agement processes. In this dissertation, attack modeling mainly focuses on the technical
aspect of these methods. Information to be considered includes network confgurations,
known vulnerabilities, and alert data gathered by various security scanners. The reason
for this approach is that attack-modeling techniques are related to advances in other areas
of computer security research. Specifcally , these advances include information gathering,
vulnerability assessment (VA), security decision systems, visualization of vulnerabilities
and intrusions, and other related areas. By taking advantage of these advances, modeling
an attack from a technical perspective is possible. The research described in this dissertation is an important step towards a more comprehensive framework that includes both
social engineering and management elements in attack modeling.

1.2

Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Tools and Graph-Based Attack Modeling

1.2.1 VA Tools
Tools are available for assessing vulnerabilities in a single host and across a network.
Examples are ISS security scanner [32], Nessus [16], STAT scanner [79], Cybercop [13],
and Retina network security scanner [64]. These tools provide a capability to scan for
known vulnerabilities according to various vulnerability sources (e.g., the SANS top 20
vulnerability list [67], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [10], Bugtraq entries [5], Secunia [71], or CERT advisories [6]). Using these tools, vulnerabilities are
exposed and fx es to vulnerabilities are recommended.
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Although these tools are adequate to expose known weaknesses in single hosts and
networks, they do not provide for an analysis of possible attacks that may take advantage
of these weaknesses. More specifcally , consider the following scenarios.
• System services or software components can often be used securely in isolation,
but when used together, they collectively can become vulnerabilities that provide
attackers with an ability to violate security policies. For example, when an FTP
server and an HTTP server reside on the same machine and the FTP server is set
to be writable to anonymous users, the attacker can then write a malicious program
that can be executed through the HTTP service [66].
• The usefulness of services can become vulnerabilities in some cases. Tradeoffs must
be made between the security and usefulness of a system. For example, the Network
File System (NFS) provides users of UNIX machines the ability to access their home
directories on different hosts within a network. However, this mechanism can lead
to compromise of all user accounts if NFS is compromised.
• New vulnerabilities are discovered frequently due to software design errors, inappropriate system confgurations, increased complexity and the heterogeneous nature of
systems. Detecting these vulnerabilities can be prohibitively labor-intensive. Even
if all vulnerabilities can be detected using defensive products (e.g., vulnerability
scanners), it is usually not feasible to remove all of them. Reasons could include the
timing of software patches, time and monetary limitations, or poor system administration.
These scenarios cannot be addressed using current VA approaches. VA tools need
to be combined with other techniques in order to be effective. Among these efforts, the
graph-based modeling technique seems to be an applicable candidate.

1.2.2

Graph-Based Modeling Techniques

In order to model attack behaviors in network confgurations where attacks are organized as multi-step activities, it is important to consider and implement innovative methods. Several approaches have been proposed in recent years. For example, the attack tree
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approach uses tree structures to represent possible attacks [68]. The attack graph approach
uses a variety of techniques to build graphs to simulate attack scenarios [3, 36, 66]. A more
detailed review of these efforts will be introduced in Chapter II of this dissertation. In the
approach we implemented, we mainly rely on previous research in graph-based modeling
techniques, but vary from previous methods in several ways. A detailed explanation of
this will be introduced in the next section.
It seems natural to use a graph-based approach for attack modeling in networked environments. The basic idea behind this approach is that attacks are viewed as chains of
activities/events performed by attacker(s). These activities/events are then used as a basis to construct directed graphs. Nodes within these graphs represent a combination of
security-related system states such as changes to system fles, levels of user privileges, or
trust relationships between different hosts. Edges between the nodes represent potential
steps performed by attackers where the outcome of each step depends on the outcome of
previous steps. Lengths of attack paths usually depend on the intention of attackers and
the diffculty necessary to perform specifc attacks. Figure 1.2 depicts a simple graph used
for attack modeling. Nodes within this graph represent the start state to initiate an attack,
the fnal state after the attack, and various goals achieved during the process of the attack.
Edges are marked with different types of attacks. In this graph, there are two alternative
paths which may be followed to achieve the same fnal goal. Each path has a length of two
which indicates that both represent the same level of diffculty .
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Figure 1.2 A simple graph for attack modeling
It has been shown that graph-based modeling techniques are useful for studying simulated attack scenarios, for analysis of network vulnerabilities, and for building a defensive
mechanism around networks [12, 36, 38, 41, 50, 65, 66, 72, 81, 82]. Generally speaking,
the graph-based exploitation modeling approach is useful for the following reasons.
• To understand the nature of attacks. By separating attacks into different stages, a set
of events, a series of pre-conditions and sequences, or a set of privileges, it becomes
easier for users to model the attacks and provide possible defending mechanisms. In
order to add weights to edges inside graphs, it is necessary to provide quantitative
measures (e.g. level of effort) for attacks [14, 55]. These efforts will lead to more
precise attack modeling, which in turn will beneft netw ork analysis.
• To estimate costs for attackers/defenders. It is important for attackers and defenders
to have a quantitative estimate of the overall cost (e.g. effort, time) during attacks
[14, 55]. The graph-based approach provides a meaningful way to separate the attack process into different steps. By assigning costs for each step that is represented
as an edge in graphs, it is possible to get an estimate of the overall cost. By assigning
edges for other attributes, such as the probability that an attacker will follow a specifc path during an attack, it is possible to get a quantitative estimate of the overall
cost in even more complex scenarios.
• To help the validation of security policies. It is important to validate the correctness
of security policies within an organization. It is also important to validate the conformance of implementations to security policies. By expressing security policies
in specialized languages such as Computation Tree Logic (CTL)1 , it is possible to
validate these policies and guarantee security-related systems with improved assurance.
1

Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is one of the most commonly used temporal logics in model checking
tools. It is used to formally state properties related with the executions of a system [4].
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• To measure the capabilities of security products. By systematically analyzing the
vulnerabilities of a networked environment, it is possible to create test beds to check
the capabilities of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or other security components. This can help to fnd the proper place to deploy these security components in
a network defensive perimeter. It can also help to determine how elusive, stealthy or
destructive specifc attacks are.

1.2.3 Combining the Two Approaches
Currently most intrusions/attacks are initiated and implemented in networked environments. Building vulnerability information into models to simulate these attacks can beneft
both the attack modeling process and the VA process. Vulnerability information gathered
from VA tools is the most important source of data that can be used to infer possible
attacks. By using graph-based attack modeling techniques, VA tools can associate vulnerability information with simulated attack scenarios. VA tools may then be able to evaluate
the tradeoff of security features and usefulness of services within network environments,
to analyze the vulnerabilities created by combining services together, and to prioritize the
removal of existing vulnerabilities. This would advance the state of information assurance
analysis and tools in use today for security engineers.
To show the usefulness of graph-based modeling which takes into account vulnerability information, consider a hypothetical attack example illustrated in Figure 1.3. This
example is similar to a recent attack targeted against the high-performance computing facilities at Stanford University [33]. In Figure 1.3, M1 and M2 denote two Linux machines
interconnected through the campus network. Attacker A is connected to a campus network through the Internet. M2 is a machine where the Portable Batch System (PBS) [54],
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a job-scheduling program for high-performance applications, is installed. Suppose there is
a pre-established trust relationship between M1 and M2 . The trust relationship is realized
through the .rhosts fle on both machines. Several vulnerabilities exist on host M1 and M2
and are listed below.

M1
John the Ripper

M2
Internet

Telnet
Ethereal
.rhosts
PBS Scheduler
Vulnerable WuFTP
Vulnerable
Sendmail
.rhosts

Attacker A

Campus Network

Figure 1.3 A hypothetical attack example: one attacker and a campus network

M1 :
1) Users can log into M1 using the Telnet program, where user names and passwords
are transferred without encryption.
2) A traffc sniffer2 , Ethereal [18], is installed on host M1 .
M2 :
1) Vulnerable FTPD software, WuFtpd 2.5.0 [86] 3 , is installed on M2 .
2

A traffc sniffer is a software or a wire-tap device that eavesdrops on the network traffc. More information is available at http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/sniffn g-faq.html.
3

The Wu-ftpd heap corruption vulnerability (CVE-2001-0550) is a vulnerability for Wu-ftpd 2.6.1 (or
lower) that allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands. More information is available at
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2001-0550.
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2) The Sendmail 8.10 4 software, a program used to provide email messaging, contains
a remote buffer overfo w vulnerability.
Suppose attacker A has already used tools to probe the campus network and knew the
network topology, trust relationships and vulnerability information. Then A initiates an
attack. Steps that could have been executed are described below.
1) Attacker A cracked a valid user account/password pair and used it to log into M1 .
The cracking tool A used was John the Ripper [37]. Attacker A might have also used
Ethereal to passively observe clear-text account names and passwords.
2) A logged into M1 from A’s machine.
3) A logged into M2 from M1 by taking advantage of the trust relationship between
two hosts.
4) A could also get common user privilege on host M2 by taking advantage of the
Sendmail vulnerability.
5) By taking advantage of the WuFtpd vulnerability, A ran a local buffer overfo w
attack on M2 to gain root user privilege.
6) A compromised the PBS scheduler by terminating some of the running high performance applications.
4

The sendmail vulnerability is a vulnerability (CAN-2002-1337) that allows a remote user to gain
user privilege of the sendmail daemon. More information is available at http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/
cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-1337.

10
7) A installed Rootkits such as SuckIT Rootkit [59], a program used to mask intrusions
and gain administrator level access, on M2 to facilitate accessing the compromised host
later.
Using the graph-based modeling method, the above attack scenario is illustrated in
Figure 1.4. For convenience, a special node S0 is used to denote the start state to initiate
an attack. For this example, since it is usually hard to determine at which step an attacker
will stop, no end node is defned.

Figure 1.4 An attack graph based on Figure 1.3
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In Figure 1.4, a set of nodes is used to represent state changes during attacks. Each
node is identifed by a number from 0 to 7. User privileges are classifed into three levels:
none, common, and root. The user level none means no account information is known.
The user level common means the user can log on to the machine and do routine work
at the user privilege level. The user level root means super-user privilege in Linux/Unix
operating systems. Inside each node, three system variables are used: host connectivity,
attack method, and changes to user privileges. During the attack process, the attacker
can use a variety of attacks to move from one host to another, elevating user privileges
at different stages of the attack. For example, node 1 indicates that attacker A connects
from A’s machine to M1 using attack tool John the Ripper to gain a common user privilege
on M1 . Node 2 shows that attacker A connects from A’s machine to M1 using a Network
Sniffer to gain a common user privilege on M1 . This example also describes the order of
attacks, which means some steps must be successful in order for the next step to happen.
For example, node 5 must be successful before node 6 can happen, meaning that PBS can
only be compromised after a local buffer overfo w attack happens. From this example we
can see that attack scenarios can be easily represented by a graph, which simplifes the
representation of different steps taken during the attack. In this example, one possible
path the attacker can follow is 0-1-4-5-6, meaning that the attacker frst connects to M1
using John the Ripper, then connects to M2 by building a trust relationship between M1
and M2 , then compromises M2 using a local buffer overfo w, and fnally compromises the
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PBS scheduler on M2 . Another similar path is 0-3-5-7. By enumerating all possible attack
paths, a system administrator can devise effective defenses.
In order to provide more useful information for system administrators, these graphs are
further analyzed using graph algorithms. For example, the minimum vertex cut algorithm
can be used to identify critical network states, which are a minimum set of states that no
attack can bypass. For example, in Figure 1.4, we can identify node 5 as the minimum
vertex cut between node 0 and node 6 using the graph algorithm. Suppose the graph in
Figure 1.4 is complete, which means, all possible attack paths are listed. If the attack
corresponding to node 5 can be removed, then the attacker has no way to compromise the
PBS scheduler or install a Rootkit. System administrators can then set a high priority to
remove the corresponding vulnerability, namely, the local buffer overfo w vulnerability on
host number 2, either through patches or by replacing the vulnerable application.
From the above attack example, we can also see that all the knowledge and information
needed to attack a system is also available to the system administrators. System administrators know topologies of their networks and trust relationships among hosts. They can
use VA tools to fnd known vulnerabilities. The graph-based approach can be viewed as
an organized way to integrate and present this known information. In the approach described in this dissertation, graphs used for modeling attack scenarios are referred to as
“exploitation graphs”.
It is important to describe the types of attack that can be modeled using the graphbased approach. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to categorize computer-
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based attacks. One rough categorization was proposed by Panko [57]. According to this
classifcation, four attack categories are identifed. These categories include physical access attacks, dialog attacks, social engineering and penetration attacks. Physical access
attacks are attacks that happened when an attacker has physical access to equipment, such
as network lines or host machines. Examples of this attack method include wiretapping,
vandalism, or the installation of malicious software via physical access. Dialog attacks are
attacks that happen during bi-directional message exchanges between two or more parties.
Examples of this attack method include eavesdropping of communications, impersonation
of one party in the communication, or intercepting and decrypting the communication
messages. Social engineering attacks refer to attacks that cause an authorized employee to
unwittingly give out information or take an action that violates the security policy of an organization or a system. An example of social engineering would be causing an employee
to allow access by an unauthorized person. Penetration attacks are attacks which happen when, for example, an attacker sends one or more messages/packets via a network to
probe or compromise a system. This attack method includes scanning of system, breaking
into a system, initiating a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, or the installation of malicious
software via a network.
These attack classifcations are shown in Figure 1.5, with examples of each category
listed. The attack steps shown in Figure 1.3 fall into two of the four categories, dialog
attacks and penetration attacks. Although attackers sometimes explore unknown vulnerabilities to attack systems, the techniques described in this dissertation are focused on
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the prevalent penetration attacks and dialog attacks where attacks are composed of multistaged events.

Figure 1.5 Types of attacks

1.3

Terms, Hypothesis and Research Problems
In this section, terms used in this dissertation are defned, research problems are iden-

tifed and discussed, and the hypotheses for this research are stated. The hypotheses will
be evaluated throughout this research.

1.3.1 Terms
Vulnerability: Refers to a condition, or the procedures affecting the operation of a
computer system, that makes it possible to carry out an operation that violates the explicit
or implicit security policy of the computer system [9].

15
Exploit: To take advantage of a vulnerability in a computer system to achieve some
information assurance objective [1] (verb). Also, any tool used by attackers to exploit a
known weakness to achieve some information assurance objective [1, 57] (noun).
Exploitation: Refers to an activity that takes advantage of one or more vulnerabilities
in a computer system to achieve some objective [39]. It can be used interchangeably with
the noun form of word “exploit”.
Exploitation graph: A directed/undirected graph that represents multi-staged attack
scenarios in a network environment by including information on vulnerabilities, network
topologies, system confgurations, and security policies.
It is important to point out the difference between an attack and an exploitation. Attack
refers to the act of trying to bypass security controls in a system. In many cases the term
attack is used as a synonym for exploitation, however, some claim that all vulnerability
exploitations are attacks but not all attacks exploit vulnerabilities [1]. It is also important
to note that an attack event does not necessarily mean that it will succeed. Sometimes “the
degree of success depends on the vulnerability of the system or activity and the effectiveness of existing countermeasures” [21].

1.3.2 Hypothesis
Based on the background information provided in the previous section, the hypothesis
for this research is the following.

16
An effective process can be defned through which known system vulnerability data,
system confgur ation data, and vulnerability scanner results can be correlated to create
an exploitation graph (e-graph) useful to the security engineer in understanding system
vulnerability status and in evaluating potential mitigation strategies. To handle the complexity problem of e-graphs, abstraction and generalization techniques can be used to
simplify these graphs in order to improve their succinctness while maintaining adequate
completeness.

1.3.3 Research Problems to Address
In order to test the validity of the suggested hypothesis, a set of research problems are
identifed belo w.
Is it possible to model complex attack scenarios based on known vulnerabilities and
system confgur ations in a network environment? Computer based attacks are complex
human behaviors with uncertainties and random choices, but they follow patterns. On the
defender side, the only way to study these patterns is by using known data. In the computer
security research community, currently there are mainly three approaches to learn attack
strategies. One approach is learning attack strategies from alert data generated by a variety
of security sensors. Alert correlation is one example of such a research area [12, 50]. A
second approach is to simulate and study attack behaviors using game theory [63]. Attacks
and defending mechanisms within this approach are modeled as moves, like those in a
chess game [63]. This approach is limited because expert opinions are needed to defne the

17
possibilities of transitions between different moves. The third approach is learning attack
strategies through known system vulnerabilities. This approach is sometimes referred to
as a “static analysis” method in the sense that defenders model attack scenarios before
the attacks really happen. We believe that such modeling of complex attack scenarios
is achievable because the modeling method uses knowledge similar to that of the real
attackers. From the viewpoint of an exploitation graph, the difference between a defender
and an attacker is that the attacker only needs to fnd one feasible path to fnish an attack,
while the defender needs to fnd all possible paths. The advantage of static modeling is
that a system administrator can take advantage of data provided by vulnerability scanners
used on their systems and combine with other known attributes of the network to provide
a more complete view of their vulnerability status. Usually vulnerability scanners treat
host vulnerabilities as isolated system states. In the work described by this dissertation,
they are viewed as correlated potential attack steps that can be exploited by attackers.
Alert correlation is limited by the observed alerts issued by security sensors, which may or
may not observe events related to all system vulnerabilities that can be exploited. While
approaches using static analysis and alert correlation complement each other, the work
described here mainly focuses on the static analysis approach and is aimed at modeling
complex attack scenarios.
How should one build an exploitation graph based on known vulnerabilities and system
confgur ations? There are different methods for graph-based attack modeling and the
modeling method used greatly affects the performance of the attack modeling process. In
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this dissertation, a detailed feasibility analysis of the graph-based network vulnerability
analysis is provided. Beyond that, we use a novel representation for system states that
is suitable for building exploitation graphs. The most important question to address is
how one can build a framework from which an engineer can perform a cause/consequence
analysis on multi-staged activities. The graphs are represented using open-source tools,
such as Graphviz [24].
How can one evaluate the performance of exploitation graphs? Currently there are
no commonly agreed upon standards to evaluate the performance of graph-based attack
modeling techniques. Although some methods, such as Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
for attacks are used to measure system security [55], most analyses are based on theoretical aspect of the algorithms. In this dissertation, some quantitative measures for testing
these algorithms are developed. One candidate metric is computational time required to
generate an exploitation graph for a mid-sized network. These algorithms are tested using
some network vulnerability scanners and network confguration data. Due to limitations in
trace back abilities within current network protocols, the graph-based modeling technique
mentioned in this dissertation is limited to local networks where network confgurations
and user activities can be recorded.
How can one manage the sizes of exploitation graphs? As may be seen from the
previous discussion, the sizes of e-graphs may be very large due to the complexity of
networked environments and the number of possible exploitations. Effective methods for
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reducing the sizes of e-graphs are needed in order to make the e-graph approach practical.
Useful attack scenario analysis should also be performed based on reduced e-graphs.

1.4

Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation to the feld of information assurance are briefy

outlined below.
1) A template was designed to represent vulnerability information related to operating
system, applications, user privileges and access ranges. Vulnerability data were represented using pre-conditions and post-conditions. Each entry in the vulnerability base was
referred to as a vulnerability graph (v-graph).
2) Techniques were developed to correlate individual v-graphs to create e-graphs that
are tailored to a network environment. Tradeoffs in defning nodes and edges within egraphs have been evaluated. Network topology information and security policies (e.g.,
fre wall rules) were encoded during the modeling process.
3) A set of experiments were designed to test the modeling approach in a cluster computing environment consisting of one server node and eight internal computing nodes.
Experimental results showed that the techniques can be used to evaluate vulnerability mitigation solutions, e.g., identifying critical vulnerabilities and evaluating fre wall policies.
Controlled experiments have been executed to test scalability issues for the same cluster
where each node has up to 100 vulnerabilities. The approach can be easily extended to
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model mid-sized network (e.g., with tens of computing nodes) with reasonable time and
memory complexity.
4) A detailed analysis of factors that affect the topology of e-graphs was conducted.
These factors include the number and type of exploitations, network topology, security
products deployed, and the defnition of initial states and goal states.
5) A detailed analysis of attack scenarios based on e-graphs was presented. Several
parameters, such as the number of branches and the number of attack paths were presented
to facilitate the analyses. A cost/beneft analysis and detection of vulnerabilities were also
presented based on resulting e-graphs.
6) In order to manage the size of resulting e-graphs, effcient graph-simplifcation
techniques were proposed based on host and exploitation similarity. Experimental results
showed that these techniques can not only reduce the sizes of e-graphs substantially, but
also preserve most information needed for useful attack scenario analysis.

1.5

Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II provides an

overview of current attack modeling techniques. Chapter III presents the underlying
principles of our approach. Chapter IV shows the experiments carried out in a highperformance cluster computing environment and the analysis on experimental results.
Chapter V describes abstraction techniques that can be applied on exploitation graphs.
Chapter VI shows the conclusion and plan for future work.

CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
During the past few decades, there have been various research efforts that relate to
building a healthier network environment. For example, in order to evaluate hosts for
known vulnerabilities, Vulnerability Assessment (VA) tools such as vulnerability scanners
are often used. In order to study and understand potential attacks, graph-based tools such
as attack trees or attack graphs are used. While these efforts may seem different, their
goals are similar - a better understanding of possible exploitations is benefcial in building
defensive mechanisms for a vulnerable network environment. This chapter discusses these
topics and compares different approaches.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, widely used VA tools are
introduced and discussed. Second, graph-based attack modeling techniques, such as the
attack tree, attack graph and other graph-based approaches are introduced and discussed.
Third, other attack modeling techniques are presented. Finally a conclusion is provided.

2.1

VA tools
To identify vulnerabilities in a network environment, one of the most prevalent ap-

proaches is to use host VA tools. Vulnerability scanners such as ISS Internet Scanner [32],
21
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CyberCop [13], STAT scanner [79], Nessus [16], and eEyes’s Retina [64], are typical examples of these tools. Similar to a virus scanner, a vulnerability scanner is a very useful
tool to help identify system vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. These vulnerability scanners are widely used, especially by system administrators, to help evaluate
a single host or hosts within networked environments.
Vulnerability scanners usually work well in identifying known vulnerabilities for sinR
, system administrators are able
gle hosts. For example, using ISS Internet Scanner 6.2.1°

to perform scheduled and selective probes on their networks. In order to organize reports
for scanned networks that are composed of many hosts, identifed vulnerabilities are categorized according to user accounts, hosts, services, or operating systems. By comparing
host confgurations against commonly used vulnerability datasets, such as the SANS top
20 vulnerability list [67], Common Vulnerability Exposures (CVE) [10], Bugtraq [5], or
R
advisories [6], suggestions are given for “patch-and-fx” of the vulnerable sysCERT°

tems. Figure 2.1 shows a sample host vulnerability report grouped by host IP addresses.
Associated with each IP address are the DNS name, name of the operating system, names
of vulnerabilities and corresponding severities.
Figure 2.2 is an example of CVE-2002-0958 in the CVE dataset. A brief description
of a PHP (a widely used script language for web applications) vulnerability is given, followed by sources of references. Following these references, modern VA tools can provide
useful suggestions to system administrators. These VA tools can also be augmented by
integrating automatic system/software repair functionalities.
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Figure 2.1 Sample host vulnerability report created by ISS Internet Scanner

CVE-2002-0958
Cross-site scripting vulnerability in browse.php for PHP(Reactor) 1.2.7 allows remote attackers to
execute script as other users via the go parameter in the comments section.
Reference: BUGTRAQ:20020606 [ARL02-A12] PHP(Reactor) Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
Reference: CONFIRM:http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?release_id=91877
Reference: XF:phpreactor-browse-xss(9280)
Reference: BID:4952

Figure 2.2 CVE entry example: CVE-2002-0958
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While these VA tools are effective in handling single host vulnerabilities, they cannot
be used to address the problem of modeling multi-stage exploitations. In a networked
environment, they scan all individual hosts, and then list the hosts’ vulnerabilities from a
network view. There is no in-depth analysis, such as how attacks might be implemented
using the vulnerabilities identifed on different hosts or relationships between the vulnerabilities. In addition, some scanners often produce huge vulnerability reports that are hard
to manage.
Several approaches have been proposed to better organize host vulnerabilities. For example, researchers at Harris Corporation proposed an approach called FuzzyFusion [20].
This proposed approach uses fuzzy logic to integrate vulnerability data and provides a
holistic view of the security posture for the entire network. This approach works by associating results from multiple network mapping and scanning tools into a single output to
improve vulnerability assessment coverage. Network analysis is also done by taking into
account specifc information, such as the severity of vulnerabilities or attack scenarios
[78].

2.2

Graph-Based Attack Modeling Techniques
In the past two decades, a variety of approaches for graph-based attack modeling

techniques have been proposed. However, there has been no consensus on any one single
name used to represent these approaches. Research topics such as Graph-based Intrusion
Detection System (GrIDS) [77], attack trees [68], network penetration tests or red teams
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[38, 41], attack graphs [36, 66, 72, 81, 82], collaborative attack modeling [80], multistage
attacks [9], attack plan tracking [22], multi-host confguration vulnerability checker [87],
and quantitative assessment of operational security [14] are related to the graph-based
approach we have developed to various extents.

2.2.1 Attack Tree Approach
The attack tree approach can be traced back to a research area called Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [7, 84]. FTA is a well-founded cross-disciplinary research area that involves
probability theory, probabilistic and statistical analysis, Boolean logic, and combinatorial
theory. It was mainly used for system risk assessment and system reliability analysis. In
this approach, a root event is used to represent the occurrence of component failures or
other events within a system. This root event is then recursively decomposed into low
level events to form a tree structure. Logical structures, such as AND or OR gates, are
used to represent the relationship between low level events. If all of the low level events
are needed in order for the top event to occur, these events are grouped under an AND gate.
If any of the low level events can trigger the top event to occur, these events are grouped
under an OR gate. Analyses on these fault trees can help identify causes that lead to system failures and evaluate the probability of these failures. It has been shown that by using
FTA, potential causes of system failure can be identifed during the system design phase.
This approach is extremely useful for safety-critical systems [7, 26, 84]. As an extension
of FTA, Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) was used specifcally to help identify haz-
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ardous faults that lead to software failure. In the area of computer security, SFTA has been
shown to be useful to model intrusions and develop requirements for intrusion detection
systems [27].
It was Schneier who frstly introduced the term “attack tree” using concepts in SFTA
[68]. In this approach, AND-OR tree structures are used to model attacks. Inside an attack
tree, nodes represent attack goals and sub goals. The root node represents the goal of
an attack and leaf nodes represent sub goals of the attack. Two special internal nodes
are used to show the relationships among their children nodes. OR nodes are used to
represent different ways to achieve the same goal, and AND nodes are used to represent
a combination to achieve the same goal. Figure 2.3 [68] is an attack tree example that
illustrates an attack scenario against a physical safe. In this example, “Open Safe” is one
of the OR nodes. The node “Eavesdrop” is the only AND node.

Figure 2.3 An attack tree by Schneier
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This example can be explained in the following way. In order to open a safe, the
attacker can pick the lock, learn the combination, cut open the safe, or install the safe
improperly. In order to learn about the combination, the attacker can either fnd written
combination or get the combination from an owner of the safe. In order to get the combination from an owner, the attacker can threaten, blackmail, eavesdrop conversations or
bribe the owner. In order to eavesdrop the conversation of safe owners, the attack needs to
listen to the conversation and get the owner to state the combination [68]. In this example,
we can see how AND and OR nodes are used to represent the relationship among the sub
goals with the same parent node. Although this simplifed attack tree cannot accommodate
all possible scenarios, it is a powerful tool to help study attacks.
Generally speaking, the power of the attack tree approach lies in several aspects. First
is the capability to examine mental models. Using this approach, security expects can
brainstorm and integrate their opinions into attack trees. These attack trees can be used in
situations whenever risks need to be estimated and evaluated. Second is the capability for
cost-beneft or probability analysis. By adding monetary values to nodes within an attack
tree, a security professional can estimate the cost of attacks, or the costs to defend their
systems. By assigning probabilities to different branches of an attack tree, system administrators can estimate the most vulnerable areas of their networks. Third is the capability
to model complex scenarios. As mentioned above, an attack tree can be used to combine
complicated mental models from security experts through the brainstorming process.
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The attack tree approach has been shown to be successful in analyzing real-world
attacks, such as attacks against Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [68]. PGP is a set of programs
used for secure communication based on the public/private key encryption scheme [68].
One interesting outcome of the cost-beneft analysis using an attack tree is that, the most
effcient way to attack against the PGP program may not be the breaking of encryption
algorithms. Instead there are simpler ways that cost much less, such as stealing the user’s
private key using a network sniffer [68].
The attack tree approach has also been used in defense experiments such as complicated penetration testing [38] and organized red team work [41]. These experiments are
designed specifcally to test the robustness of a system to defend against attacks. A special
group called a “red team” is usually used to model a well-resourced adversary. Another
special group called a “blue team” is responsible for the defensive mechanisms of the system. In these experiments, frst a hypothesis, such as “dynamic modifcation of defensive
structure improves system assurance” [38] or “sensitive data on the laptop is protected
from unauthorized access by an adversary with physical access” [41], is set. The work
performed by the red team and the blue team is either to support or to refute the hypothesis. Attack trees are used both by the red team and the blue team to plan and document the
steps taken by attackers. Once the hypothesis is tested, defensive measures are designed
and the system is improved [38, 41].
There are limitations with the attack tree approach. First, due to inherent limitations
in tree structures, it cannot model multiple attack attempts, time dependencies or access
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controls. Second, it cannot be used to model cycles of events. For example, in order to mislead IDSs, an attacker may attack the frst host, then connect to other intermediate hosts,
connect to the frst host again, and then attack other target hosts. This example is hard to
represent using attack trees. Third, the attack tree approach does not consider vulnerability data during the modeling process. These disadvantages are hard to overcome due to
the process used to build attack trees. Fourth, this approach often incurs the complexity
problem. In most real-world cases, in order to include all possible attack scenarios, attack
trees can become very large in size. This makes the generation and processing of attack
trees diffcult. This approach is more applicable for modeling high-level events instead of
system events because the amount of data required by high-level events is much less.

2.2.2 Attack Graph Approaches
In the area of computer security research, there is a long history of using graphs
to model network-based attacks/intrusions. Graph-based attack modeling appeared as a
distinctive research area in the mid-1980s. It became an active research area in the late
1990s, partly due to the increasing number of attacks/intrusions.
It has been shown that graph-based modeling techniques are useful for studying simulated attack scenarios, for analysis of network vulnerabilities, and building a defensive
mechanism around networks [11, 36, 38, 41, 50, 65, 66, 72, 81, 82, 87]. There are different
terms used to defne graphs in these approaches. In this dissertation, whenever appropriate,
the term “attack graph” is used as a generalized representation for these approaches.
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2.2.2.1 Attack Graph by Cunningham
One early graph-based approach was proposed by Cunningham at Carleton University, Canada in 1986 [11]. In this approach, non-negative edge-weighted graphs are used
to represent networks. Networks are composed of components, such as hosts in a network, services running on the hosts, or hardware used to connect the hosts. These components are interconnected by physical or logical connections, represented as edges inside
the graph. Each edge has a nonnegative strength that represents the effort required by an
attacker. The strength and effort attribute also refect the robustness of a network edge.
The attacker gets beneft by attacking network components. The purpose of an attacker
is to reduce the effort required, and to maximize the beneft obtained. The purpose of a
defender is to maximize the strength of the network or maximize the effort required by
attackers. By employing graph algorithms, this model can help address questions such as
1) How to attack a specifc network component with minimum effort or 2) How to defend
a network component with minimum cost. The frst question can be answered based on the
solution of the minimum-cut problem, which is the minimum total effort required to attack
components. The second question is answered based on the solution of the reinforcement
problem, which is fnding a way to increase the strength of edges with minimum cost so
that the network has strength above a specifc threshold [11].
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2.2.2.2 NetKuang
In an approach proposed by Zerkle and Levitt at the University of California, Davis
R
OS to fnd vulnerabilities
in 1996 [87], a system called NetKuang was used on Sun°

in system confguration that could be exploited by attackers. Similar to the attack tree
approach, attack goals were represented as nodes in graphs. One example of these attack
goals is “become user ID 0 at host 1”. These goals were expanded recursively to form a
graph. Then graph algorithms are applied and the attack graph was searched in order to
fnd possible paths that lead to the attack goals. In NetKuang, an effcient backward goalbased searching method was used to reduce the search space. NetKuang has been used to
fnd confguration vulnerability in networks of UNIX hosts [87].

2.2.2.3 GrIDS
A system called Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System (GrIDS) was developed
by Staniford-Chen et al. at the University of California, Davis in the mid 1990s [77].
The design goal of GrIDS was to build an IDS that can detect large-scale automated or
coordinated attacks on a computer network in near real time. In this approach, the GrIDS
system dynamically builds tree-like graphs to describe network activities. Data sources
for GrIDS are modules or sensors that monitor activity on hosts and networks. In GrIDS,
graphs represent causally connected sets of events inside networks. Nodes and edges
within graphs adopt straightforward meanings - nodes represent hosts or departments in an
organization, and edges represent network traffc between these hosts or departments. In
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this approach, graphs are built in a fe xible way. Rule sets are used to generically describe
how graphs are built, combined or adjusted according to data types to be modeled. Rule
sets are also used to report alerts when suspicious network events are discovered [77].
Figure 2.4 shows an example of how a worm spread in a network. The graph on the left
hand side shows the initial status of the network where the worm has infected department
A, B, C, D and E. After the worm propagates to other departments, GrIDS builds another
attack graph to represent all affected departments, as shown on the right hand side of
Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 An example of attack graphs in GrIDS

One of the interesting capabilities of the GrIDS approach is that it uses a hierarchical
reduction scheme for graph construction. This capability allows the system to scale up to
large networked environments. Figure 2.5 shows an example of how groups within three
departments are combined and how the size of an attack graph is reduced. In this example,
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group A and B belong to the same department and are represented as a single node in the
reduced graph. In this fgure, dashed lines represent department boundaries [77].

Figure 2.5 Attack graph reduction in GrIDS

The GrIDS system also uses a policy language for users to describe security policies.
After the graphs are built, they are compared against known patterns of intrusive or hostile
activities according to these policies. An alert or a warning is issued when some similarities are found. The implementation of a prototype has shown that GrIDS is successful in
detecting worm attacks [77].

2.2.2.4

Attack Graph by Swiler et al.

An attack graph approach was proposed by Swiler et al. at Sandia National Laboratories in the late 1990s [81, 82]. Inside the attack graphs, nodes represent possible attack
stages and edges represent changes of state caused by hostile behaviors. One distinctive
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feature of this approach is that edges are weighted by quantitative metrics, such as the
time to succeed for a specifc attack. Inputs for this approach include confguration fles,
attacker profles and attack templates. A confguration fle contains information on operating systems, network type, network topology, and router confguration. The confguration
fle represents the initial state of the network. An attacker profle contains information
about the assumed attackers’ capabilities, such as tools they can use or skill levels they
have. The attacker profle represents the initial capabilities of the attacker. An attack
template represents generic steps in known attacks. Each node in the attack template
represents system states such as user privilege level, machines used, vulnerabilities, or attacker’s capabilities. All nodes and edges are generated according to predefned templates,
with only the templates applicable to the environment instantiated [81, 82].
Figure 2.6 [82] shows an attack graph with the attack goal being the achieving of userlevel access on machine M. The attack graph shows two possible strategies that can be
used by attackers. One is through the “rlogin” process and the other is through physical
access. These two paths correspond to two attack templates that were instantiated in the
template database. A node circled with a dotted line (e.g. N4 and N5 ) means that the
attacker does not have physical access to M. Therefore, under current conditions, these
nodes will not be reachable from the initial state.
This approach was further expanded by applying graph algorithms to the generated attack graphs. For example, graph algorithms are proposed to fnd the near -optimal shortest
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paths, which are indications of the most exploitable components of the system confgura tion. A system prototype was implemented and some exploitations were shown [81, 82].
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Figure 2.6 An attack graph generation process used by Swiler et al.

2.2.2.5 Attack Graph and Model Checking
Due to the complexity of graphs generated by the above approaches, model checkers,
such as SMV/NuSMV, were used to automatically generate attack graphs for heterogeneous networks [36, 66, 72, 65]. The model checking technique is a formal approach used
to prove that a system satisfes its specifed properties [4, 56].
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Figure 2.7 [56] shows how a model checker works. In this fgure, the system requirements are called models and system properties are called specifcation. The model
checking tool accepts inputs from the model and the specifcation. A thorough check of
the specifcation against the state space of the model is then done. If the model satisfes its
specifcation, the answer “yes” is given. If not, a counter-example is given to describe why
the model does not satisfy the property. After the counter example is carefully studied, the
model can be corrected. The idea behind this approach is that, the more errors we fnd,
the more confdence we have in the system being checked. This formal technique is useful
in requirement analysis and bug-fnding for a variety of systems. As an integral part of
the model checking technique, Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is used to specify system
properties [4, 56].

Figure 2.7 The model checking technique
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When the model checking technique is applied to attack graphs, a network is modeled
as a fnite state machine, where state transitions represent atomic attacks. A security policy
is encoded using CTL and checked using model checkers. A counterexample - a violation
of the security policy - is used to show a single attack in the network. If the security policy
fails, an attack graph is generated to show all counter examples, which are indications of
possible attack paths. This made it possible for analysts to understand all possible attack
scenarios [36, 66, 72].
We can use an example to show how this approach works. Suppose we use the model
checker NuSMV and have the network confguration as shown in Figure 2.8. NuSMV is
an open-source symbolic model checker developed jointly by researchers from Trentino
Cultural Institute, Italy, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Genova and University
of Trento [53].

Figure 2.8 An network example for attack modeling
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In Figure 2.8, the adversary/attacker has Internet connection to a local network. The
local network has two hosts, ip1 and ip2 . A router and a fre wall separate the hosts from the
Internet. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is used to monitor the network traffc. Two
services, ftp and ssh, are running on ip1 . Two services, database and ftp, are running on
ip2 . Four attacks can be used against one of the two hosts, namely, 0) sshd buffer overfo w,
1) ftp .rhosts, 2) remote login, and 3) local buffer overfo w. These four attacks can either
be detectable or stealthy. If the attack is detectable, then the IDS will be able to capture it.
If the attack is stealthy, the IDS is likely to miss it [36, 72].
Suppose a CTL formula is used to defne a safety property p of the network shown in
Figure 2.8.
p = AG(network.adversary.privilege[2] < network.priv.root) [36, 72]
This CTL formula can be explained as follows: “it is always true that in any state, the
user privilege level of the adversary on the second host should be less than that of the root
user”. Clearly this is a policy that should always hold inside a network. This property p is
checked against a fnite state machine model M using a model checker, such as NuSMV.
If M satisfes p, NuSMV reports “true”. If M does not satisfy p, NuSMV generates a
counter example, which can be viewed as one path in the attack graph. When all counter
examples are generated, a complete attack graph is formed. This attack graph is shown in
Figure 2.9.
In Figure 2.9, states in the state fnite model include information about attacks used by
attackers (denoted by a number from 0 to 3), whether the attack is stealthy or detectable
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(denoted either by S or D), and host connections (denoted by source and target host numbers: 0 is the attacker’s machine, 1 and 2 are hosts within the network). Transitions in
this model are nondeterministic, which means, if the current network state satisfes all
pre-conditions of more than one attack rule, the attacker will randomly choose one attack.
States encoded with dotted lines show a possible attack path which will help the attacker
gain root privilege on host 2 [36, 72].

Figure 2.9 An attack graph by Jha et al.

The power of model checkers lies in the fact that, by taking advantage of current
progress in model checking techniques, the graph generation process can be automated.
This is an apparent advance compared with other attack graph approaches. However, in
order to get attack graphs that include all possible attack scenarios, the attacks graphs must
be complete. This will make the generation process computationally expensive. In order to
produce a concise representation of the attack graph, the ordered Binary Decision Diagram
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(BDD), a technique that helps to reduce the complexity of model checking algorithms, is
used [36, 72].
In order to reduce the complexity of attack graphs, some restrictions are imposed on
the graph-generation process. For example, Ammann et al. proposed a solution that is
based on the assumption of monotonicity property of exploitations. This property means,
“the pre-condition of a given exploit is never invalidated by the successful application
of another exploit” [3]. Based on this assumption, attack graphs can be generated based
on a goal-based search and the computational cost can be greatly reduced [3]. However,
whether this assumption can be extended in most attack cases is still a research question. Today, the computational cost related graph-based attack modeling remains a diffcult
problem.

2.2.2.6 Exploit Dependency Graph by Noel et al.
One of the recent attack-modeling approaches is the work by Noel et al. at George
Mason University [34, 51, 52]. A Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) tool is used
to perform impact analysis of various network confgurations on overall network security.
Figure 2.10 shows the architecture of the TVA tool. There are three major components in
this architecture. The frst part is a database composed of descriptions of vulnerabilities.
The second part is a description of a network in which information is discovered using
open-source tools such as Nessus [16]. The third part is a specifcation of an attack scenario, which includes information about initial conditions, attack target and confguration
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changes. This tool can be used to generate exploit dependency graphs that represent all
attack paths related to specifc attack goals [34]. It should be noted that these graphs are
generated based on the monotonicity assumption proposed by Ammann et al [3].

Figure 2.10 Architecture of the topological vulnerability analysis (TVA) tool

Based on the analysis of resulting exploit dependency graphs, a set of hardening measures can be computed in order to guarantee the safety of the network of interest. These
hardening measures are assignments of initial network confgurations that once satisfed,
the corresponding attack paths cannot be followed by a potential attacker. Furthermore, by
assigning costs to individual hardening measures, an optimum solution can be computed
[34, 52]. This approach is further extended by an effort to reduce the complexity of the
exploit dependency graphs. A technique called hierarchical aggregation can be used by
users (e.g., system administrators) to abstract graphs interactively. This technique is based
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on a set of pre-defned aggregation rules, which corresponds to different network elements
at different levels of abstraction [51].
Our work differs from previous research in several aspects. First, we use a template to
facilitate the defnition of single vulnerabilities, as will be shown in Chapter III. Second,
we employ graph-based techniques within the domain of high-performance computing
(HPC), as will be shown in Chapter IV. Third, we develop a novel graph-abstraction
technique and show its effectiveness in the HPC environment, as will be shown in Chapter
V.

2.2.2.7 Attack Modeling Using Petri Net
Other graph structures such as Petri nets have also been used to model attacks [14, 49,
80]. The Petri net was introduced by C. A. Petri in the early 1960s. It is both a graphical and a mathematical tool to describe distributed systems and notions of concurrency,
non-determinism, communication and synchronization. It was mainly used for communication protocols, performance evaluation and fault-tolerant systems. It was also used for
concurrent and parallel systems modeling and analysis [27, 88].
During the past decade, there were a variety of research efforts using Petri nets for
attack modeling. For example, McDermott used a graph model called an attack net for
attack modeling during the process of penetration testing [49]. An attack net is a Petri
net with “a set of places representing interesting (e.g. control or knowledge of) states or
modes of the security relevant entities of the system of interest” [49]. An attack net also
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has “a set of transitions that represent input events, commands, or data that cause one
or more security relevant entities to change state” [49]. These places and transitions are
interconnected through directed arcs. In addition, an attack net includes a set of tokens that
can move from place to place through arcs to indicate progress of an attack. A place with
a token indicates the attacker has control of the corresponding entity. Tokens from several
places may be merged at transitions and tokens leaving transitions may be duplicated to
several places [27, 49]. The example shown in Figure 2.11 uses attack nets to model a
brute-force password guessing attack. This example is a variant of the example used by
Steffan and Schumacher in [80].

Read access to
/etc/passwd

Knowledge of password

Knowledge of password

Brute-force
Brute-force password
guessing

Brute-force password
Brute-force
guessing

Account with
weak password

(a) Attack net before token move

Read access to
/etc/passwd

Account with
weak password

(b) Attack net after token move

Figure 2.11 An attack net example

In Figure 2.11, place “Knowledge of password” corresponds to the goal of the attack.
Places “Read access to /etc/passwd” and “Account with weak password” represent two
prerequisites for the goal. Transition “Brute-force password guessing” represents the action taken by the attacker. A place with a black dot inside indicates the token is held by the
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current place. Figure 2.11(a) shows an attack net when two tokens are held at two places,
“Read access to /etc/passwd” and “Account with weak password”. Figure 2.11(b) shows
an attack net where tokens are moved to one place “Knowledge of password”, indicating
the attack was performed successfully by the attacker.
A similar approach was proposed by Dacier et al. [14] at the Laboratory for Analysis and Architecture of Systems, National Center for Scientifc Research (LAAS-CNRS),
France. The authors proposed a graph-based model called “privilege graph” where the
nodes represent a set of privileges owned by a user or a set of users, and edges represent
probabilities for a user to extend his/her privilege contained in another node. Similar to
Cunningham’s approach [11], two quantifcation variables, “effort” and “time” are used
to represent cost paid by attackers. The authors claimed that these variables are suffcient
to characterize the potential intrusion process. After the privilege graphs are built, they
are transformed into a stochastic Petri net. This approach differs from other approaches
in that, a Markov model was used on the Petri net to build a “state graph” that shows all
possible probing sequences of an attacker. As a well-founded area, Markov models were
widely used for dependability evaluations [14]. By using Markov models, this approach
includes more semantic information that is meaningful for network exploitation modeling.
A variant of the Petri net, Colored Petri Net (CPN), is also used to model complex attack scenarios [27]. In this approach, tokens are marked with different colors. These colors
can be viewed as data types or data structures that contain placeholders for the objects of
an attack, such as source/destination host names or source/destination port numbers [27].
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It seems that the expressivity of the Petri net is almost the same as that of predicate
logic, although the latter approach might be more subjective. For example, the attack
example in Figure 2.11 can be translated using predicate logic. The meanings of predicates
are self-explanatory. Place “Read access to /etc/passwd” can be expressed as a predicate
“can-read (Attacker, fle /etc/passwd)”. Transitions can be expressed using rules such as
has-weak-password (User, password) ) can-guess-password (Attacker, User) [80].
The Petri net approach has been shown to be useful in collaborative attack modeling
where attacks are composed of chains of activities [80]. As an alternative to the attack tree
approach, it is also useful in penetration testing [49]. Today, more investigation still needs
to be done on the scalability, expressivity and succinctness issues of using Petri nets for
attack modeling.

2.2.3 A Comparison of Attack Trees and Attack Graphs
Based on the above discussion, it should be noted that the expressive power of the
attack tree and attack graph approaches are similar. An attack graph can be converted to
a forest of attack trees with no “AND” nodes. For example, one way of representing the
attack graph shown in Figure 2.9 is using a forest of attack trees, as shown in Figure 2.12.
There are some differences between the two approaches. The attack tree approach
seems to need more redundant nodes to represent the same attack scenarios. The attack
graph approach cannot represent the “and” relationships in attack trees. Based on CTL, the
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attack graph approach seems to be more powerful. It is specifcally tailored to statements
and reasoning that involve the notion of order in time [4].

Figure 2.12 A forest of attack trees

Among all the attack graph approaches, Petri nets have distinctive features. Nodes
within Petri nets have similar meanings as those in attack trees, and transitions are comparable to intermediate nodes within attack trees [49, 80]. Cyclic Petri nets can be used
to model attacks with cycles. An example of this type of attack is when an attacker jumps
back and forth between several hosts within a network using the same strategy in order to
trick an IDS.
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2.3

Other Attack Modeling Techniques

2.3.1 Attack Language
There are other active research efforts ongoing in attack modeling. Templeton and
Levitt [83] proposed a requires/provides model to represent computer attacks. Rather than
viewing an attack as a chain of events as in the attack graph approach, the requires/provides
model views attacks as “a set of capabilities that provide support for abstract attack concepts that in turn provide new capabilities to support other concepts” [83]. In this model,
capabilities are defned as necessary information or states needed for an attack to happen. Concepts are defned as abstract attack tasks or subtasks. For example, the concept
syn food can be used to indicate a generic SYN food Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In
order for this attack to be effective, a set of capabilities, such as a network connection
from the attacker’s host to the target host and the running of TCP/IP services, are needed.
Central to this approach is an attack specifcation language, JIGSAW, which provides a set
of tools and specifcations to describe attacks in terms of concepts and capabilities. Using
the requires/provides model, attacks can be abstracted and generic vulnerabilities can be
produced [83].
Cheung et al. at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) proposed a language, Correlated
Attack Modeling Language (CAML), to model multistep attack scenarios [9]. In CAML,
modules are used to model steps during an attack. Modules can be linked together to
represent attacks consisting of multiple steps. Along with CAML is a library of predicates,
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which serve as vocabularies to describe the properties of system states and events related
to attacks. CAML predicate categories are shown in Table 2.1.
Design goals of the CAML language include: extensible to represent new attacks and
sensors, expressive to cover an abundant range of attacks, unambiguous in representation,
and fe xible to facilitate event reduction in order to identify high-level events from a large
volume of low-level events. The implementation of CAML has been used in a prototype
to identify attack scenarios in near real time [9].

Table 2.1 CAML predicate categories
Category
Temporal
Hosts
Services
Files
Users
Know

Description
Example
Relationships between two IsBefore(r1, r2) indicates time interval r1
time intervals
ends strictly before the start of time interval r2
Properties or states of a host
SuspiciousHost inidcates suspicious activity originated from a specifed host
have been observed
Properties or states of an oper- HasService indicates a specifed host
ating system or an application provides a specifed service
instance
Relationships and properties HasFile indicates a specifed host has a
pertaining to fles
fle with a specifed name
Relationships and properties SwitchUser indicates a specifed user at
pertaining to users
a specifed host can “become” another
specifed user at another specifed host
Specifying the predicate in- One may indicate a specifed user knows
stances known by a particular the password of another specifed user at
user
a specifc host
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Another language-based attack modeling approach was proposed by Ramakrishnan
and Sekar [62]. Similar to the CAML language, a prolog-like language is used to represent
abstract and accurate models of behaviors within an operating system (e.g., UNIX). This
language seems to have more features than CAML (e.g. object-oriented capabilities).
Similar to modules used in the CAML language, a set of concurrent processes are used
to model an operating system. These processes are viewed as objects that communicate
with each other. Model checkers could be applied to automatically detect vulnerabilities
existing in the system being modeled. This approach has been shown to be useful in
exposing vulnerabilities in a simplifed v ersion of UNIX [62].
The advantages of using an attack-modeling language are obvious. Using rigorous
specifcations like attack languages, system security features can be formally verifed and
validated. In addition, a generic attack modeling language is more adapted to describe
various attack situations than any other approach. However, it has been shown that the
language-based attack modeling approach is limited both by its scalability property and its
complexity property [62].

2.3.2 Alert Correlation
Alert and alarm correlation [35] have been active research areas in the feld of network
and telecommunication for some time. The objective of alarm correlation is “correlating
multiple network alarms” to improve “telecommunication network surveillance and fault
management” [35]. When applied to the feld of computer security, alert correlation mainly
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refers to intrusion alert correlation [12, 23, 50]. This area is active because today, Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) face several challenges. First is the number of alerts produced.
The number of these alerts is often too large to be handled effciently . Second is the false
positive rate. Some IDSs produced too many false alerts (false positives) and essentially
made these systems unusable. Third is the false negative rate. Sometimes IDSs miss
important intrusions. This is especially true when IDSs encounter unknown intrusions or
intrusions that are designed to be elusive [61].
The alert correlation technique attempts to address challenges faced by IDSs today.
However, there is no common agreement on how alert correlation technique should be
defned. One defnition is “intrusion alert correlation refers to the interpretation, combination, and analysis of intrusion alerts, together with information external to the intrusion
detection system, with the purpose of intrusion alert refnement and intrusion scenario
building” [23]. This technique works by constructing attack scenarios from alerts generated by multiple sensors to facilitate intrusion analysis [12, 23, 50]. Several approaches
have been proposed. Generally speaking, these approaches can be categorized into three
classes [50]. The frst approach correlates alerts according to the similarities between
alerts [76]. For example, alerts with the same source and destination IP addresses can be
grouped together to reduce the number of alerts. The second approach correlates alerts
according to attack scenarios specifed by human users or learned from training datasets
[12]. This approach works well for known attack scenarios. The third approach correlates
alerts based on the pre-conditions and consequences of attacks. Alerts are correlated when
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the pre-conditions of some later alerts are (partially) satisfed by consequences of the earlier alerts. This approach has the potential to fnd casual relationships among alerts. Its
detection rate is also higher for unknown attacks than other approaches [50, 83].
It should be noted that alert correlation is a parallel research area to the graph-based
modeling approach. As pointed out by Ning et al. in [50], the difference between the two
approaches is the data source used to model attacks. Alert correlation makes use of alert
data, and focuses on what “has happened” according to data reported by IDSs. Graphbased attack modeling makes use of network confguration and vulnerability data, with
the focus on what “may happen” inside networked environments. These two approaches
can beneft each other when used together in attack scenario analysis.

2.3.3 Game Theory
Computer based attacks are complex human behaviors with uncertainties and random
choices, but they follow patterns. The competition between the attacker and the defender is
similar to two parties playing a game. This observation stimulated the research of applying
game theory into attack modeling [2, 25, 26, 63]. Game theory was founded by mathematician John von Neumann in 1928. Game theory is a well-founded cross-disciplinary
area that involves mathematics, economics and the other social and behavioral sciences. It
has been used to study decision making in different confict situations [48].
In the game theory approach, attacking and defending mechanisms are modeled as
moves and counter moves, like those in a chess game [63]. In this approach, usually a
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game tree or a threat tree is built to model possible moves of attackers and defenders. Two
basic techniques are needed for this approach: searching and evaluation. The searching
technique involves “which moves to consider”, and “returns the move it considers best at
the end of searching” [26]. Evaluation involves the defnition of a function to report “how
good a position looks to the player” [26]. During the searching through the game/threat
tree, the moves are judged by the evaluation function. This approach can help defenders
choose their best reactions during the process of an attack.
The game-theory approach has been used to model complex attack behaviors and evaluate the performance of IDSs [2]. However, there are some diffculties with this approach
due to the difference between computer-based attacks and other games. One diffculty
is that there are limited examples to use in order to tune the evaluation function. Other
diffculties involve the complexity of attackers’ and defenders’ behaviors. For example,
attackers and defenders can make multiple simultaneous moves, attackers have no time
control constraints, attackers may have different end goals from experimental settings,
and resources used by attackers may change over time [25]. These scenarios are diffcult
to model using the current approaches.

2.3.4 Honeypot
In order to capture more attack scenarios in real systems, researchers are devising
innovative techniques. The honeypot [75] is one such technique. A honeypot is a “security
resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” [75]. It works by
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setting up an unsecured computer environment, and enticing the attackers to attack the
system. The attacks can either be studied by researchers (as those in a research honeypot)
or be diverted in order to protect the production system (as those in a production honeypot)
[28, 75].
Honeypots are categorized into three types according to the interaction level for users
and attackers: low-interaction, medium-interaction, and high-interaction. It mainly depends on the users to decide which type of honeypots fts them best. Tradeoffs of the three
types are listed in Table 2.2. In this table, the frst category to compare is the installation
and confguration. It defnes the time and effort needed to install and confgure a working
honeypot. The second category is the deployment and maintenance. It defnes the time
and effort needed after the installation and confguration of honeypots. The third category
is information gathering. It defnes the amount of data that can be gathered from a working honeypot. The fourth category is the level of risk. It defnes the risks introduced by
installing a honeypot [75]. The greater the levels of interaction, the more functionality provide to the attacker, the more risks will be in the honeypot. Honeynet [28] is an example
of a set of high-interaction honeypots.
The honeypot is a useful approach for attack behavior gathering and analysis. Today
there are working honeypots in the community including BackOffcer Friendly (BOF),
Specter, Honeyd, Homemade, Mantrap, and Honeynets [75]. These working systems provide security professionals with valuable insights into real-world attacks.
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Table 2.2 Tradeoffs of honeypot levels of interaction
Level of
Interaction
Low
Medium
High

2.4

Work to Install
and Confgur e
Easy
Involved
Diffcult

Work to Deploy Information
and Maintain
Gathering
Easy
Limited
Involved
Variable
Diffcult
Extensive

Level of
Risk
Low
Medium
High

Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown how VA tools work and described various approaches

used for attack modeling. Today, VA tools such as vulnerability scanners play an important
role in providing system administrators with evaluation of a single host or hosts within
networked environments. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, these VA tools
cannot be used to address the problem of modeling multi-stage exploitations. There is no
in-depth analysis on how attacks might be implemented using the vulnerabilities identifed.
The amount of data generated by VA tools is sometimes too large to be analyzed effciently .
There have been various attack-modeling approaches proposed during the past two
decades. Each has specifc advantages and disadvantages. The attack tree approach is
simple and easy to understand, but it is hard to model complex attack scenarios due to
the limitation of tree structures. The attack graph is more fe xible, but is more complex.
There is no agreement on which graph structure is better, how meanings of nodes and
edges should be defned in the graphs, and which graph algorithm can be used to address
real-world problems. Using an attack language seems promising due to its power of ex-
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pressivity, but it suffers from a complexity problem. There are also some novel approaches
such as honeypots, alert correlation, and game theory used in attack modeling. Despite all
approaches mentioned in this chapter, modeling network-based exploitations remains a
diffcult problem and is f ar from solved.
In order to integrate attack modeling and VA techniques, research is needed in both
areas. In our research, the basic problem we wish to address is to explore a more effcient
modeling technique. A more detailed discussion of our approach is given in the next
chapter.

CHAPTER III
BUILDING EXPLOITATION GRAPHS: TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW
3.1 Problem Description
Current commercial vulnerability assessment (VA) tools are effective at providing system administrators with information regarding vulnerability information on hosts. However, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of how these vulnerabilities may be chained
together in complex attacking scenarios, other techniques are needed. Graph-based attack
modeling is one such technique. It refers to methods used to formally model attack scenarios based on information gathered from different sources. Attack modeling has been used
in areas such as vulnerability assessment, red team penetration testing [38], and intrusion
alert correlation [12, 50].
Many attack modeling approaches have been proposed during the past few years, as
discussed in Chapter II. Although these approaches are useful in representing hypothesized attack scenarios, they introduce several challenges.
First, these approaches must address various levels of information granularity in their
models. This is because attackers not only take advantage of vulnerabilities to attack a
system, they also make use of available information at different granularities (e.g., network topology, trust relationships between hosts, detailed system confguration informa56
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tion, software and hardware usage). Building such heterogeneous information into one
graph-based model is a challenging task. Second, an effective graph structure is needed
to accommodate information related to attack scenarios. There are several options one
can choose from when representing attack scenarios. For example, nodes inside graphs
can represent vulnerabilities, alert information, changes of important system fles, or user
privileges. Edges can represent exploits used during different stages of an attack, intrusions that triggered alerts, methods used to change system fles, or operations used to
elevate user privileges. The graph structure used in modeling greatly affects the graph
building process and the techniques used to analyze attack scenarios. Third, an effective
graph abstraction technique is needed in order to simplify the resulting graphs. The graphs
should contain useful information to system administrators while remaining compact. No
known current methods meet all these objectives.
This dissertation describes research that focuses on addressing all three of these objectives. A basic assumption of this research is that most system compromises take advantage of system vulnerabilities. In this approach, known system vulnerability data, system
confguration data, and vulnerability scanner results are combined in a systematic way to
create an exploitation graph (e-graph) representing attack scenarios. This modeling process consists of three primary steps. The frst step is the creation of a knowledge base of
known system vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are represented using pre-conditions
and post-conditions. To address granularity issues associated with vulnerability information, we focus on a certain information level in which vulnerabilities can be detected
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using vulnerability scanners. We then use a template to represent pre-conditions and postconditions and encode vulnerabilities using a pre-defned set of attributes. These data
entries are constructed to show pre-conditions for a single vulnerability as well as postconditions that occur after exploitation of a single vulnerability [44, 45]. The second step
in our approach involves instantiating generic vulnerabilities into host-specifc exploitations (by considering vulnerability scanner data), and associating multiple exploitations
with system administrator data (that defne the overall confguration of the system) to create a system-specifc e-graph [46, 45]. The third step of this process involves the abstraction techniques that can be used to simplify exploitation graphs. We propose an abstraction
technique based on host connection similarity and exploitation similarity [46], which will
be discussed in Chapter V. We then apply this technique to a high-performance cluster computing environment to show that it facilitates a compact representation of attack
scenarios and provides in-depth vulnerability assessments. For example, analysis of an
exploitation graph can help answer the following questions among others.
• What is the minimum set of vulnerabilities that could be removed to prevent a specifc attack?
• How will the strategies of the attacker change after specifc vulnerabilities are removed in a networked environment?
• What attack strategies are likely to change if the network topology is changed?
Answers to these questions are useful in designing defensive mechanisms and in performing a return on investment (ROI) analysis.
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3.2

Formal Representation of Network Exploitations
In this section, a formal representation of the network-exploitation problem is given.

Suppose there is a set E of exploitations, which are derived from vulnerabilities discovered
using vulnerability scanners. The number of exploitations is generally larger than the
number of vulnerabilities because one vulnerability may lead to multiple exploitations.
There is a set C of system confguration information specifcs, such as host connectivity,
open ports, versions of operating systems and software. The term states (or attributes) is
used to denote the set C because it describes the status of system confgurations before and
after exploitations occur. Each ei 2 E corresponds to a certain exploitation of a specifc
vulnerability. It might not be the case that each exploitation makes use of vulnerabilities,
for example, the attacker may use brute-force tools to crack user passwords. The current
model, however, only represents attacks that exploit system vulnerabilities. This is based
on the assumption that most compromises conducted by remote attackers take advantage
of system vulnerabilities.
For each ei 2 E, pre(ei ) and post(ei ) denote the set of pre-conditions and the set of
post-conditions of ei . It is clear that pre(ei ) µ C and post(ei ) µ C. For any c 2 C, c
is satisfed when the value of c evaluates to true. This could happen when the value of
c is satisfed before the attack (e.g., versions of OS’s, software, or other confgurations)
or after the attack (because exploitations change the confguration of the target system).
From this viewpoint, given an attacker with a set of initial states, an attack is a series of
exploitations continued until some specifc post-conditions are satisfed. There are two
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special sets, INIT and GOAL. INIT is a set of initially satisfed system states and GOAL is
the goal of satisfed system states after e xploitations.
Using the symbols described above, an attack is formally defned as a series of exploitations of vulnerabilities. To facilitate the representation, e0 is used to denote the initial
state and ef to denote the fnal state of an attack. These two states are not actually part of
the exploitations, so pre(e0 ) = post(e0 ) = pre(e1 ) and post(en ) = pre(ef ) = post(ef ).
For simplicity, suppose there are only one initial state and one fnal state. Intermediate
states during the process of an attack are denoted as ei for 1 · i · n. A series of exploitations is formally defned as a chain of states e0 , e1 , ..., ei , ..., en , ef where
1) for each c 2 pre(e1 ), c 2 IN IT ;
2) GOAL 2 post(en );
3) if i 6= j, then ei 6= ej ;
4) for each c 2 pre(ei ), c 2 [ij−=11 post(ej ) [ IN IT ;
5) post(ei−1 ) \ pre(ei ) 6= Á for 2 · i · n; and
6) if c0 is satisfed for 8c0 2 pre(ei ), then for any c 2 post(ei ), c is satisfed for
1 · i · n.
This defnition needs further explanation. The frst rule states that all pre-conditions
of the initial stage are satisfed before any exploitation. The second rule states that the
attacker’s goal is a post-condition of the last exploitation in a series. The third rule states
that no exploitation on the same vulnerability is repeated during the attack process (this assumption may not always hold in real attacks, since some attackers purposely perform the
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same exploitation in order to mislead intrusion detection systems). This rule is essentially
based on the monotonicity assumption proposed by Ammann et al. [3] The fourth rule
states that, for each exploitation to appear in a series of exploitations, the pre-conditions
must be satisfed. In other words, it should appear either in the set of initially satisfed
states (set IN IT in our defnition) or in the set of post-conditions of previously exploited
vulnerabilities (set [ij−=11 post(ej )). The ffth rule states that each previous exploitation
(partially) prepares for the next exploitation. The sixth rule states that for a specifc exploitation, if all pre-conditions are satisfed, then all post-conditions will be satisfed as
well.
Given an initial state and a fnal state, an e-graph EG = (E, G) is constructed by
combining all series of exploitations in a single graph. No two series of exploitations are
exactly the same in order to guarantee minimal property of the graph. The set E is a set of
exploitations. Set G is a set of edges, which corresponds the system states that have been
changed due to exploitations. We have G µ C and |G| < |C|. In terms of our modeling
process, the value of |G| is basically proportional to the value of |C|. An e-graph then has
the following properties.
1) EG is a directed acyclic graph (DAG);
2) If ei and ej are two consecutive exploitations in at least one series of exploitations,
then there is an edge from ei to ej . Each edge is represented as (ei , ej ) 2 G.
3) Each path from INIT to GOAL in EG is a series of exploitations.
4) There are no duplicate paths in EG.
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3.3

Implementation Techniques
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the techniques used for creating exploitation graphs

specifc to a network system. Vulnerability data (e.g., CVE data) are stored in a vulnerability knowledge base, in which each entry is represented using pre-conditions and
post-conditions. By correlating this data with vulnerability data discovered using network
scanners (e.g., STAT scanner [79]), along with system specifc information (e.g., host connectivity, open ports, security products), exploitations graphs can be generated. The data
can also be simplifed and reduced graphs can be generated using the simplifcation module. Two-way conversion between simplifed and original e-graphs can also be performed
to facilitate useful security analyses. The graphs may be drawn using an open-source
software, such as Graphviz [24].
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Module
E-Graphs
E-Graphs

Vulnerability
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System Information
Gathering Tool

E-Graphs
E-Graphs

Graph-Simplification
Graph-Simplification
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Simplified E-Graphs
E-Graphs

Simplified E-Graphs
E-Graphs

Graph-Drawing
-Drawing
Graph
Module

Figure 3.1 Technique overview of the e-graph approach

A sketchy graph-generation process can also be illustrated as follows. More details
about each step will be introduced in the following sections.
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Step 1. Creating a knowledge base of vulnerability graphs (v-graphs) from known
system vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities (CVE data from Mitre Corp. was used in
this work) are represented using pre-conditions and post-conditions. Vulnerability graphs
(v-graphs) show pre-conditions for a single vulnerability as well as post-conditions that
occur after exploitation of a single vulnerability.
Step 2. Instantiating v-graphs with specifc exploitations. This step is necessary because one single vulnerability may lead to several exploitations.
Step 3. Instantiating exploitations with specifc host information. This step is necessary because one single exploitation may be performed on multiple hosts.
Step 4. Associating multiple exploitations with system administrator data and with
vulnerability scanner data to create a system specifc e-graph.
Step 5. Applying graph algorithms to model potential defensive strategies. This step is
necessary because each e-graph is specifc to a problem domain (e.g., prioritizing the removal of vulnerabilities). Graph algorithms should be chosen according to this pre-defned
domain. Tradeoffs are usually needed in this step due to the incurred computational cost
in fnding optimal solutions.
Step 6. Applying graph-simplifcation techniques (optional).
Step 7. Presenting resulting e-graphs.
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3.4

Construction of a Vulnerability Base
In our work, the frst step is the creation of a vulnerability base. This knowledge base

serves as a searchable data source to facilitate attack scenario construction and representation. Each vulnerability has a data entry in the vulnerability base and its pre-conditions
and post-conditions are listed using a set of pre-defned attrib utes.
For the construction of our vulnerability base, we chose to use the CVE from the
MITRE Corporation due to its widespread acceptance. It should be noted that the CVE
is not the only possible source of vulnerability information. Others include the SANS
top 20 vulnerability list [67], Bugtraq entries [5], CERT advisories [6], Secunia [71], and
vulnerability information from vendors of software/hardware products.
Figure 3.2 is an example of pre-conditions and post-conditions developed for a CVE
entry. This example shows CAN-2002-0013, a vulnerability of SNMPv1 that allows remote attackers either to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or to get root level access on
the target host [10]. A simplifed representation of this vulnerability indicates that there
are three pre-conditions necessary to make the vulnerability exploitable: the attacker must
have remote access to the target host, the version of ucd-snmp (a particular SNMP application running on Linux hosts) must be less than 4.2.2, and ucd-snmp must be running.
The two post-conditions show that the attacker can either cause a DoS or gain root level
access on the target host.
It should be noted that fnding pre-conditions and post-conditions for vulnerabilities is
one of several approaches possible to combine single vulnerabilities into graphs to facil-
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itate representation of attack scenarios. This process requires substantial effort and may
be error-prone. For example, additional pre-conditions could be added to the example
in Figure 3.2, such as “Target host is running a Linux/UNIX operating system”. Some
pre-conditions can also be split into several others. For example, the node “Version of
ucd-snmp is less than 4.2.2” can be split into two nodes “ucd-snmp is installed on target
host” and “Version of vulnerable software is less than 4.2.2”. In the following section,
we partially address this issue and use a template for pre-conditions and post-conditions
to facilitate the defnition of v-graphs.

Remote Access

ucd-snmp is running

Version of ucd-snmp is less than 4.2.2

CAN-2002-0013

Denial of Service

Root Level Access

Figure 3.2 A vulnerability example: CAN-2002-0013

3.4.1 Data Source
The goals of the CVE project included creating standardized names for computer
vulnerabilities and security exposures and making it easier to share data across separate
vulnerability databases and security tools [10]. In an effort to organize CVE data entries,
researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) placed vulnera-
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bility data into a “metabase” called ICAT [30]. The ICAT metabase is a “searchable index
leading one to vulnerability resources and patch information” [30]. ICAT has been widely
used by system administrators because it facilitates the searching, organizing and studying
of known vulnerabilities. In our work, we use ICAT as a major source for the construction
of v-graphs because it assists the acquiring of detailed vulnerability information, as well
as the defnition of pre-conditions and post-conditions of vulnerabilities.

3.4.2 Template for Pre-conditions and Post-conditions
In our work we use a template to facilitate the defnition of vulnerabilities, as shown
in Table 3.1. The table contains f ve columns. The frst column indicates whether the (sub)
category is a pre-condition or a post-condition. The second column shows categories and
sub-categories. The third column shows the attribute name for the corresponding (sub)
category. These attributes will be represented using v-graphs. Column four provides the
data type for each attribute. Detailed explanations of these categories are as follows.
Pre-conditions
• Operating system: provides specifc information about the vulnerable operating system. This category includes the following attributes.
– OS name: name of the operating system. The data type for this attribute is
String.
– OS version: version of the operating system. Five mathematical operators can
be used for version comparison, =, >, <, ¸, and ·. The data type for this
attribute is String.
– OS archi: architecture of the operating system. This attribute is used because
some vulnerabilities are specifc to architectures of operating systems. This
attribute is especially useful for Linux/UNIX related operating systems. For
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example, the architecture of a Red Hat Linux could be “ix86” or “Sparc”. The
data type for this sub-category is String.
– OS kernel: kernel version of the operating system. The data type for this attribute is String.
• Application: refers to the vulnerable application.
– App name: name of the vulnerable software or hardware. The data type for
this attribute is String.
– App version: version of the vulnerable application. Similar to the version of
the operating system, f ve mathematical operators can be used for the comparison of the version, =, >, <, ¸, and ·. The data type for this attribute is
String.
• Access: refers to the access level of the attacker.
– Access range: refers to range of the exploitation. Possible values include remote and local. Remote exploitation means the exploitation can be launched
by the attacker outside the network without any user privileges. Local exploitation means the exploitations can only be launched when the attacker has access
from the same local network as the target host [15, 30]. The data type for this
attribute is Boolean. The value 0 indicates a local exploitation and the value 1
indicates a remote exploitation.
– Access level: refers to the user privilege level on the target host. Possible values include none, user and super user. The none level means no user-level
access is needed in order to launch the exploitation. The user level means that
the exploitation can only be launched when the attacker has some user-level access to the target system. The super user level means that the exploitation can
only be launched when the attacker has super user privileges. Usually the term
“super user” means “root” in Linux/UNIX operating systems or “Administrator” in Windows operating systems. The data type for this attribute is Integer.
The value 0 indicates none level, the value 1 indicates user level, and the value
2 indicates super user level.
• Additional: refers to additional pre-conditions that do not fall into the previous categories.
– Addition port: refers to the necessary open ports in order to launch the attack.
The data type for this attribute is Integer. Values of this attribute range from 0
to 65535 in IPv4 protocols.
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– Addition runapp: refers to the name of necessary running applications(or processes) in order to launch the attack. These applications usually refer to server
programs. The data type for this attribute is String.
– Addition other: refers to additional requirements that do not fall into other
sub-categories (special requirements). For example, CVE-2001-0905 is associated with Procmail, an email processing program [60]. The pre-condition
“Procmail runs suid root” for CVE-2001-0905 means that the Procmail program must run “setuid” in order to make the exploitation effective [10]. The
data type for this attribute is String. This attribute usually handles special preconditions and can be represented using predicate logic.
Post-conditions
Following the conventions used in ICAT, post-condition categories are defned as follows. For these post-conditions, each attribute has a binary value of 0 or 1, meaning
whether or not a security property is compromised upon a successful exploitation.
• Availability: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that “enables an attack that
directly inhibits a user (human or machine) from accessing a particular system resource” [30].
• Confdentiality : refers to the outcome of an exploitation that enables an attack to
“directly steal information from a system” [30].
• Integrity: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that enables an attack to “directly
change the information residing on or passing through a system” [30].
• Security Protection: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that gives an attacker
“privileges in a system that the attacker is not allowed to have by the access control
policy of the system” [30]. Three additional attributes are used for this category.
– SecPro superuser: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that grants an attacker full control of the target system.
– SecPro user: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that grants an attacker
partial control of the target system. Usually this means a valid user account
through which an attacker can log into the target system.
– SecPro other: refers to the outcome of an exploitation that grants an attacker
other privilege on the target system, such as read access to system confguration
fles.

Table 3.1 Template for pre-conditions and post-conditions
Condition Category
Operating
Preconditions System

Application
Access
Additional
Postconditions

Availability
Confdentiality
Integrity
Security
Protection

Name

Name
OS name

Version
OS version
Architecture
OS archi
Kernel
OS kernel
Name
App name
Version
App version
Range
Access range
User level
Access level
Open Port(s)
Addition port
Running Application(s) Addition runapp
Other
Addition other
Availability

Type
String
String
String
String
String
String
Boolean
Integer
Integer
String
String
Boolean

Super User Access

Confdentiality
Integrity
SecPro superuser

Boolean
Boolean
Boolean

User Access
Other Access

SecPro user
SecPro other

Boolean
Boolean
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It should be noted that different values on most pre-conditions can be compared using
string-matching algorithms. Values on two pre-conditions, version of the operating system and version of the application, can be compared using mathematical operators (e.g.
<, >, =, ·, ¸). These operators facilitate the defnition of most vulnerabilities because
vulnerabilities usually exist on specifc versions of the operating system (or applications).
For example, we defne “2.8”<“2.9.9” in terms of versions of applications. For each precondition, several can be combined using logical operators such as “AND” and “OR”.
For example, the pre-condition for a kernel version can be defned as OS kernel = “2.4.2”
or “2.4.1”. These operations facilitate the defnition of complex requirements of preconditions. Defnition of post-conditions is simpler. It should be noted that these (sub)
categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive since an attacker might achieve several
outcomes by successfully exploit a single vulnerability.
The classifcation scheme introduced here is concerned with prevention of exploitations in operational systems. There are other classifcation schemes based on different but
related concerns. One approach is concerned with classifying the origin of vulnerabilities,
such as program errors during the software design phase. A detailed list of these errors
includes input validation error, access validation error, exceptional condition handling error, environmental error, confguration error, race condition, design error, and others [30].
Another approach classifes the manifestation of vulnerabilities, such as attack signatures
[40], to facilitate misuse intrusion detection. In our approach, we are concerned with both
the origin of vulnerabilities and the manifestation of vulnerabilities. These two aspects are
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similar to those defned by pre-conditions and post-conditions. We believe this approach
is valid in the static analysis of vulnerabilities. However, the origin of vulnerabilities is
different from the classifcation scheme of design errors. We wish to have the granularity
of information provided at a level useful to vulnerability scanners such that a system administrator can know the general vulnerability status of the system - but not necessarily
discover why the vulnerability exists. As a by-product, we envision our approach will beneft the reasoning capability of vulnerability scanners to provide a more in-depth analysis
of attack scenarios.

3.4.3 Vulnerability Examples
Based on the template presented, we constructed a vulnerability base using the ICAT
information associated with a set of Linux vulnerabilities found in an operational highperformance cluster system we refer to as Microcosm [42, 43]. The Microcosm cluster
environment is a nine-node cluster composed of one quad-processor server and eight dualprocessor internal nodes [42]. More details about this cluster will be described in the next
chapter.
As a proof-of-concept step, we coded approximately 100 data entries in our current
vulnerability base. Some examples of entries in the vulnerability base are listed in Table 3.2. All these vulnerabilities are Linux/Unix CVE-listed vulnerabilities.

Table 3.2 Examples of vulnerabilities
Category
Pre-conditions

OS name
OS version
OS archi
OS kernel
App name
App version
Access range
Access level
Addition port
Addition runapp
Addition other
Post-conditions Availability
Confdentiality
Integrity
SecPro superuser
SecPro user
SecPro other

CVE-2001-0905 CVE-2001-0550
Linux/Unix
Linux/Unix
n/a
n/a
ix86
ix86
NULL
NULL
Procmail
Wu-ftpd
· 3.20
(¸ 2.5.0) ^ (· 2.6.1)
0
1
1
0
NULL
NULL
Procmail
Wu-ftpd
NULL
NULL
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

CAN-2003-0961
Linux
n/a
ix86
< 2.4.22
Kernel
< 2.4.22
0
1
NULL
NULL
NULL
0
0
0
1
0
0

CAN-2003-0693
Linux/Unix
n/a
ix86
NULL
OpenSSH
< 3.7
1
0
NULL
NULL
NULL
0
0
0
1
1
1
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Intuitively the relationship among different pre-conditions and different post-conditions
is an “AND” relationship. For example, CVE-2001-0905 in Table 3.2 can be represented
using the following sentence.
Pre-conditions:
(OS name= “LinuxUnix”) ^ (OS archi= “ix86”) ^ (App name=“Procmail”)
^ (App version· 3.20) ^ (Access range = 0) ^ (Access level= 1)
^ (Addition runapp= “Procmail”)
Post-conditions:
(Availability= 1) ^ (Confdentiality= 0) ^ (Integrity =0)
^ (SecPro superuser=1) ^ (SecPro user=0) ^ (SecPro other=0)
If one CVE entry corresponds to several vulnerabilities, or to the same vulnerability
that spans different platforms, the entry can usually be split into several entries in the
vulnerability base. This situation can be viewed as the handling of “OR” relationships.
In other words, different combinations of pre-conditions can make the same vulnerability
effective. For example, CVE-2001-0905 in Table 3.2 can be split into several entries.
Different pre-conditions for these entries are represented as follows.
Pre-condition 1:
(OS name= “Linux”) ^ (OS archi= “ix86”) ^ (App name= “Procmail”)
^ (App version · 3.20) ^ (Access range = 0) ^ (Access level= 1)
^ (Addition runapp= “Procmail”)
Pre-condition 2:
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(OS name= “Unix”) ^ (OS archi= “ix86”) ^ (App name= “Procmail”)
^ (App version · 3.20) ^ (Access range = 0) ^ (Access level= 1)
^ (Addition runapp= “Procmail”)
Currently the vulnerability base we described is constructed manually. Although the
proposed categorization is helpful for organizing pre-conditions and post-conditions, due
to limited information available for some vulnerabilities, improvements are needed in order to create more detailed descriptions. For example, in CVE, some vulnerabilities are
described as “may allow remote attacker to execute arbitrary code”[10]. Since it is usually
labor-intensive to perform real exploitations, deciding the exact outcome of the exploitations is diffcult. In other words, it is diffcult to decide whether the attacker will obtain
super user privilege, user privilege, or other privileges. Despite these diffculties, we view
this work as important towards a well-organized vulnerability base.
We also represented vulnerabilities using vulnerability graphs (v-graphs). Each of
these graphs is similar to the one shown in Figure 3.3, which depicts CVE-2000-1026, a
Tcpdump1 vulnerability represented using the template defned above. For simplicity, this
fgure only shows seven pre-conditions and one post-condition. Techniques to combine
these v-graphs with system confguration data are introduced in the next section.
1

Tcpdump is a widely used open-source tool for network monitoring and network traffc data acquisition.
This software was originally developed by the Network Research Group at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory. More information is available at http://www.tcpdump.org.
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OS.name = "Red Hat Linux"

OS.version = "7.1"

OS.architecture = "ix86"

Access.range = "remote"

Access.level = "none"

App.name = "tcpdump"

App.version = "3.4/3.5"

CVE-2000-1026

Access.level = "root"

Figure 3.3 V-graph for CVE-2000-1026 (a Tcpdump vulnerability)
3.5

Graph Building Process
The vulnerability base previously discussed contains data entries of single vulnerabil-

ities that could be exploited in an operational system. To understand how different vulnerabilities are exploited in specifc systems, these vulnerabilities are better viewed when
associated with additional information, for example, system confguration, host connectivity, and open ports.

3.5.1

General Overview of Exploitation Graphs

Figure 3.4 shows a general view of exploitation graphs that will be generated using the proposed techniques. Two abstract nodes, “Initial State” and “Goal State” are
used to represent the starting point and the ending point for an attack process. Each exploitation (denoted by circles) is represented using a set of pre-conditions and a set of
post-conditions. Two exploitations can be associated when there is a mapping between
these conditions. The basic idea is that an exploitation will not be effective until all its preconditions are satisfed. These pre-conditions can be satisfed either by the initial system
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confguration, or through some other exploitations. By chaining exploitations together,
resulting graphs may become very large - even for a small-to-mid sized network.

Initial
State

Exploitatio s

Goal
State

……

Pre-co ditio s

Post-co ditio s

Figure 3.4 A general view of exploitation graphs

3.5.2 Defnition of Nodes and Edges
One of the challenges in the graph-based modeling area is how nodes and edges are defned in a graph. Although many approaches have been proposed, as reviewed in Chapter
II, none are perfect. This problem is diffcult because it relates to the systematic categorization of system information. In our approach, we partially address this problem by
achieving a granularity level where information can be discovered using VA tools.
In order to simplify the generated graphs, a scalable graph-construction method has
been recently proposed by Ammann et al. [3]. This method uses a monotonicity assumption, which means the pre-conditions of an exploitation are never invalidated by performing another exploitation. Compared to attack-modeling approaches using model checkers
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[36, 72, 66], this assumption greatly reduces the size of the state space from exponential
to polynomial. Intuitively this assumption means that a system attribute no longer needs
to be re-checked once it is satisfed in the modeling process. Based on this assumption,
a forward-chaining algorithm can be designed to generate an attack graph without explicitly enumerating combinations of all exploitations and system attributes. Inside graphs,
nodes represent system attributes and edges represent exploitations used to change system
attributes in favor of potential attackers’ goals. The result of this approach is a layered
structure of system states, in which the satisfaction of states in a specifc layer depends on
the satisfaction of system states in lower layers [3].
In our modeling approach, we use a similar monotonity assumption, which means that
an exploitation can never be executed twice in the attack process. We use nodes to represent exploitations and edges to represent state changes related to exploitations. It has been
shown that an exploitation-based approach has a more straightforward view of exploitations in an attack process than the state-based approach [51]. The result of this process is
a layered structure of network exploitations, in which the execution of an exploitation in a
layer depends on exploitations in the lower layers. This process starts with an empty set of
exploitations at the lowest layer, which means no exploitation has been performed before
an attack. This process proceeds by checking pre-conditions of non-executed exploitations
against available system states. Newly-available exploitations and newly-satisfed system
states are added into new layers. This incremental process ends when there are no newlyavailable exploitations or the goal state is reached. One of the most important implications
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of this approach is that there is no “backtrack” of exploitations. Also, there is no edge
from higher-layer exploitations to lower-layer exploitations. Due to the assumption of
monotonicity, complexity problems incurred by state-explosion and loops can be avoided.
Examples in Figure 3.5 show the difference between layered system states and layered
exploitations. Figure 3.5(a) is an attack graph based on the approach proposed by Ammann
et al. In this graph, nodes represent system states and are numbered from S1 to S7 . States
S1 and S2 are initially satisfed system states. Other states are satisfed through a series of
exploitations. A special grey node is used to indicate an abstract goal state of an attacker.
Edges represent exploitations and are labeled from E1 to E6 . Two paths can be followed
from the initial states to the goal attribute: E1 − E3 − E5 and E2 − E4 − E6 . Figure 3.5(b)
shows our modeling approach. In this approach, nodes represent exploitations and edges
represent satisfed system states at each step of the attack process. Two special nodes,
InitState and GoalState; indicate the initial system states and the goal state of an attack.
The same paths from the initial system state to the goal state can be discovered by applying
graph algorithms. It can be seen that series of exploitations can be easily identifed from
Figure 3.5(b). The biggest difference between Figure 3.5(a) and Figure 3.5(b) is that the
graph in Figure 3.5(b) is a multi-graph, in which there may be more than one edge from
one node to another. Strictly speaking a multi-graph is not a graph, but for simplicity we
still use the name “exploitation graph”.
Using our approach, the complexity of the modeling process can be reduced. The original approach by Ammann et al. has a time complexity of O(|C|2 |E|) where |C| is the
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number of states and |E| is the number of exploitations [3]. Using a similar algorithm, our
approach has a complexity of O(|C||E|2 ). This algorithm is illustrated as LabelExploitations(INIT, GOAL, E, C).
GoalState

E3

E5

E6

S6

S7
E3

S3
E1

E4
S4

E5

E2

S1

S2

E6

S6
E4
S5

E1

Higher layers

E2

(a) Layered system states

S7
E3

S3

E4
S4

S4

E1

S5
E2

S1

Lower layers

S2
InitState

Initially satisfied states

(b) Layered exploitations

Figure 3.5 Comparison of graph structures: layered system states vs. layered exploitations

The time complexity incurred by computation is due to the following. First, the algorithm needs at most |E| steps. Second, within each step, the algorithm needs at most
|C||E| steps. So the overall complexity is O(|C||E|2 ). This complexity may seem similar
to that of the layered system states approach (O(|C|2 |E|)). However, in real networks, the
number of system states (the value of |C|) is generally greater than the number of available
exploitations (the value of |E|). This means that our approach will typically have better
real world performance than the state-based approach.
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Input:
1. A set E of exploitations;
2. A set C of system states;
3. For each ei 2 E, pre(ei ) µ C and post(ei ) µ C represent the set of preconditions and the set of post-conditions of ei ; and
4. IN IT µ C and GOAL µ C represent the set of initially satisfed system states
and a goal state for an attack.
Output:
Layered structure of exploitations with forward labeling.
Suppose En represents the set of exploitations labeled at layer n, Cn represents the
set of satisfed system states at layer n.
if ((IN IT = Á) or (GOAL = Á) or (GOAL 2 IN IT )) then
exit;
end if
E0 = Á; C0 = IN IT ; n = 1;
repeat
for all ei 2 En do
if pre(ei ) µ Cn−1 then
for all ci 2 post(ei ) do
Mark the ci label of ei with number n;
end for
end if
end for
Suppose all system states used to label exploitations at layer n are represented as
An .
Cn = Cn−1 [ An ;
n = n + 1;
until ((n = |E|) or (An = Á) or (GOAL 2 En )).
Figure 3.6 Algorithm: LabelExploitations(INIT, GOAL, E, C)

81
3.5.3 An Example
In order to better illustrate the mapping from post-conditions to pre-conditions and
how multiple exploitations are associated (or correlated), an example can be used. Suppose
a small network consists of multiple hosts including an attacker’s host, an intermediate host
and a server (Figure 3.7). An attacker is assumed to be connecting to the local network
via Host 1 through the Internet. The attacker has no direct access to the server. Table 3.3
lists the vulnerabilities discovered on host 1 and the server. The column “Exploitation
Outcome” in Table 3.3 is an indication of outcomes resulting from the vulnerabilities. This
column also partially represents the post-conditions of associated vulnerabilities. Possible
values in column 3 include remote-to-user (R2U), remote-to-root (R2R), and user-to-root
(U2R). Remote-to-user exploitation grants a remote attacker user level privilege on the
victim host. Remote-to-root exploitation grants a remote attacker root level privilege on the
victim host. User-to-root exploitation grants a local user root level privilege on the victim
host [47]. These categories are useful to explicitly describe changes of user privilege
during exploitations and are drawn from work done during the 1999 DARPA intrusion
detection evaluation [47].

Attacker

Host 1

Server
Local Network

Figure 3.7 A sample network with one host and one server

Table 3.3 Vulnerabilities for the sample network in Figure 3.7
Host
Host 1

Server

Vulnerability
CVE-2002-0836

Exploitation Outcome
Description
Remote-to-user
A vulnerability in the tetex package allows
remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands.
CAN-2002-0013 Remote-to-root
Vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or gain
user level privileges.
CVE-2002-0178 User-to-root
The sharutils package before 4.2.1 vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite fles or execute commands.
CAN-2002-1378 Remote-to-user
Buffer overfo ws in OpenLDAP 2.2.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2002-0391 Remote-to-root
Integer overfo w vulnerability in RPC servers
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code.
CVE-2002-0638 User-to-root
A vulnerability in the util-linux package may
allow local users to gain privileges via a complex race conditions.
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Host 1 and the server each have three vulnerabilities, one remote-to-user, one remoteto-root, and one user-to-root vulnerability. It should be noted that all vulnerabilities listed
here have outcomes related to user privilege escalation (or elevation). Our experience with
CVE leads us to believe that this set of vulnerabilities constitutes an important part of CVE
entries and has been exploited in many attack scenarios.
Figure 3.8 shows how different vulnerabilities can be connected together to form an
exploitation graph. Each of the sub-fgures in Figure 3.8 depicts an attack scenario. Note
that in these graphs, pre-conditions and post-conditions of each exploitation are not explicitly shown for the purpose of compact representation. For convenience, within each
sub-fgure, a hypothesized initial state s0 and a fnal state sf (or s0f ) are used. Each of these
states has the following meanings.
s0 : The attacker has full access only on his/her host.
sf : The attacker has root level access on host 1.
s0f : The attacker has user level access on host Server.
Figure 3.8(a) shows an attack scenario that consists of two steps. The attacker frst
exploits vulnerability CVE-2002-0836 on host 1, through which the attacker obtains user
level access. The attacker then exploits vulnerability CVE-2002-0178 on host 1, through
which the attacker gets root level access. It should be noted that the second exploitation
cannot be performed without the frst step. This is because one of the pre-conditions of
CVE-2002-0178 is “attacker has user level access on host 1”, which can be formally represented as “(Access level=1) and (Access range=1)” using the attributes discussed in the
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previous section. Similarly one of the post-conditions of CVE-2002-0836 is “attacker has
user level access on host 1”, which can be formally represented as “SecPro user=1” using
our naming convention. In our modeling process, post-condition “SecPro user=1” can be
mapped to pre-condition “(Access range=1)”. In this case, we say that the post-conditions
of CVE-2002-0836 match the pre-conditions of CVE-2002-0178. In other words, in order for these two vulnerabilities to be chained together in a series of exploitations, one of
the post-conditions of CVE-2002-0836 must be the same as one of the pre-conditions of
CVE-2002-0178.

s0

s1: CVE-2002-0836 on Host 1

s2: CVE-2002-0178 on Host 1

sf

s2: CVE-2002-1378 on Server

sf’

s2: CVE-2002-1378 on Server

sf’

(a)

s0

s1: CVE-2002-0836 on Host 1
(b)

s0

s1: CVE-2002-0836 on Host 1

s3: CVE-2002-0013 on Host 1
(c)

Figure 3.8 Simple e-graphs for the sample network in Figure 3.7

Figure 3.8(b) shows a similar scenario. This example differs from the example in
Figure 3.8(a) in that the attacker exploits two different vulnerabilities on two different
hosts. In this example the goal of the attacker is to acquire user level access on the server.
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As in the frst example, the post-condition “attacker has user level access on host 1” of
CVE-2002-0836 is one of the pre-conditions of CVE-2002-1378.
Figure 3.8(c) shows a scenario in which two different paths can be followed to achieve
the same attack goal. One path s0 − s1 − s2 − s0f is the same as that shown in Figure 3.8(b).
The other path s0 − s1 − s3 − s2 − s0f represents a different attack scenario. Although it
seems unnecessary to perform exploitations related to state s3 in terms of the goal s0f , this
scenario could happen in a real world attack because attackers often fully compromise the
intermediate targets (denoted as getting super user privilege on victim hosts) before moving on. This kind of situation should be taken into consideration during the construction
of exploitation graphs.
An important implication of Figure 3.8 is that exploitation of a vulnerability does not
require much in the way of previous exploitation. For example, the exploitation of s2 in
Figure 3.8(c) requires only one previous exploitation, either the exploitation on s1 or the
exploitation on s3 . From this perspective, a relationship between different paths in an exploitation graph is considered an “OR” relationship. In other words, there are different
options to help an attacker achieve the same goal by exploiting different vulnerabilities.
This notion is different from the “AND” relationship used by the attack tree approach,
where the relationship can be used to represent the combination of different exploitations
in order to achieve a single goal. The examples in Figure 3.8 show how different vulnerabilities can be modeled as chains of events in attack scenarios. From these examples
we can see that given a set of initial states and fnal states, it is possible to construct an
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exploitation graph that includes all exploitable vulnerabilities with specifc system confg urations.

3.5.4 Mapping Post-Conditions to Pre-Conditions
In the previous section, we have mentioned that in our modeling process, one necessary step is to map the post-conditions of an exploitation to the pre-conditions of other
exploitations. In order to build comprehensive exploitation graphs that include all possible
attack scenarios within a specifc network, one important research problem is to discover
what kind of post-conditions can be mapped. Although this question relates to the unsolved systematic categorization of computer-based attacks and is beyond the focus of this
dissertation, it is important to present a general overview of the problem here.
Generally speaking, two kinds of post-conditions, general conditions and application
specifc conditions, are possible to be mapped to pre-conditions. These two categories are
listed as follows. Within each category, some sub-categories are listed.
• General conditions. These conditions refer to conditions that are not specifc to an
application or a specifc activity.
– Elevation of user privileges. Exploitations related to this condition can be observed in a wide variety of attack scenarios. Mapping of these conditions is
straightforward. There are generally more options to select from by an attacker
when the user privilege is elevated on a target host/network. Post-conditions
such as this can be mapped to pre-conditions of an exploitation that requires
user-level privileges. A special post-condition is that an attacker gains super
user privilege on intermediate hosts during an attack process.
– Conditions related to host reachability. Exploitations can sometimes change
available (intermediate) target hosts from the viewpoint of an attacker. Once
an initially inaccessible target host becomes accessible through some exploitations, the attacker can perform more exploitations by exploring the vulnerabil-
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ities on that host. Post-conditions such as this can be mapped to pre-conditions
of an exploitation that requires accessibility to a specifc host.
– Performing Denial of Service (DoS). This condition refers to a subset of DoS
attacks in which an attacker has the potential to “spoof” some server services
(e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks). One example is “DNS Cache Poisoning”,
in which Domain Name Service (DNS) queries can be directed to a rogue
DNS server by polluting an existing DNS server [69]. Post-conditions such as
this can be mapped to pre-conditions of a DoS exploitation that requires the
spoofng of server applications. Unfortunately the post-condition of most of
these attacks is not easy to describe.
• Application-specifc conditions. These refer to post-conditions that are specifc to
an application or an activity. These conditions are diffcult to be mapped compared
with general conditions. A few examples are presented below.
– Stealing password fle. It is clear that stealing a password fle can be harmful
to a system. Post-conditions of such an exploitation can be mapped to preconditions of many other exploitations. However it may not be easy to decide
the post-conditions of such exploitation - perhaps the attacker will achieve user
privilege or super user privilege. It is also possible that the attacker cannot
crack the password fle in a reasonable amount of time.
– Changing system confguration fles. Post-conditions of such an exploitation
can also be mapped to pre-conditions of many other exploitations. Deciding
the outcome of this kind of exploitation is diffcult. For example, if a attacker
gains access to confguration fles of a HTTP server, the post-condition may be
defacing a website or shutting down the server.
– Other conditions. Other conditions usually needed to be considered together
with management or social issues, for example, the social engineering attacks
mentioned in Chapter I. Deciding the post-conditions of this kind of exploitation may also be diffcult.
It can be seen that one diffculty of the e-graph approach is the representation of preconditions and post-conditions - not the graph-construction techniques themselves. In this
dissertation, we focus on the use of a limited set general conditions (corresponding to
those defned in the condition template). More specifcally , we focus on post-conditions

88
related to user privilege elevation and host reachability. Our experience shows that these
conditions relate to a large number of typical attack scenarios.

3.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, an approach is proposed to address two of the three challenges faced

by the graph-based modeling approach. A template is proposed to facilitate the defnition
of pre-conditions and post-conditions. An exploitation-centric structure is used to accommodate exploitation information and state transitions. An effcient graph-simplifcation
technique will be proposed later in Chapter V.
It should be noted that the objectives proposed at the beginning of this chapter is only
partially addressed. For example, the systematic classifcation problem needs a large
amount of research effort. A good classifcation scheme for computer attacks will contribute to this area. Also the graph structure needs to be refned in order to better accommodate information and represent state transitions. A way to address this problem might
be building exploitation graphs that are specifc to each kind of attack, such as buffer
overfo w attacks.
It should also be noted that the techniques discussed here are not limited to networkbased exploitations. For example, for attacks within an operational system, this approach
can also be used to represent information accumulation as an attack progresses.

CHAPTER IV
BUILDING E-GRAPHS FOR A CLUSTER COMPUTING
ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Overview of the Cluster Environment
Our test bed for the graph-based modeling approach is called Microcosm [44, 43], a
cluster-computing environment in the Center for Computer Security Research (CCSR) at
Mississippi State University. Cluster computing is a popular high-performance computing
(HPC) facility. A cluster can be viewed as a set of computers (computing nodes) that
act together to create a single system image (in terms of availability, performance, or
administration). It is also generally viewed as a low cost solution for high performance
and high availability requirements. Software and hardware components within a cluster
are usually commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products or open-source products developed
by various interest groups. The computers are typically connected through high-speed
networks that are dedicated to the cluster [43, 58].
The Microcosm cluster environment is a nine-node cluster composed of one quadprocessor server and eight dual-processor computing nodes. All these nodes run Red

89

90
Hat Linux 7.1 (kernel 2.4.2)1 . The eight computing nodes are interconnected through a
100Mbps Ethernet switch and a Gigabit switch. We chose our experimental test bed as a
cluster environment due to the special security requirements that arise with these systems
(e.g., the use of COTS products or open-source products, sensitivity of applications, and
the increased number of users and functions [43]). These requirements make it necessary
to perform an in-depth analysis beyond normal vulnerability assessments. The choice of
the cluster environment is also due to the properties of clusters, such as the homogeneity
of computing nodes and their enclosed nature. Such properties make it more convenient
to perform an in-depth analysis of our modeling approach.
In the original setting of the Microcsom cluster, the head node (the server) is connected
directly to the Internet as a single point of entry. All internal computing nodes can only
be accessed after a user logs into the head node [42]. In order to better simulate attack
scenarios, a variant of Microcosm was used as shown in Figure 4.1. This change is considered reasonable because in most corporate networks, outsiders usually do not have direct
access to a server (especially a data server). The server runs all server applications, such as
the database server (Oracle 9i), the FTP server, the RPC (Remote Procedure Call) server,
and a parallel job scheduler. An attacker is assumed connecting to the local network via
Host 1 to Host 8 through the Internet. The attacker has no direct access to the server. The
goal for the attacker is to compromise the server - more specifcally , to get user or root
level privilege on the server.
1

This is a relatively old version of Linux. We used an older version in order to obtain a large set of known
vulnerabilities for this work.
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Host 1
Host 2
Host 3
Attacker

Host 4
Host 5

Server

Host 6
Host 7
Host 8

Local network

Figure 4.1 A cluster-computing environment: Microcosm
The graph-building process for a cluster environment is similar to that for other networked systems. It consists of f ve major steps.
• Gather initial states from the system to be modeled. These initial states are used to
describe the status of the system before exploitations are performed.
• Defne goal states of the presumed attacker. If there are multiple goal states, separate
them and build multiple exploitation graphs. It should be noted that the separation
of multiple goals is for simplifcation purpose only. Multiple goals may also be
modeled within a single e-graph.
• Instantiate vulnerabilities into exploitations. This step is necessary because one vulnerability may correspond to one or multiple exploitations (e.g., CAN-2002-0838
can lead to f ve different exploitations). The set of vulnerabilities may be discovered
through the use of a vulnerability scanner.
• Instantiate exploitations with host and network information. This step is used to
transform a generic exploitation description into host-specifc and network-specifc
descriptions.
• Match pre-conditions and post-conditions among instantiated exploitations to create
system-specifc e-graphs.
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4.2

Experimental Results
In this section, typical VA problems are used to illustrate the generation process for

e-graphs. For illustration purposes, we frst assume there is only one intermediate host between the attacker and the server, as shown in Figure 4.2. Then experiments are conducted
with more intermediate hosts modeled.

Attacker

Host 1

Server
Local Network

Figure 4.2 A simplifed cluster with one host and one server

4.2.1 Experiment on Typical VA Problems
In order to build e-graphs specifc to the Microcosm cluster, we frst performed vulnerability scanning using STAT Scanner [79] (from Harris Corp.) for the network environment shown in Figure 4.2. Second we selected a sample of the vulnerabilities discovered
and used them to model exploitations related to the user-privilege elevation process for
this cluster-computing environment. Some resulting vulnerabilities are listed in Table 4.1.
There are three categories of vulnerabilities for each host. These categories are classifed into three groups, remote-to-use, remote-to-root, and user-to-root. This is the same
categorization scheme described in Chapter III.
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Table 4.1 Vulnerabilities used to generate sample exploitation graph
Exploitation
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root

Vulnerability
CVE-2002-0836
CAN-2002-1378
CAN-2002-0013
CVE-2002-0391
CVE-2002-0178
CVE-2002-0638

Since each exploitation graph is specifc to initial states and a fnal state, the following
is defned. The initial states for this attack are informally described as “The attacker has
remote access to host 1 with no user privilege and the attacker has no access to the server”.
The goal state for the attacker is described as “The attacker has root level access on the
server”. These statements can be transformed into pre-conditions and post-conditions
according to the template defned in Chapter III. For simplicity, only pre-conditions and
post-conditions that are related to user-privilege changes and host reachability are listed.
INIT = {host1.Access level=0, server.Access level=0, host1.Access range=1,
Server.Access range=NULL}
GOAL = {server.SecPro superuser=1}
Using the algorithms from Chapter III, an exploitation graph was generated and is
shown in Figure 4.3. This graph shows all possible known paths that can lead an attacker
to root user privilege on the server via host 1. Intuitively this graph is straightforward
- the attack frst attains a user/super user privilege on host 1, and then a user/super user
privilege on host Server. This attack needs a minimum number of two steps and maximum
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of four steps to fnish. It should be noted that this example is a simplifed version (e.g.,
pre-conditions and post-conditions are not shown in this fgure) and is presented for proofof-concept purposes.

S0

s2: H1, CAN-2002-1378

s6: H1, CVE-2002-0638

s10: Server, CVE-2002-0391

s1: H1, CVE-2002-0836

s5: H1, CVE-2002-0178

s4: H1, CVE-2002-0391

s7: Server, CVE-2002-0836

s8: Server, CAN-2002-1378

s11: Server, CVE-2002-0178

s12: Server, CVE-2002-0638

s3: H1, CAN-2002-0013

s9: Server, CAN-2002-0013

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.3 E-graph for a two-host network

Now consider two questions related to network defensive strategies. Answers to these
questions show how the e-graph approach provides an in-depth analysis for vulnerability
assessment in understanding attack scenarios. An example is provided for each of the
following questions.
1) Given the initial system states and a goal for the attacker, what is the minimum set
of vulnerabilities that needs to be removed in order to make an attack process infeasible?
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We have listed the initial state and goal state for the example exploitation graph shown
in Figure 4.3. It is straightforward to apply a minimum cut algorithm2 on the exploitation
graph in order to fnd the minimum set of vulnerabilities. The original version of minimum cut algorithm can be used to fnd a minimum set of edges to separate any two vertices
within a graph. In order to create a standard form of the minimum cut problem, frst all
edges in an e-graph are converted into vertices and all vertices are converted into edges
because we want to identify a set of vulnerabilities to be removed. These vulnerabilities
correspond to a set of nodes instead of edges in e-graphs. Then a capacity value of 1 is
assigned to each new edge inside the graphs. Graph algorithms are then executed to fnd a
minimum set of vulnerabilities. In the following sections, this algorithm is referred to as
“minimal vertex cut algorithm” because it may fnd several minimum sets of vulnerabilities, instead of just one optimal solution. It should be noted that the e-graphs are simplifed
into graphs instead of multi-graphs3 . In other words, there is at most one edge between
any two nodes within e-graphs. However there are also graph algorithms available to fnd
minimum cuts within multigraphs.
After running the minimal vertex cut algorithm, we get at two minimal sets of states,
for example, {s1, s2, s3, s4} and {s9, s10, s11, s12}. By checking the labels of each state,
the corresponding vulnerabilities can be identifed as {CAN-2002-1378 on host 1, CVE2002-0836 on host 1, CAN-2002-0013 on host 1, CVE-2002-0391 on host 1} and {CVE2

The minimum cut algorithm can be found in most textbooks on graph algorithms, such as the one by
Chartrand and Lesniak[8]. We have implemented a variant of this algorithm in our experiments.
3

Note here multigraphs are not graphs.
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2002-0178 on Server, CVE-2002-0638 on Server, CAN-2002-0013 on Server, CVE-20020391 on Server}. Either of the two sets can be viewed as a minimum set of vulnerabilities
needing to be removed.
It is obvious that the above analysis can be very helpful for system administrators in
prioritizing the removing of vulnerabilities, especially when 1) time and monetary constraints exist within an organization, and 2) there are a large number of vulnerabilities
discovered using vulnerability scanners. Current VA tools cannot handle such situations.
2) Given the initial system states and a goal for the attacker, how will the strategies of
the attackers change after specifc vulner abilities are removed?
The exploitation graph can be used to analyze attack scenarios when a set of vulnerabilities, such as {CVE-2002-0836 on host 1}, are removed. The resulting graph is shown
in Figure 4.4.

S0

s3: H1, CAN-2002-0013

s4: H1, CVE-2002-0391

s2: H1, CAN-2002-1378

s6: H1, CVE-2002-0638

s9: Server, CAN-2002-0013

s10: Server, CVE-2002-0391

s5: H1, CVE-2002-0178

s7: Server, CVE-2002-0836

s11: Server, CVE-2002-0178

s8: Server, CAN-2002-1378

s12: Server, CVE-2002-0638

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.4 Changes in e-graph after a vulnerability is removed

97
By using the minimal vertex cut algorithm again on the graph shown in Figure 4.4, we
know the minimal set of vulnerabilities now becomes {CAN-2002-1378 on host 1, CAN2002-0013 on host 1, CVE-2002-0391 on host 1}, instead of the original two sets obtained
from previous analyses. This means that network defensive strategies may need to be
changed once certain vulnerabilities are removed. Such analyses are useful in modeling
the tradeoffs between applying security measures and improving the usefulness of system
features.

4.2.2 Additional Experiments
Similar to the experiments discussed in the previous sub-section, we have performed
additional experiments by varying the number of intermediate hosts between the attacker
and the server. More specifcally , we performed experiments using 2, 4, 6, and 8 intermediate nodes between the assumed attacker and the server. The network topology is similar
to the one shown in Figure 4.1. Each machine is seeded with specifc vulnerabilities for
control experiments. For illustration purpose, we focused on identifying the minimal set
of critical vulnerabilities in these experiments.
Experiment on 2 hosts
Using the vulnerabilities shown in Table 4.2, an e-graph was built and shown in Figure 4.5. Using the analysis similar to that presented before, we can identify three minimal
critical sets: {s1, s2, s3, s4}, {s7, s8, s9, s10}, and {s9, s10, s11, s12}. Vulnerabili-
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ties corresponding to any of them can be removed in order to guarantee the safety of the
network.
Experiment on 4 hosts
Using the vulnerabilities shown in Table 4.3, an e-graph was built and shown in Figure 4.6. Using the analysis similar to that presented before, we can identify two minimal
critical sets: {s13, s14, s15, s16} and {s15, s16, s17, s18}. Vulnerabilities corresponding
to any of them can be removed in order to guarantee the safety of the network.
Experiment on 6 hosts
Using the vulnerabilities shown in Table 4.4, an e-graph was built and shown in Figure 4.7. Using the analysis similar to that presented before, we can identify two minimal
critical sets: {s19, s20, s21, s22} and {s21, s22, s23, s24}. Vulnerabilities corresponding
to any of them can be removed in order to guarantee the safety of the network.
Experiment on 8 hosts
Using the vulnerabilities shown in Table 4.5, an e-graph was built and shown in Figure 4.8. Using the analysis similar to that presented before, we can identify two minimal
critical sets: {s25, s26, s27, s28} and {s27, s28, s29, s30}. Vulnerabilities corresponding
to any of them can be removed in order to guarantee the safety of the network.

4.2.3 Discussion
From the above experiments, it is obvious that the e-graph approach can help identify
the minimal critical set of vulnerabilities.
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Table 4.2 Additional experiments: vulnerability list for two hosts and one server
Host State
CVE ID
Host 1 s1
CVE-2002-0836
s2
CVE-2000-1026
s3
CAN-2002-0838
Host 2 s4
CVE-2002-0836
s5
CVE-2000-1026
s6
CAN-2002-0838
Server s7
CAN-2003-0693
s8
CAN-2002-1378
s9
CVE-2000-1026
s10
CVE-2001-0550
s11
CAN-2002-0838
s12
CVE-2000-0514

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
User-to-root

S0

s2: H2, e2_1

s6: H2, e2_3

s10: Server, e_s4

s1: H1, e1_1

s5: H1, e1_3

s4: H2, e2_1

s7: Server, e_s1

s8: Server, e_s2

s11: Server, e_s5

s12: Server, e_s6

s3: H1, e1_1

s9: Server, e_s3

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.5 Additional experiments: e-graph for two hosts and one server
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Table 4.3 Additional experiments: vulnerability list for four hosts and one server
Host State
CVE ID
Host 1 s1
CVE-2002-0836
s2
CVE-2000-1026
s3
CAN-2002-0838
Host 2 s4
CVE-2002-0836
s5
CVE-2000-1026
s6
CAN-2002-0838
Host 3 s7
CVE-2002-0836
s8
CVE-2000-1026
s9
CAN-2003-0127
Host 4 s10
CVE-2002-0836
s11
CVE-2000-1026
s12
CAN-2003-0127
Server s13
CAN-2003-0693
s14
CAN-2002-1378
s15
CVE-2000-1026
s16
CVE-2001-0550
s17
CAN-2002-0838
s18
CVE-2000-0514

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
User-to-root

S0

s2: H2, e2_1

s5: H1, e1_2

s6: H2, e2_2

s9: H1, e1_3

s15: Server, e_s3

s3: H3, e3_1

s4: H4, e4_1

s10: H2, e2_3

s11: H3, e3_3

s16: Server, e_s4

s13: Server, e_s1

s17: Server, e_s5

s1: H1, e1_1

s12: H4, e4_3

s7: H3, e3_2

s8: H4, e4_2

s14: Server, e_s2

s18: Server, e_s6

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.6 Additional experiments: e-graph for four hosts and one server
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Table 4.4 Additional experiments: vulnerability list for six hosts and one server
Host State
CVE ID
Host 1 s1
CVE-2002-0836
s2
CVE-2000-1026
s3
CAN-2002-0838
Host 2 s4
CVE-2002-0836
s5
CVE-2000-1026
s6
CAN-2002-0838
Host 3 s7
CVE-2002-0836
s8
CVE-2000-1026
s9
CAN-2003-0127
Host 4 s10
CVE-2002-0836
s11
CVE-2000-1026
s12
CAN-2003-0127
Host 5 s13
CAN-2002-1393
s14
CVE-2000-1026
s15
CAN-2003-0127
Host 6 s16
CAN-2002-1393
s17
CVE-2000-1026
s18
CAN-2003-0127
Server s19
CAN-2003-0693
s20
CAN-2002-1378
s21
CVE-2000-1026
s22
CVE-2001-0550
s23
CAN-2002-0838
s24
CVE-2000-0514

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
User-to-root

S0

s3: H3, e3_1

s8: H2, e2_2

s9: H3, e3_2

s15: H3, e3_3

s4: H4, e4_1

s13: H1, e1_3

s1: H1, e1_1

s16: H4, e4_3

s21: Server, e_s3

s5: H5, e5_1

s17: H5, e5_3

s22: Server, e_s4

s6: H6, e6_1

s2: H2, e2_1

s18: H6, e6_3

s14: H2, e2_3

s19: Server, e_s1

s24: Server, e_s6

s10: H4, e4_2

s7: H1, e1_2

s11: H5, e5_2

s12: H6, e6_2

s20: Server, e_s2

s23: Server, e_s5

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.7 Additional experiments: e-graph for six hosts and one server
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Table 4.5 Additional experiments: vulnerability list for eight hosts and one server
Host State
CVE ID
Host 1 s1
CVE-2002-0836
s2
CVE-2000-1026
s3
CAN-2002-0838
Host 2 s4
CVE-2002-0836
s5
CVE-2000-1026
s6
CAN-2002-0838
Host 3 s7
CVE-2002-0836
s8
CVE-2000-1026
s9
CAN-2003-0127
Host 4 s10
CVE-2002-0836
s11
CVE-2000-1026
s12
CAN-2003-0127
Host 5 s13
CAN-2002-1393
s14
CVE-2000-1026
s15
CAN-2003-0127
Host 6 s16
CAN-2002-1393
s17
CVE-2000-1026
s18
CAN-2003-0127
Host 7 s19
CVE-2002-0836
s20
CVE-2000-1026
s21
CAN-2002-0838
Host 8 s22
CVE-2002-0836
s23
CVE-2000-1026
s24
CAN-2002-0838
Server s25
CAN-2003-0693
s26
CAN-2002-1378
s27
CVE-2000-1026
s28
CVE-2001-0550
s29
CAN-2002-0838
s30
CVE-2000-0514

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Remote-to-root
User-to-root
User-to-root
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S0

s1: H1, e1_1

s11: H3, e3_2

s12: H4, e4_2

s19: H3, e3_3

s2: H2, e2_1

s23: H7, e7_3

s5: H5, e5_1

s24: H8, e8_3

s6: H6, e6_1

s7: H7, e7_1

s17: H1, e1_3

s18: H2, e2_3

s27: Server, e_s3

s8: H8, e8_1

s20: H4, e4_3

s28: Server, e_s4

s4: H4, e4_1

s3: H3, e3_1

s21: H5, e5_3

s25: Server, e_s1

s29: Server, e_s5

s22: H6, e6_3

s13: H5, e5_2

s9: H1, e1_2

s10: H2, e2_2

s14: H6, e6_2

s15: H7, e7_2

s16: H8, e8_2

s26: Server, e_s2

s30: Server, e_s6

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.8 Additional experiments: e-graph for eight hosts and one server
The critical set information may be useful for system administrators to effectively
harden a vulnerable network especially under time and budget constraints. Of course,
more critical sets (not necessarily minimal) can be identifed by using an extensive search
on e-graphs. An extreme example of a critical set is the one that includes all vulnerabilities
discovered.
An interesting observation of the above experiments is that, despite the difference of
state notations, experiments for 4, 6 and 8 hosts identify the same set of the vulnerabilities. More specifcally , two sets, {CAN-2003-0693 on Server, CAN-2002-1378 on Server,
CVE-2000-1026 on Server, CVE-2001-0550 on Server} and {CVE-2000-1026 on Server,
CVE-2001-0550 on Server, CAN-2002-0838 on Server, CVE-2000-0514 on Server} are
identifed to be critical sets of vulnerabilities. This can be attributed to the network topology and the techniques used to discover minimal critical sets. As the number of intermediate hosts increases, there are more vulnerabilities to be exploited in the frst few steps
of the attack process. However the vulnerabilities on the server remain the same among
all experiments. Using the minimal critical set searching algorithm, the smallest sets are
those related to the server (each has four states).
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4.3

Factors Affecting Topologies of E-graphs
An important issue to be investigated in the graph-based modeling approach is factors

affecting the topology of e-graphs. The topology here means the number and properties
of nodes and edges within e-graphs. These factors include the number and type of exploitations, the topology of the network being modeled, the inclusion of various security
products, and the way we defne initial states and goal states. In general, exploring features of these factors will be benefcial in, but not limited to, three aspects of the e-graph
approach.
• Predicting graph structures before the graphs are generated. By doing this, we can
(partially) estimate the complexity and structure of e-graphs before these graphs are
generated. This is important because sometimes e-graphs are large enough to exceed
the processing capability of a specifc machine. Graph-simplifcation techniques are
necessary in such cases.
• Facilitating analysis of attack scenarios. Sometimes factors affecting graph topologies are factors that affect attack strategies. For example, the number of available
vulnerabilities can be a factor that both affects attack strategies and the topology of
e-graphs. Knowing these factors is useful in understanding series of exploitations in
an attack process.
• Designing optimized network topologies. One can deduce defensive mechanisms
from an e-graph. By exploring factors affecting graph topologies, we can compare
different defensive approaches and fnd optimized strategies in protecting networked
systems. This is useful in modeling network deployment issues, such as how the
machines should be placed, or where security products should be deployed.
We explore features of these factors in the following sub-sections. Within each subsection, we use experimental results gathered by a two-step process: 1) running STAT
scanner to discover vulnerabilities on each host; 2) building e-graphs using techniques
described in Section 4.1.
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4.3.1 Exploitations
It is obvious that the number and type of available exploitations may infuence topologies of e-graphs. Some experimental results are used to illustrate this issue in detail.

4.3.1.1 Number of Exploitations
The number of exploitations affects the topology of e-graphs. In order to show this,
frst we consider the simple network structure shown in Figure 4.2. Suppose we want to
build an e-graph that models initial states and a goal state defned in Table 4.6. The basic
idea here is that the attacker starts with no access to host 1 and the server. The goal for
the attacker is to get user level privilege on the server. The attacker can frst perform some
remote-to-user exploitations on Host 1, and then performs remote-to-user exploitations on
the server. Table 4.7 shows available exploitations. Figure 4.9 is an e-graph that depicts
this scenario.

Table 4.6 Defnition of initial states and goal state for network shown in Figure 4.2
Set of States
INIT

GOAL

Description
host1.access level=0;
server.access level=0;
host1.access range=1;
server.access range=NULL;
server.access level=1;
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Table 4.7 Available exploitations: each host has one R2U exploitation
Host
Host 1
Server

Exploitation
e1
es

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836
Remote-to-user
CAN-2002-1393
Remote-to-user

S0

s1: H1, e_1

s2: Server, e_s

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.9 E-graph: each host has one remote-to-user exploitation
Using the same set of initial states and goal state, we model the same problem with
more exploitations. We can see that when the number of available exploitations changes
(as shown in Table 4.8), the topology of e-graph also changes (as shown in Figure 4.10).
More specifcally , there are more nodes, edges and branches in the e-graph shown in Figure 4.10. Obviously this graph depicts a more vulnerable network and there are more
choices for an attacker to follow. It is true in most cases that more exploitations lead to
more complex e-graphs.
Analysis similar to this example is useful to predict the topology of resulting e-graphs
before they are generated. Analysis here shows the effectiveness of a general defense-indepth rule in building defensive networks: reduce the number of vulnerabilities as much
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as possible. It should be noted that, in terms of initial states and goal states, exploitations
existing on different hosts may have the same infuence on the topology of e-graphs as
those existing on the same host.

Table 4.8 Available exploitations: each host has two R2U exploitations
Host Exploitation
Host 1
e1
Host 1
e2
Server
e s1
Server
e s2

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836
Remote-to-user
CAN-2003-0690
Remote-to-user
CAN-2002-1393
Remote-to-user
CAN-2003-0693
Remote-to-user

S0

s1: H1, e_1

s2: Server, e_s1

s2: H1, e_2

s4: Server, e_s2

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.10 E-graph: each host has two remote-to-user exploitations

4.3.1.2 Type of Vulnerabilities
The type of vulnerabilities also affects the topology of e-graphs. This can be illustrated
using the following experiments. The network being modeled is the same as the one shown
in Figure 4.2. Table 4.9 shows exploitations used for the modeling process. For each host,
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there is one exploitation distributed in each of the three categories, namely, remote-to-user,
remote-to-root, and local-to-user exploitations. Figure 4.11 shows the resulting e-graph.
Altogether six exploitations are included in the e-graph. Note that in this example, the
goal for the attacker is to get user level privilege on the server, including both user level
privilege and root level privilege.
Table 4.10 and Figure 4.12 shows another modeling approach that represents the same
problem with the same number of exploitations. However, the distribution of available
exploitations is different. For each host, there is one remote-to-user exploitation and two
remote-to-root exploitations available. There are no local-to-root exploitations.
The graphs shown in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 have the same number of nodes.
However the meaning of the nodes and edges is different. A more in-depth analysis shows
that the e-graph in Figure 4.11 represents a less vulnerable network in terms of defensive
strategies. This is because the minimal vertex cut (found using the minimal vertex cut
fnding algorithm mentioned earlier in this chapter) of this graph contains only two exploitations (e.g., set {s1 , s2 }). However the minimal vertex cut in Figure 4.12 contains
three exploitations (e.g., set {s1 , s2 , s3 } or set {s4 , s5 , s6 }). It is easier to remove fewer
vulnerabilities in order to protect the network. There are four shortest paths in Figure 4.11,
for example, s0 -s2 -s5 -sf and s0 -s2 -s4 -sf . However in Figure 4.12, there are nine different
(and shortest) paths. Each path has a length of two. This analysis shows that the e-graph
in Figure 4.11 represents a less vulnerable network (from the security point of view), since
there are fewer possible paths for an attacker to follow.
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Table 4.9 Available exploitations: each host has a R2U, a R2R, and a U2R exploitation
Host
Host 1
Server

Exploitation
e1
e2
e3
e s1
e s2
e s3

CVE ID
CVE-2002-0836
CVE-2000-1026
CAN-2002-0838
CAN-2002-1378
CVE-2001-0550
CVE-2000-0514

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Local-to-root
Remote-to-user
Remote-to-root
Local-to-root

S0

s1: H1, e_1

s2: H1, e_2

s3: H1, e_3

s4: Server, e_s1

s5: Server, e_s2

s6: Server, e_s3

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.11 E-graph: each host has a R2U, a R2R, and a U2R exploitation

Table 4.10 Available exploitations: each host has a R2U and two R2R exploitations
Host
Host 1
Server

Exploitation
e1
e2
e3
e s1
e s2
e s3

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836 Remote-to-user
CVE-2000-1026 Remote-to-root
CVE-2002-0083 Remote-to-root
CAN-2002-1378 Remote-to-user
CVE-2001-0550 Remote-to-root
CAN-2003-0693 Remote-to-root
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S0

s1: H1, e_1

s4: Server, e_s1

s2: H1, e_2

s5: Server, e_s2

s3: H1, e_3

s6: Server, e_s3

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.12 E-graph: each host has a R2U and two R2R exploitations
Other than the exploitations related to user privileges and host reachability, some exploitations may also have infuence on topologies of e-graphs. For example, Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks may create what we call “isolated nodes” within e-graphs. These
nodes are connected to other nodes but may not lead to the goal of the attack. We use the
following experiment to illustrate this issue.
We model the same problem as we did in the previous examples, with different types
of exploitations. Table 4.11 shows exploitations that can be used to implement this attack.
There are two DoS attacks against Host 1 and the server, respectively. It should be noted
that a DoS attack cannot be launched if the host is not accessible to the attacker. Figure 4.13 shows the resulting e-graph. Two nodes, s3 and s6 are reachable from the IN IT
state. However they do not lead to the goal of the attack. These nodes can be referred to
as “isolated nodes”. In such cases, we can either choose to discard these nodes and the
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edges associated with them, or model DoS as a goal state and generate different e-graphs
to represent it.

Table 4.11 Available exploitations: each host has a R2U, a R2R, and a DoS exploitation
Host
Host 1
Server

Exploitation
e1
e2
e3
e s1
e s2
e s3

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836 Remote-to-user
CVE-2000-1026 Remote-to-root
CVE-2001-0905 Denial of Service
CAN-2002-1378 Remote-to-user
CVE-2001-0550 Remote-to-root
CVE-2000-0514 Denial of Service

4.3.2 Network Topology
Another factor that infuences the topology of e-graphs is the network being modeled.
As can be seen from our modeling process, network topology information is incorporated
into the graph generation process through the defnition of system states. Investigation of
this issue will help a system administration learn how the network topology affects the
structures of e-graphs, and how to design better defensive mechanisms.
For example, a network might be changed, as shown in Figure 4.14(a) and Figure 4.14(b).
Intuitively, the one shown in Figure 4.14(b) is more secure because the network separates
the server from an attacker. To describe this scenario more precisely, we can generate
e-graphs for two different network topologies using the vulnerability set shown in Table 4.1. The two graphs are shown in Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16. It can be seen that
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the e-graph generated before the network change is less deep, which means that an attacker needs fewer steps to achieve the goal state. A more in-depth analysis shows that
the e-graph in Figure 4.16 represents a better defensive strategy for two reasons. First, it
takes more steps for an attacker to achieve the goal. Second, the network administrator
has more options to choose from in order to stop potential attacks. For example, using the
same analysis introduced in Section 4.2, one of the two minimal sets for the e-graph in
Figure 4.15 is {CAN-2002-0013 on server, CVE-2002-0391 on server, CVE-2002-0178 on
server, CVE-2002-0638 on server}, which has four vulnerabilities. In the e-graph shown
in Figure 4.16, we have 5 options for minimal vertex cuts, each has four vulnerabilities each of which can be removed in order to prevent the attack. This information is useful
for system administrators in devising network defensive strategies.

S0

s2: H1, e_2

s5: Server, e_s2

s1: H1, e_1

s4: Server, e_s1

s3: H1, e_3, DoS

s6: Server, e_s3, DoS

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.13 E-graph: each host has a R2U, a R2R, and a DoS exploitation
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Host 1
Attacker

Server

Host 1

Attacker

Host 2

Host 2

Server
Local Network

Local Network

(a) Before changing

(b) After changing

Figure 4.14 Changes on the network topology
S0

s2: H1, CAN-2002-1378

s5: H1, CAN-2002-0013

s6: H1, CVE-2002-0391

s9: H1, CVE-2002-0178

s15: Server, CAN-2002-0013

s3: H2, CVE-2002-0836

s4: H2, CAN-2002-1378

s10: H1, CVE-2002-0638

s11: H2, CVE-2002-0178

s16: Server, CVE-2002-0391

s13: Server, CVE-2002-0836

s17: Server, CVE-2002-0178

s1: H1, CVE-2002-0836

s12: H2, CVE-2002-0638

s7: H2, CAN-2002-0013

s8: H2, CVE-2002-0391

s14: Server, CAN-2002-1378

s18: Server, CVE-2002-0638

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.15 E-graph before changing the network topology
S0

s1: H1, CVE-2002-0836

s2: H1, CAN-2002-1378

s10: H1, CVE-2002-0638

s9: H1, CVE-2002-0178

s8: H2, CVE-2002-0391

s3: H2, CVE-2002-0836

s6: H1, CVE-2002-0391

s4: H2, CAN-2002-1378

s12: H2, CVE-2002-0638

s16: Server, CVE-2002-0391

s5: H1, CAN-2002-0013

s7: H2, CAN-2002-0013

s11: H2, CVE-2002-0178

s14: Server, CAN-2002-1378

s13: Server, CVE-2002-0836

s18: Server, CVE-2002-0638

s17: Server, CVE-2002-0178

s15: Server, CAN-2002-0013

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.16 E-graph after changing on network topology
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4.3.3 Deployment of Security Products
Some network products (e.g., fre walls, routers, network switches) are commonly used
in order to control access to hosts within networked environments. Deployment of these
products will infuence the structure of e-graphs by disabling some exploitations. Exploring how these products infuence the topologies of e-graphs is useful in solving some of
the product deployment problems.
For example, although security products are effective in controlling network traffc
to/from specifc IP addresses and ports, deciding where to deploy them is sometimes diffcult. This is especially true for medium to large-scale networks. Consider the network
shown in Figure 4.17. An FTP server and a database server are installed on the server to
facilitate data transfer between Host 1 and the server. A system administrator may want to
deploy some security products to protect this network. This network is the same as the one
shown in Figure 4.2, except that a fre wall product is to be deployed. The problem that we
want to solve is: where to deploy the fr ewall, position (1) or position (2)?

(1)
Attacker

(2)
Host 1

Server

FTP
DB

Local Network
Firewall

Figure 4.17 A network with one host, one server and a fre wall to be deployed
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Table 4.12 lists available exploitations for this problem. The goal of this attack process
is to get root level privilege on the server. Suppose exploitation e s1 and e s2 represents
exploitations related to the database server and the FTP server, respectively. Figure 4.18
shows the resulting e-graph. Two sets of nodes, {s4 } and {s5 } denote the minimal set of
exploitations that can be removed to stop the attack. These two states are denoted using
grey-flled nodes and represent vulnerabilities that can be removed with minimum effort.

Table 4.12 Available exploitations: host 1 has 3 vulnerabilities, server has 2 vulnerabilities
Host Exploitation
Host 1 e 1
e2
e3
Server e s1
e s2

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836 Remote-to-user
CVE-2000-1026 Remote-to-root
CAN-2002-0838 Local-to-root
CAN-2002-1378 Remote-to-user
CVE-2000-0514 Local-to-root

We use this e-graph to analyze the fre wall deployment problem. Since the system
administrator may want to remove either minimal exploitation set {s4 } or {s5 }, the fre wall
can be placed at position (2) so that access to either the database server or the FTP server
can be blocked. This is effective in stopping the attack process. Deploying the fre wall at
position (1) will not stop the exploitations represented either by {s4 } or {s5 }. This is due
to the fact that a fre wall at position (1) cannot control the network traffc between host 1
and the server.
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S0

s1: H1, e_1

s3: H1, e_3

s2: H1, e_2

s4: Server, e_s1

s5: Server, e_s2

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.18 E-graph: host 1 has 3 vulnerabilities, server has 2 vulnerabilities
As we check the usability of the network, security solutions may not be as simple as
discussed above. Because network users still want to use the database server and the FTP
server, we do not want to impose a security solution that simply blocks network traffc.
The best solution may not be removing sets {s4 } or {s4 } from e-graphs, but rather could
be disabling other node sets such as the exploitation set {s1 , s2 }. After carefully reviewing
the tradeoffs between usability and security of this network, the fre wall should probably
be deployed at position (1).
As can be seen from the above example, the e-graph approach is useful in providing
fne-grained analysis in mitigating network vulnerabilities. It can also be used in evaluating tradeoffs of different security solutions.
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4.3.4 Initial States and Goal States
As mentioned earlier, each e-graph is specifc to the set of initial states and goal
states. In our modeling process, the set of initial states represents system confguration
information gathered by system administrators. Although the defnition of initial states is
a procedural process and does not have many variants, sometimes we may want to change
this set and compare different e-graphs in order to fnd secure network topologies. For
example, for the network shown in Figure 4.1, we may want to compare the inclusion of a
different number of intermediate hosts between the attacker and server. This can be done
by changing the defnition of initial states.
The following shows examples as an illustration. In this example, two e-graphs are
generated in accordance with two different sets of initial states. These two sets correspond
to different numbers of intermediate hosts between the attacker and the server, one with
two intermediate hosts and another with three.
Figure 4.19 shows the network topology for the problem being modeled. Table 4.13
shows two sets of initial states. Table 4.14 shows exploitations being modeled. Figure 4.20
and Figure 4.21 shows two e-graphs generated due to different defnitions. Such a modeling process is useful in testing the topology of e-graphs for a subset of hosts within
a network instead of generating the entire e-graph (which maybe very complex) for the
whole network (e.g., for all eight intermediate hosts of the Microcosm cluster). In this
case, the generated e-graph represents a subset of the e-graph for the whole network.
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Host 1

Attacker

Host 2

Host 3

Server

Local Network

Figure 4.19 Network topology for three hosts and one server

Table 4.13 Defnition of initial states and goal state for the network shown in Figure 4.19
Set of States Set 1 (2 intermediate host)
INIT
host1.access level=0;
host2.access level=0;
server.access level=0;
host1.access range=1;
host2.access range=1;
server.access range=NULL;
GOAL

server.access level=1;

Set 2 (3 intermediate hosts)
host1.access level=0;
host2.access level=0;
host3.access level=0;
server.access level=0;
host1.access range=1;
host2.access range=1;
host3.access range=1;
server.access range=NULL;
server.access level=1;

Table 4.14 Available exploitations for the network shown in Figure 4.19
Host Exploitation
Host 1 e 1
Host 2 e 2
Host 3 e 3
Server e s

CVE ID
Exploitation Outcome
CVE-2002-0836 Remote-to-user
CAN-2002-1393 Remote-to-user
CAN-2003-0690 Remote-to-user
CAN-2003-0693 Remote-to-user
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S0

s1: H1, e_1

s2: H2, e_2

s3: Server, e_s

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.20 E-graph: initial state set 1 for the network shown in Figure 4.19

S0

s1: H1, e_1

s2: H2, e_2

s3: H3, e_3

s4: Server, e_s

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.21 E-graph: initial state set 2 for the network shown in Figure 4.19
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It should be noted that due to the monotonicity assumption, the initial states are assumed to remain constant during the attack process.
It is obvious that the defnition of goal state is another factor that infuences the topology of e-graphs. This can also be illustrated by the example shown in Figure 4.13, where
the goal of a DoS attack can either be included in an e-graph, or can be represented using a
single e-graph. Currently, our modeling approach mainly focuses on exploitations related
to changes in host reachability and user privilege. The defnition of goal states is also related to these changes. Other attack goals, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS),
worm/virus propagation, man-in-the-middle attacks, may also be analyzed and modeled
using the e-graph approach.

4.3.5 Scalability Issues
In this research, scalability is understood to mean whether the e-graph approach works
effciently as the size of the problem increases. We have discussed factors that affect the
topology of e-graphs. It is obvious that all these factors relate to the scalability of e-graphs.
As can be seen from previous examples, changes in any of these factors may affect the
graph topology dramatically. In this section, we use experimental results to show a quantitative analysis of scalability issues based on three factors - the number of exploitations,
the type of exploitations, and the network topologies being modeled. The following experiments were performed on a stand-alone Pentium 4 machine with 1GB memory. Analysis
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based on two other factors, deployment of security products and defnition of initial/goal
states, should be performed based on case-by-case studies.
The monotonicity assumption we used in the graph-generation process greatly reduces
both the time and space complexity compared to graphs that allow repetition of exploitations. Basically both of them are polynomial to the number of nodes and edges. The
experimental results presented in this section mainly focus on the time complexity. The
problem of space complexity can be an issue when the e-graphs are very large, as will be
shown in Chapter V.

4.3.5.1 Number of Exploitations
We have tested the time needed for generating e-graphs for different number of exploitations. The testing network is the same as the one shown in Figure 4.2. We suppose
that the presumed attacker starts with access to an intermediate host (host 1) and has no
access to the server. Also suppose the goal for the attacker is to obtain user level privilege
on the server. There is only one remote-to-user exploitation that can be performed on the
server. E-graphs generated are similar to those shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. We
have tested the graph generation time using the proposed approach by varying the number
of exploitations on host 1. The number of exploitations ranges from 1 to 100. The results
are shown in Figure 4.22. It can be seen that in all cases, the time needed for generating
graphs is less than one second. As mentioned in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter III, the graphgeneration process is expected to be O(|C||E|2 ) where |C| is the number of attributes
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and |E| is the number of exploitations. Our results show that, if other parameters remain
constant, the graph-generation time is linear in the number of exploitations (|E|).
Note that graph-generation time shown in Figure 4.22 is for the generation of relatively
less complex (in terms of attack strategies) graphs. It should also be noted that 100 possible
exploitations on one host is not uncommon for some computer systems that are running
old or un-patched operating systems and applications.

E-graph generation time (Seconds)

0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
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0.10
0.05
0.00
1

11

21

31

41

51

61

71

81

91

Number of exploitations

Figure 4.22 E-graph generation time for different number of exploitations

4.3.5.2 Type of Exploitations
We have tested the graph generation time for different types of exploitations. Within
these experiments, the defnition of initial states and goal states is the same as those used in
Section 4.3.5.1. Graph generation time was tested with distributions of different types of
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exploitations on host 1. These distributions are related to three categories, remote-to-user
(R2U), remote-to-root (R2R) and user-to-root (U2R).
An abstract graph is used to represent the attack process, as shown in Figure 4.23.
It can be seen that, during the attack process, an attacker frst attempts either R2U or
R2R exploitations on host 1. From R2U exploitations the attacker attempts either U2R
exploitations on the same host or R2U exploitations on the server. From a R2R exploitation
on host 1, the only choice for the attacker is to proceed with a R2U exploitation on the
server in order to reach the GOAL state.

INIT

R2U exploitations on host 1

U2R exploitations on host 1

R2R exploitations on host 1

R2U exploitations on Server

GOAL

Figure 4.23 Abstracted attack process for different exploitation distributions

Graph generation time was tested using two sets of experiments, one with 24 exploitations and another with 84 exploitations. Within each test set, there are four different distributions. Each distribution has the same total number of exploitations. The frst distribution has mostly R2U exploitations, the second has mostly R2R exploitations, the third has
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mostly U2R exploitations, and the fourth has an even distribution among three categories.
It should be noted that these distributions are all related to exploitations on host 1. For all
experiments, only one R2U exploitation on the server is used.
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 show the exact numbers of exploitations with different distributions and numbers of nodes/edges in resulting e-graphs. These distributions are also
shown in Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.26. Graph generation time for different distributions
are shown in Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.27, respectively.
It can be seen in both experiments, e-graphs with distribution 4 takes the longest time
to generate, which means the e-graph generated for distribution 4 is the most complex.
The e-graph generated for distribution 2 is the least complex. A more detailed analysis
can be done based on the attack process shown in Figure 4.23. It should be noted that the
number of nodes within e-graphs is the same among all distributions. The variant here is
the number of edges. Note that each exploitation corresponds to a node within e-graphs.
When most of the exploitations are evenly distributed among different categories, the egraph will produce the most edges.
In Section 3.5.2 of Chapter III, we have shown that the time complexity of the graphgeneration process is O(|C||E|2 ) where |C| is the number of system states and |E| is the
number of exploitations. The experiments results here are consistent with this complexity
analysis. This is because the number of edges (|G|) is generally proportional to the total
number of system states (|C|). These experiments show that the value of |G| has a direct
relationship with the graph-generation time.
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Table 4.15 Distribution of 24 exploitations on host 1
Number of Exploitations
Distributions

Number
of Nodes

Number
of Edges

R2U

R2R

U2R

Total
Number

#1

20

2

2

24

27

87

#2

2

20

2

24

27

51

#3

2

2

20

24

27

69

#4

8

8

8

24

27

105

Number of Exploitations

25
20
R2U

15

R2R
U2R

10
5
0
#1

#2
#3
Dis tributions

#4

Figure 4.24 24 exploitations with different distributions
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Figure 4.25 Graph generation time for 24 exploitations with different distributions

126
Table 4.16 Distribution of 84 exploitations on host 1
Number of Exploitations
Distributions

Number
of Nodes

Number
of Edges

84

87

325

2

84

87

171

2

80

84

87

249

28

28

84

87

925

R2U

R2R

U2R

Total
Number

#1

80

2

2

#2

2

80

#3

2

#4

28

Number of exploitations

90
80
70
60

R2U

50

R2R
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U2R
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20
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0
#1

#2

#3

#4

Distributions

E-graph generation time
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Figure 4.26 84 exploitations with different distributions
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Figure 4.27 Graph generation time for 84 exploitations with different distributions
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From these experiments, we can see that different types of exploitations have a big
impact on the graph-generation time. Although it is not easy to claim precisely which distribution leads to the most complex e-graphs, we can analyze this by measuring the number
of nodes/edges and by considering the context used in correlating different exploitations.

4.3.5.3

Network Topologies

We have measured the graph generation time needed for generating e-graphs. The
experimental results are shown in Figure 4.28. For these experiments, we used the cluster
environment shown in Figure 4.1, and tested time complexities for graph-generation using
different numbers of hosts and vulnerabilities. We used the following assumptions in these
experiments.
1) All hosts have the same number of vulnerabilities; and
2) All hosts contain only remote-to-root vulnerabilities.
In Figure 4.28, the horizontal axis shows how many vulnerabilities were found on each
host, including the server. The vertical axis shows the time (in seconds) needed for generating the e-graphs. The number of hosts shows how many intermediate hosts exist between
the attacker’s machine and the server, which is the fnal target for the attacker (represented
using the GOAL state according to our defnition). Intuitively, as the number of vulnerabilities and the number of hosts increase, the time needed for computation also grows.
Due to the assumptions imposed on the graph-generation process, the time complexity is
essentially polynomial to the number of hosts and the number of vulnerabilities. Again,
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the complexity of the graph-generation process is O(|C||E|2 ) where |C| is the number of
system states and |E| is the number of vulnerabilities. It should be note that the number of
system attributes (|C|) is usually proportional to the number of hosts within a networked
environment.
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Figure 4.28 Graph-generation time for different number of hosts

This data showed that e-graphs can be generated for a small network in reasonable
time with specifc assumptions. Using the techniques shown before, the e-graph approach
can be easily extended to model a cluster with tens of computing nodes with reasonably
average computing costs.
One problem with the graph-based approach is the viewing of e-graphs. Using the examples shown in Figure 4.28, if 9 vulnerabilities exist on each of the 9 hosts, the resulting
exploitation graph will contain 92 nodes and 819 edges, as shown in Figure 4.29(a). It
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can be seen that this graph is hardly viewable and diffcult to organize. A subset of this
e-graph is shown in Figure 4.29(b). In this example, although the attack strategy seems
very simple, the resulting e-graph can be very large. It is obvious that graph-simplifcation
techniques are needed in order to represent such complex e-graphs. This topic will be
addressed in Chapter V.

4.4

Using E-Graphs for Attack Scenario Analysis
In this section, we discuss how e-graphs may be used for in-depth attack scenario anal-

ysis, and why such analysis is useful for system administrators. Several straightforward
parameters, such as the length and number of attack paths, are presented to facilitate the
analysis.
Based on e-graphs, we also explore complicated parameters by assigning cost/benefts
to nodes/edges. This will lead to a more accurate analysis of attack scenarios and fnally ,
lead to the design of more secure networks. It should be noted that some of these parameters are closely related to the research efforts by the Information Design Assurance Red
Team (IDART) at Sandia National Laboratories [31], the research red team at SRI International [70], and the National Center for Scientifc Research, Laboratory of Analysis and
Architecture of Systems (LAAS-CNRS) in France [55].

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.29 A complex e-graph and part of its sub-structures
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4.4.1 Number of Branches
Intuitively, the number of branches (or “attacker work factor” - a common penetration
team measure) is a measure of how many different paths an attacker can follow in order
to achieve the goal of an attack. Using e-graphs, this parameter can be calculated by
enumerating the total number of branches from initial state to the goal state. The number
of branches can be a good estimation of the diffculty of the attack, as well as the diffculty
in protecting a networked system.
The number of branches can be formally described as follows. Suppose we have an egraph EG(E, G) where E is a set of exploitations and G is a set of edges connecting these
exploitations. Also suppose IN IT and GOAL represent the initial state and goal state of
an attack. An attack path can be defned as an ordered series of exploits p = {e1 , e2 , ..., en }
so that
1) e1 = IN IT ;
2) en = GOAL;
3) (ei , ei+1 ) 2 G for ei , ei+1 2 E and 2 · i · n − 2; and
6 ej for i =
6 j.
4) ei =
Given an IN IT state and a GOAL state, the number of branches is defned as how
many different paths P = {p1 , p2 , ..., pn } that an attacker can follow. An example can
be used to illustrate how this parameter may be used by system administrators to test
the security level of networks. Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31 show two e-graphs that
were created for two similar networks. In Figure 4.30, one path can be represented as
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p1 = {s0 , s1 , s3 , s7 , s8 , sf }. The graph in Figure 4.30 shows that there are 62 distinctive
paths from state s0 to sf . Each of these paths is similar to p1 . Similarly, Figure 4.31 has
60 distinctive paths to follow. It means that, in terms of possible attacks, the network represented by Figure 4.31 is slightly more secure than the one represented by Figure 4.30.
In order to protect the networks being modeled, the goal of the system administrator is to
reduce the number of paths to as few as possible. It can be seen that such fne-grained
comparison is benefcial to the quantitative analysis of security levels of corporate networks.
The enumeration of attack paths can be implemented using a breadth-frst search on
directed graphs. This algorithm can be found in most graph theory textbooks, such as the
one by Chartrand and Lesniak [8].

S0
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s5
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s8

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.30 E-graph 1: analysis on number of branches
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s5

s6

s7

s8

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.31 E-graph 2: analysis on number of branches
4.4.2

Length of Attack Paths

As a natural extension of the branches of the e-graphs discussed above, another measure of the security level can be the length of attack paths. Following the conventions used
before, we defne a length() function. We have
length(p)={number of exploitations in attack path p}.
Since two abstract nodes, s0 and sf , are used and do not represent real exploitations,
we have
length(p)={number of nodes in attack path p}-2.
For example, we have length(p1 ) = length({s0 , s1 , s2 , s3 , s7 , s8 , sf }) = 7 − 2 = 5.
The length of attack paths in e-graphs can not only be a measure of the complexity of
e-graphs, but also be a measure of the diffculty of specifc attacks. Three factors can be
defned in this category.
• Length of shortest path. This is which path(s) take minimum effort to implement.
Since most attackers want to fnd such paths, this can be an accurate measure on
how robust a network is.
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• Length of longest path. This is which path(s) takes maximum effort to implement.
Since most attackers try to avoid most labor-intensive processes, this might not be
as accurate as the length of the shortest path in evaluating the security level of a
network.
• Average length of all attack paths. This is the average effort needed to implement
an attack. Since attackers may not always fnd the shortest path, this can be a good
estimate of how robust a network is. This can be calculated in a way similar to the
calculation of number of branches, as discussed in Section 4.4.1.
We use some experimental results to show how these measures work. We still use the
two e-graphs shown in Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31. We have enumerated all attack paths
within each graph, and compared the shortest, the longest, and average length of all paths.
The results are shown in Figure 4.32. E-graph 2 represents a less secure network because
the shortest path takes only 2 steps, while the shortest path in e-graph 1 needs 3 steps.
Attacks shown in e-graph 2 also need less average steps. The two graphs show the same
number of steps in executing the longest path.
Another use of these measures might be the separation of different attackers by measuring their skill or knowledge levels. For example, skilled or insider attackers may choose
the shortest paths in most attack scenarios, while script kiddies may not. Attack paths followed by attackers may be a good indication of what kind of attack and by whom, an
organization is experiencing.
It should be noted that the above analysis is based on the assumption that all exploitations take equal efforts to implement. In real-world applications, we can assign weights to
different exploitations in order to get more realistic estimates, as will be discussed in the
following sections.

Length (number of steps)
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Figure 4.32 Comparison of lengths of attack paths
4.4.3 Cost/Beneft Analysis
In the previous section, we have mentioned that weights can be assigned to edges/nodes
within e-graphs in order to perform more realistic analysis of attack scenarios. This concept is discussed in more detail here.
E-graphs can be used for cost/beneft analysis. These costs and benefts can be derived
from sources such as security professionals, business management team members, or the
hacker community. Table 4.17 shows how the costs and benefts can be derived based on
different viewpoints. As a proof-of-concept example, this table is by no means complete.
It should be noted that cost and benefts are sometimes closely related to each other; for
example, the cost for attackers may be a beneft for defenders.
We now show an example of how e-graphs can be used for such analysis. Figure 4.33
is an e-graph generated for a networked environment. This e-graph is an adaptation from
the example shown in Figure 4.3.
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Table 4.17 Costs and benefts that can be assigned to nodes/edges of e-graphs
Viewpoints
Attacker

Costs
• Time and effort needed to perform exploitations;
• Monetary investment needed
to perform exploitations (e.g.,
hardware, software);
• Risk of being caught;
• Others.

Benefts
• Elevated fame within the attacker community (e.g., hacker
newsgroups);
• Business secrets (e.g., data
needed for competition between business rivals);
• Political goals (e.g., terrorist attacks);
• Others.

Defender
• Loss of business information
(e.g., credit card information,
patient information);

• Confdentiality , integrity and
secrecy of business information;

• Loss of equipment (e.g., hardware, software);

• Continued business without interruption (e.g., website operation);

• Defamed business;
• Others.

• Others.
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Figure 4.33 An e-graph with costs of exploitations
In Figure 4.33, values for nodes indicate the efforts needed to implement the corresponding exploitations. For example, node “s2 : 3” means the expense (in terms of hundreds of dollars) of removing a vulnerability corresponding to node s2 is 3. There is no
cost related to nodes s0 and sf . It should be noted that values assigned here do not necessarily refect true operational values. However, we tried to assign values that were close
to real-world values. For example, exploitations on a server (represented as nodes s7 ,
s8 , s9 , s10 , s11 , and s12 in e-graph) generally cost more than exploitations on other hosts
(represented as nodes s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 , and s6 in the e-graph).
We can calculate the minimum, the maximum and average cost for all paths in a manner similar to that used to compare the lengths of attack paths. The results for Figure 4.33
are shown in Figure 4.34. In this e-graph, there are a total of 40 different attack paths
(again this can be enumerated using a breadth-frst searching algorithm). The cost for
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each path is the sum of costs of all exploitations on that path. For example, we have the
following equation.
cost({s0 , s1 , s5 , s7 , s11 , sf }) = cost(s1 ) + cost(s5 ) + cost(s7 ) + cost(s11 ) = 2 + 2 +
8 + 7 = 19.
The cost values in Figure 4.34 can be used as one factor for comparing the security
levels of different networks. It is apparent that e-graphs with costs can provide a more
accurate quantitative analysis of attack scenarios.
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Figure 4.34 Cost analysis for the e-graph shown in Figure 4.33

4.4.4 Detection of Attacks
As can be seen from the discussion in Section 4.3.3, e-graphs can help the deployment of security products. In this section, we are concerned with the detection of attacks
using intrusion detection products, such as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion
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Prevention System (IPS), anti-virus product, or anti-spam products. For example, for the
network shown in Figure 4.35, a network IDS (NIDS) can be deployed either in position
(1) or position (2) to monitor live network traffc in order to detect intrusions.

Attacker

(1)

Host 1

(2)

Server
Local Network

NIDS

Figure 4.35 A network with one host, one server and a NIDS to be deployed

E-graphs can directly use information provided by the NIDS. For example, Table 4.18
lists all exploitations modeled for the networked environment shown in Figure 4.35. This
table also corresponds to the e-graph shown in Figure 4.36. The “detectable” column of
this table shows whether or not an exploitation can be detected by an operational NIDS.
In the security research community, non-detectable intrusions are sometimes referred to as
“stealthy” intrusions, such as the CAN-2003-0252 exploitation on the server in Table 4.18,
or some other newly-discovered intrusions. The value of “N/A” shows that a NIDS is not
capable of fnding exploitations, such as CVE-2002-0178 and CVE-2002-0638, which are
all host-based local buffer overfo w exploitations (these exploitations might be detected
by a host-based IDS or HIDS). The “state” column shows the corresponding node number
in the e-graph shown in Figure 4.36. Within this fgure, each grey-flled node represents
detectable exploitations. Set {s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 } represents exploitations that can be detected
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if a NIDS is deployed at position (1). Set {s7 , s8 , s9 } represents exploitations that can be
detected if a NIDS is deployed at position (2).

Table 4.18 Exploitations and corresponding states in e-graph shown in Figure 4.36
Exploitation
CVE-2002-0836 on host 1
CAN-2002-1378 on host 1
CAN-2002-0013 on host 1
CVE-2002-0391 on host 1
CVE-2002-0178 on host 1
CVE-2002-0638 on host 1
CVE-2002-0836 on Server
CAN-2002-1378 on Server
CAN-2002-0013 on Server
CAN-2003-0252 on Server
CVE-2002-0178 on Server
CVE-2002-0638 on Server

Detectable?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
No
N/A

State
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
s9
s10
s11
s12

E-graphs can not only be used to show detectable exploitations within e-graphs, but
also be used to refne deployments of security products. For example, after reviewing the
e-graph in Figure 4.36, we fnd that it may not be a good solution to deploy a single NIDS
at position (2), as shown in Figure 4.35. This is because the NIDS can not detect the
exploitation denoted by node s10 . The attack might be executed through a path that cannot
be detected by the NIDS, for example, path s0 -s2 -s6 -s10 -sf . However, if the NIDS is
deployed at position (1), then at least one exploitation on any attack path will be detected.
This information is helpful for a system administrator in deciding the optimal deployment
solution for security products.
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s3: H1, CAN-2002-0013

s9: Server, CAN-2002-0013

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 4.36 E-graph for network shown in Figure 4.35
We have shown how the e-graph approach aids an in-depth analysis of detectable attacks, and how it helps to refne the deployment of a NIDS product. It is clear that modeling the deployment of other security products, such as anti-virus products, can also be
performed using a similar approach.

4.4.5

Discussion

We have shown some experimental results that demonstrate how e-graphs can be used
to provide in-depth attack scenario analyses. Several factors are used to measure the diff culty in executing an attack. A cost/beneft analysis is used for more accurate quantitative
analysis of attack scenarios. We have also shown how the attack scenario analyses help
better deployment of security products and design of network topologies. We believe
defense-in-depth strategies can be implemented in corporate networks by combining these
analyses.
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Several of the previous examples show that e-graphs sometimes can be too complex to
be used by system administrators for useful attack analyses. From our experience, once
an e-graph contains more than 100 nodes or edges, the attack process will be hard to
understand.

4.5

Summary
In this chapter, we have used a cluster computing environment as an application area

of the e-graph approach. We have shown how typical vulnerability assessment problems
might be solved in this computing environment. More specifcally , we have provided
solutions to the following two questions using experimental results.
1) Given the initial system states and a goal for the attacker, what is the minimum set
of vulnerabilities that needs to be removed in order to make an attack process infeasible?
2) Given the initial system state and a goal for the attacker, how will the strategies of
the attackers change after specifc vulner abilities are removed?
A detailed review of factors affecting topologies of e-graphs has been given in this
chapter. Scalability issues related to these factors, such as the number/type of exploitations
and network topologies, have been demonstrated using experimental results. These results
show that the e-graph approach has the potential to be used to solve real-world problems
with reasonable computational costs.
We have also used e-graph techniques to provide in-depth analyses of attack scenarios, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Length of attack paths and number of branches
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have been used to indicate the diffculty of attacks. As a natural extension, we have applied cost/beneft analysis to e-graphs. We also provided proof-of-concept analysis on
how modeling the deployment of security products, such as fre wall and IDS, might be
accomplished.
Clearly, modeling with e-graphs can help provide solutions in mitigating network vulnerabilities. This information can be very useful for system administrators.
As a part of a general approach for all networked environments, the techniques used in
this chapter can be used in, but is not limited to, the cluster-computing environment. However it should be noted that some distinctive features of clusters can be used in simplifying
e-graphs. These features will be explored in detail in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V
GRAPH SIMPLIFICATION TECHNIQUES
One of the central goals of graph-based attacking modeling research is to help system administrators evaluate vulnerability mitigation strategies. In order to achieve this,
techniques are needed to manage the sizes of e-graphs. In this chapter, a simplifcation
technique is proposed and discussed based on exploitation similarity and host similarity.
This technique can not only be used to effectively reduce the sizes of e-graphs, but can
also be used to perform an in-depth analyses of attack scenarios similar to those discussed
in Chapter IV.

5.1

Problem Description
As can be seen from Chapter IV, exploitation graphs, such as the one shown in Fig-

ure 4.29, can grow very large. This problem, if left unsolved, could make the e-graph
approach infeasible for solving real-world problems. It not only makes the viewing of
e-graphs diffcult for system administrators, but also makes the generation and processing
of e-graphs time-consuming. Graph-simplifcation techniques are clearly needed. Within
this sub-area, two objectives should be addressed by the simplifcation techniques.
• The techniques should reduce the size of e-graphs effciently . Effcienc y here is
expressed in terms of run time and memory usage. Only reasonable computational
overhead should be introduced for extra computations. Little extra memory should
144
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be required to store information needed for the two-way conversion between original
graphs and simplifed graphs.
• Analyses similar to those proposed in Chapter IV can be applied to simplifed graphs.
It is clear that graph simplifcation techniques will change the topology of e-graphs.
However it is necessary to show that useful analysis, such as attack paths, cost/beneft
analysis, security product deployment analysis, can still be applied to simplifed
graphs in order to provide vulnerability mitigation solutions.
A direct way to simplify e-graphs is to collapse the complete sub-graphs into single
nodes. This straightforward method makes it easy to recover the original graph from an
abstracted graph. In the area of graph theory, an undirected graph is usually called a clique
if every pair of nodes is connected by an edge [19]. By converting directed exploitation
graphs (or multigraphs) into undirected graphs, we can apply graph algorithms to fnd
subgraphs that are cliques. These subgraphs are then represented using individual nodes
and the graph structure is simplifed. Unfortunately, the clique problem has been proven to
be NP-complete [19]. This means topological simplifcation based on the clique-fnding
algorithm may not be an effcient solution in reducing the size of e-graphs. Whether some
approximation algorithms are available to fnd near-optimum solutions remains unsolved.
For the purposes of this research, we do not further explore graph simplifcation using the
topological approach.
A better way to simplify complex e-graphs is to use domain knowledge. This will
be discussed in detail in the next section. In this chapter, words such as simplifcation,
abstraction and reduction all refer to the graph-simplifcation process and are used interchangeably.
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5.2

Graph Simplifcation Based on Domain Knowledge
Domain knowledge in the area of attack modeling refers to any knowledge that makes

an attack representation meaningful. This knowledge can imply useful heuristics in simplifying e-graphs.
Although many aspects of knowledge inside the networked systems can be explored,
for this dissertation, we mainly focus on graph simplifcation techniques based on the relationships between pre-conditions, post-conditions, and different exploitations. Knowledge
of network topologies is also considered. Experimental results are used to demonstrate
these techniques. As in the previous chapters, the test bed is still a variant of the Microcosm cluster shown in Figure 4.1.

5.2.1 Simplifcation Techniques
In the cluster environment modeled, we found that several features of exploitations
can be used to simplify exploitation graphs. Usually a cluster has a homogeneous (or
similar) set of computing nodes where the same (or similar) set of applications is installed.
The implication of this is that if a vulnerability exists on one host, it is very likely to exist
on another (similar) computing node within the same computational domain. This means
exploitations in a cluster environment have the potential to be more compactly represented
using an exploitation graph.
Our abstraction technique starts with multiple exploitations existing on the same host.
Since exploitation graphs are directed graphs, in order to apply abstraction techniques, we
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need to consider edges both to and from specifc nodes in an e-graph. Consider the graph
examples shown in Figure 5.1. Each internal graph node represents an exploitation. In this
fgure, e1 , e2 , e3 and e4 are exploitations (intermediate goals) on the same host. Suppose
e1 and e2 are two exploitations having the same set of post-conditions. In other words, all
system changes related to e1 and e2 are the same. Without observing Figure 5.1(a), if we
know there is an edge from e1 to e4 , then we can deduce that there is also an edge from e2
to e4 . In other words, if e1 satisfes the pre-condition of e4 , then e2 also satisfes the preconditions of e4 . Figure 5.1(a) shows an exploitation graph that illustrates this scenario.
The graph shown in Figure 5.1(b) is not a candidate for simplifcation because there is no
edge from e2 to e4 . Similarly, suppose e3 and e4 have the same set of pre-conditions. If
there is an edge from another node (e.g., e2 ) to e3 , then there should be an edge from that
node to e4 .
In an attack scenario like the one described in Figure 5.1(a), exploitations such as e1
and e2 can be combined into a single abstract node without affecting the representation
of the attacking process as shown in Figure 5.1(c). On the other hand, by viewing Figure 5.1(c) (the simplifed graph), we can deduce the graph structure in Figure 5.1(a) (the
original graph). In order to handle situations similar to this, we defne a parameter to measure the similarity between different exploitations. This defnition serves as a criterion to
be applied in identifying similar exploitations.
Defnition 1: Exploitation Similarity. Two exploitations e1 and e2 share the same
exploitation similarity if
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1) pre(e1 ) − IN IT = pre(e2 ) − IN IT ; and
2) post(e1 ) − IN IT = post(e2 ) − IN IT .
In this defnition, pre(e1 ) and post(e1 ) denote the pre-conditions and post-conditions
of e1 , and IN IT represents initially satisfed system attributes. It should be noted that the
operations defned here are all set operations. The reason we separate conditions in set
IN IT is that, based on the monotonicity assumption, conditions in IN IT will not change
during the attack process. This way we can fnd as many similar nodes as possible in order
to better simplify exploitation graphs.

e1
InitState

e3

…

…
e2

GoalState

e4

(a) Candidate sub-graph for abstraction

e1
InitState

e3

…

…
e2

GoalState

e4

(b) Non-candidate sub-graph for abstraction

InitState

…

e12

e34
…

GoalState

(c) Sub-graph after abstraction

Figure 5.1 Analysis based on exploitation similarity: e-graph examples
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We now use an example to show how this defnition works. Following the template
and conventions defned in Chapter III, suppose e 1 (corresponds to CVE-2000-1026) and
e 2 (corresponds to CVE-2002-0083) are two remote-to-root exploitations on host1. We
have the following defnitions.
INIT = {host1.Access level=0, host1.Access range=1, host1.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host1.App1 name=“Tcpdump”, host1.App2 name=“Openssh”},
pre(e 1) = {host1.Access range=1, host1.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host1.App1 name=“Tcpdump”},
pre(e 2) = {host1.Access range=1, host1.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host1.App2 name=“Openssh”},
post(e 1) = {host1.Access level=1}, and
post(e 2) = {host1.Access level=1}.
Then e 1 and e 2 meet the rules in defnition 1 and they are similar exploitations.
This idea can be implemented using the algorithm, AbstractExploitations. In this algorithm, pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei ) denote the pre-conditions and post-conditions of ei
except for those in set IN IT . This algorithm runs in polynomial time. The most timeconsuming step is fnding clusters for the set of exploitations. The simplest implementation can be done with a one-time scan of set E by comparing pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei )
for each ei 2 E. Implemented in this way, the algorithm has a time complexity polynomial
to the number of exploitations. Extra storage may be needed in order to store clusters of
exploitations and to map abstracted exploitations to the original ones.
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Input:
1. A set E of exploitations;
2. A set C of system attributes;
3. For each ei 2 E, pre(ei ) µ C and post(ei ) µ C represent the set of preconditions and the set of post-conditions of vi ; and
4. IN IT µ C represent the set of initially satisfed system attributes before any
attack.
Output:
1. Abstracted set E 0 ; and
2. For each e0i 2 E 0 , pre(e0i ) µ C and post(e0i ) µ C represent the set of preconditions and the set of post-conditions of e0i .
if (IN IT = Á) then
exit;
end if
for all ei 2 E do
pre abs(ei ) = pre(ei ) − IN IT ;
post abs(ei ) = post(ei ) − IN IT ;
end for
Separate set E into clusters E1 , E2 , ..., Ei , ..., En so that for 1 · i · n, each cluster
Ei represents all ei 2 E with the same pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei ). Suppose
pre(Ei ) = pre abs(ei ) and post(Ei ) = post abs(ei ). Also suppose Ei is denoted
using e0i .
E 0 = [ni=1 {e0i };
return E 0 .
Figure 5.2 Algorithm: AbstractExploitations(INIT, E, C)
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The similarity defnition can be extended to exploitations existing on multiple hosts in
a networked environment. Suppose we want to build an exploitation graph for the network
shown in Figure 5.3(a). Several hosts are included in this example, including the attacker’s
host, the server, and intermediate hosts H1, H2, H3 and H4. Exploitations e1 through e4
can be performed on the four intermediate hosts, respectively. Suppose the goal for the
attacker is to compromise the server. Assume that e1 and e2 are the same vulnerability
instantiated on different hosts (H1 and H2). During the attack process, e1 and e2 play
similar roles because they have the same set pre-conditions and post-conditions except for
specifc host information. Similar to the illustrations above, e1 and e2 can be combined
into a single abstract node in the corresponding exploitation graph without affecting the
representation of the attacking process. The resulting e-graph is shown in Figure 5.3(b),
which is the same as the one shown in Figure 5.1(c). Two parameters are used to handle
situations similar to this.

Attacker’s
host

…

H1
e1

H3
e3

e2
H2

e4
H4

…

Server

(a) A network and exploitations

InitState

…

e12

e34

…

GoalState

e-graph
(b) Abstracted e-graph

Figure 5.3 Analysis based on extended exploitation similarity: network and e-graph
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Defnition 2: Connection Similarity. Two hosts H1 and H2 share the same connection
similarity if H1 and H2 connect to the same set of hosts. This can be formally represented
as conn(H1) = conn(H2), where conn(H) is a function to denote all hosts connected to
host H.
If H1 and H2 have the same connection similarity, then either hosts H1 and H2 are
exactly the same machine or the hosts connected to them are the same. We now extend our
defnition on exploitation similarities. We defne a function remove host info() to remove
specifc host information from system confgurations. An example is listed as follows.
remove host info({“SSHD is running on host 1”, “sshd port is open on host 1”}) =
{ “SSHD is running”, “sshd port is open”}.
This function is used to facilitate the abstraction of specifc exploitations into generic
ones. This process can also be viewed as a reverse operation compared to the operation of
instantiating vulnerabilities into exploitations described in Section 4.1 of Chapter IV.
Defnition 3: Extended Exploitation Similarity. Suppose e1 is an exploitation on host
H1 and e2 is an exploitation on host H2. Then e1 and e2 share the same extended exploitation similarity if
1) H1 and H2 share the same connection similarity;
2) Neither H1 nor H2 is the fnal tar get of the attacker;
3) remove host inf o(pre(e1 ) − IN IT ) = remove host inf o(pre(e2 ) − IN IT );
and
4) remove host inf o(post(e1 ) − IN IT ) = remove host inf o(post(e2 ) − IN IT ).
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In the above defnition, Rule 1 is straightforward following Defnition 2. Rule 2 implies
that we do not want to mix exploitations existing in the fnal target host with those in other
hosts. Rules 3 and 4 state that two generic exploitations are similar. It can be seen that
Defnition 3 subsumes the rules used in Defnition 1 if we do not consider Rule 2.
Similar to the discussion on defnition 1, we use an example to show how this defni tion works. Following the template and conventions defned in Chapter III, suppose e 1
(corresponds to CVE-2000-1026) is a remote-to-root exploitation on host1, and e 2 (corresponds to CVE-2002-0083) is an remote-to-root exploitation on host2. Also suppose
host1 and host2 share the same connection similarity according to defnition 2. We have
the following defnitions.
INIT = {host1.Access level=0, host1.Access range=1, host1.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host1.App1 name=“Tcpdump”, host2.Access level=0, host2.Access range=1,
host2.OS name=“RedHat Linux”, host2.App1 name=“Openssh”},
pre(e 1) = {host1.Access range=1, host1.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host1.App1 name=“Tcpdump”},
pre(e 2) = {host2.Access range=1, host2.OS name=“RedHat Linux”,
host2.App1 name=“Openssh”},
post(e 1) = {host1.Access level=1}, and
post(e 2) = {host2.Access level=1}.
Then e 1 and e 2 meet the rules in defnition 3 and they are similar exploitations.
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The above defnitions are used as restrictions in fnding similar exploitations. From
the previous chapters it can be seen that the major complexity of our approach lies in the
graph-generation process. In order to handle this complexity, we choose to simplify exploitations before explicitly generating exploitation graphs. Each instantiated exploitation
is compared against other exploitations. Similar exploitations are grouped and represented
using abstract exploitations. This process usually takes worst-case computational time
polynomial to the number of instantiated exploitations, as can be seen from the following
algorithm, ExtAbstractExploitations. As analyzed in the previous section, the most complex step is fnding clusters for a given set of exploitations. A simple implementation can
be done with a one-time scan of set E by comparing pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei ) for each
ei 2 E.
Algorithm ExtAbstractExploitations is different from algorithm AbstractExploitations
in that, additional computations are needed to remove host information from pre-conditions
and post-conditions. In this algorithm, pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei ) denote abstracted (after host information is removed) pre-conditions and post-conditions of ei except those in
set IN IT .

5.2.2

Experimental Results

Using the abstraction techniques proposed above, the graph-generation process can be
greatly simplifed. This is shown in the following experimental results. For comparison
purposes, we frst generate an e-graph without using simplifcation techniques.
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Input:
1. A set E of exploitations;
2. A set C of system attributes;
3. For each ei 2 E, pre(ei ) µ C and post(ei ) µ C represent the set of preconditions and the set of post-conditions of vi ; and
4. IN IT µ C represent the set of initially satisfed system attributes before any
attack.
Output:
1. Abstracted set E 0 ; and
2. For each e0i 2 E 0 , pre(e0i ) and post(e0i ) represent the set of pre-conditions and the
set of post-conditions of e0i .
if (IN IT = Á) then
exit;
end if
for all ei 2 E do
pre abs(ei ) = remove host inf o(pre(ei ) − IN IT );
post abs(ei ) = remove host inf o(post(ei ) − IN IT );
end for
Separate set E into clusters E1 , E2 , ..., Ei , ..., En so that for 1 · i · n, each cluster,
Ei represents all ei 2 E with the same pre abs(ei ) and post abs(ei ).
Suppose pre(Ei ) = pre abs(ei ) and post(Ei ) = post abs(ei ). Also suppose Ei is
denoted using e0i .
E 0 = [ni=1 {e0i };
return E 0 .
Figure 5.4 Algorithm: ExtAbstractExploitations(INIT, E, C)
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5.2.2.1 Original E-graph without Simplifcation
Using the techniques presented in Chapter IV, an e-graph was generated for the Microcosm cluster. This e-graph models attack scenarios that involve eight intermediate computing nodes. The network topology is shown in Figure 4.1. Table 5.1 lists exploitations that
can be performed on each of the eight intermediate hosts, as well as those on the server.
The column “Exploitation Outcome” in Table 5.1 is an indication of outcomes resulting
from the exploitations. Possible values in column 3 include remote-to-user, remote-toroot, and user-to-root. These categories are the same as used in previous chapters.
In Table 5.1, we assume that different exploitations listed in the same row have the
same set of pre-conditions and post-conditions, except those initially satisfed system attributes. We also assume that all remote-to-user exploitations have the same set of preconditions and post-conditions, except specifc host information and initially satisfed system attributes. This assumption is also true for all user-to-root exploitations. These requirements can be better illustrated using the following examples.
Figure 5.5 shows the resulting e-graph which models the exploitations shown in Table 5.1. In order to build this graph, frst we defne the set of initial states and a goal state
for the attack. The attacker starts with no privileges on the server and the eight computing
nodes. The attacker has access to eight computing nodes and no access to the server. The
goal of the attacker is to obtain root privilege on the server. Totally there are 39 nodes and
151 edges, resulting in an e-graph that is hardly viewable.

Table 5.1 Simplifcation techniques: exploitations in Microcosm
Host
Host 1
Host 2
Host 3
Host 4
Host 5
Host 6
Host 7
Host 8
Server

Exploitation
e 11, e 12
e 13, e 14
e 21, e 22
e 23, e 24
e 31, e 32
e 33, e 34
e 41, e 42
e 43, e 44
e 51, e 52
e 53, e 54
e 61, e 62
e 63, e 64
e 71, e 72
e 73, e 74
e 81, e 82
e 83, e 84
e s1, e s2
e s3, e s4
e s5

CVE ID
CVE-2002-0836, CAN-2002-1393
CVE-2002-0638, CAN-2002-0838
CVE-2002-0836, CAN-2002-1393
CVE-2002-0638, CAN-2002-0838
CVE-2002-0836, CAN-2002-1393
CVE-2002-0638, CAN-2002-0838
CVE-2002-0836, CAN-2002-1393
CVE-2002-0638, CAN-2002-0838
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
CAN-2002-1378, CAN-2003-0693
CVE-2000-0514, CAN-2003-0961
CAN-2003-0693

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-root
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Figure 5.5 E-graph created for the Microcosm cluster without simplifcation
5.2.2.2

Simplifed E-Graph

One straightforward way of utilizing our abstraction techniques is to generate a traditional e-graph, then apply abstraction techniques on the resulting graph. However, our
approach works by abstracting the exploitations frst, representing the results using abstracted exploitations, and then using these abstracted exploitations to generate exploitations graphs. Since the abstraction process is separate from the graph-building process,
this approach will guarantee simplifcation of the most time-consuming graph-generation
process in the modeling approach. Although the abstraction process is done implicitly, it
should be noted that each step of abstraction can be represented by modifying corresponding e-graphs, as shown in Figure 5.6. This fgure represents part of the corresponding
e-graphs before and after abstraction. Each node in Figure 5.6(b) corresponds to two
nodes in Figure 5.6(a). For example, abstracted node e 31 32 in Figure 5.6(b) correspond
to nodes e 31 and e 32 in Figure 5.6(a).
Using the above exploitation-abstraction process, we modeled the same problem and
the same set of exploitations as shown in Table 5.1. Figure 5.7 shows a compact e-graph
based on exploitation similarities illustrated in Defnition 1. Each abstracted exploitation
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is represented using a grey-flled node. This graph contains only 21 nodes and 51 edges.
It is obvious that this graph more clearly shows the attack process and is more viewable
compared to the one in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.6 Part of the e-graphs before and after abstraction

We can generate a more compact graph for the same problem based both on the exploitation similarity and on the extended exploitation similarity. Figure 5.8 shows the
resulting compact e-graph for the same modeling problem. This e-graph has only 7 nodes
and 9 edges.
Similar to Figure 5.7, each abstracted exploitation is also represented using a greyflled node in Figure 5.8. For example, node “e 11 12 21 22 31 32 41 42 51 52 61 62
71 72 81 82” represents an abstracted exploitation for e 11, e 12, e 21, e 22, ... , e 81,
and e 82. The attack process is clear. The frst stage of this attack is to try one of the
16 remote-to-user exploitations on eight computational nodes. During the second stage
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of this attack, the attacker can either launch one of the 16 user-to-root exploitations on
computational nodes, or launch a remote-to-user (or a remote-to-root) exploitation on the
server. The third step depends on the outcome of the second step. It can either be compromising the server directly by launching a user-to-root exploitation, or indirectly by trying
other combinations of exploitations. However, if we model the same attack process using an exploitation graph shown in Figure 5.5, the attack process may be very diffcult to
understand, even for experienced security professionals.

InitState

e_51_52

e_11_12

e_71_72
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e_31_32
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e_23_24

e_s1_s2

e_81_82

e_83_84

e_s5

e_s3_s4

GoalState

Figure 5.7 Abstracted e-graph based on exploitation similarity

5.2.2.3 A Typical VA Process Using Simplifed E-Graphs
As previously discussed, e-graphs can be used to identify critical vulnerabilities within
a networked system in order to make a specifc attack process infeasible. Using simplifed
e-graphs, similar analyses can be performed. A direct approach is to recover the original e-graphs from simplifed ones. Analyses similar to those in Chapter IV can then be
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performed. Based on the discussion in Section 5.2.2.2, the minimal critical vulnerability sets identifed for the e-graph shown in Figure 5.5 are: {CAN-2002-1378 on Server,
CAN-2003-0693 on Server, CAN-2003-0693 on Server} and {CVE-2000-0514 on Server,
CAN-2003-0961 on Server, CAN-2003-0693 on Server} - each set contains three vulnerabilities. Either of these two sets of vulnerabilities can be removed to guarantee the safety
of the cluster.

InitState

e_11_12_21_22_31_32_41_42_51_52_61_62_71_72_81_82

e_13_14_23_24_33_34_43_44_53_54_63_64_73_74_83_84

e_s5

e_s1_s2

e_s3_s4

GoalState

Figure 5.8 Abstracted e-graph based on two similarities

We then performed experiments to remove vulnerabilities related to hosts 1 through
4 listed in Table 5.1 by patching related applications. Other vulnerabilities remain the
same as previously shown. Note that the experiment here is a simulation of the typical
vulnerability mitigation activities performed within corporate networks. The remaining
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vulnerabilities are listed in Table 5.2. The problem to be modeled, the defnition of initial
states and goal states, are also the same as those in the previous section.

Table 5.2 VA analysis based on simplifed e-graphs: exploitations in Microcosm
Host Exploitation
CVE ID
Host 5 e 51, e 52
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
e 53, e 54
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
Host 6 e 61, e 62
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
e 63, e 64
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
Host 7 e 71, e 72
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
e 73, e 74
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
Host 8 e 81, e 82
CAN-2002-1393, CAN-2003-0690
e 83, e 84
CVE-2002-0638, CVE-2002-0004
Server e s1, e s2
CAN-2002-1378, CAN-2003-0693
e s3, e s4
CVE-2000-0514, CAN-2003-0961
e s5
CAN-2003-0693

Exploitation Outcome
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-user
User-to-root
Remote-to-root

Based on the exploitation similarity, a simplifed graph is generated and shown in
Figure 5.9 after some vulnerabilities were removed. Due to the VA activities, this graph is
smaller compared to the one shown in Figure 5.7. The labels of nodes are the same due to
the same abstraction techniques applied.
Based both on exploitation similarity and extended exploitation similarity, a simplifed
graph is generated and shown in Figure 5.10. Although some of the vulnerabilities are
removed, this graph has the same topology as the one shown in Figure 5.8. The labels of
the nodes are different. This is due to the abstraction process based on extended exploita-
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tion similarity - similar exploitations related to different hosts are abstracted into a single
abstract exploitation.
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Figure 5.9 VA analysis: abstracted e-graph based on exploitation similarity

Based on either Figure 5.9 or Figure 5.10, the original e-graph can be recovered using
labels on nodes. The result is shown in Figure 5.11. It is obvious that this e-graph is smaller
compared to the one shown in Figure 5.5. We can easily identify the minimal critical
vulnerability sets, which are the same as the ones before vulnerabilities were removed.
This is because there is minimal number of vulnerabilities related to the server - these
vulnerabilities remain unchanged before and after the VA process.
From the above VA process it is clear that, using abstracted e-graphs, the identifcation
of critical vulnerabilities can be performed. Other similar analyses using simplifed egraphs will be introduced in Section 5.3.
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Figure 5.10 VA analysis: abstracted e-graph based on two similarities
5.2.3 Effciency Issues
5.2.3.1 Time Effcienc y
We intend to investigate effcienc y in terms of computational time and memory/storage
requirements. Computational effcienc y related to our simplifcation process is dependent
on specifc networked environments, and the properties of vulnerabilities discovered. We
have executed experiments to test the computational effcienc y of the proposed techniques.
First we tested graph-generation time for different numbers of exploitations. Figure 5.12
depicts the results. These experiments are similar to those listed in Figure 4.22 (shown in
Section 4.3.5 of Chapter IV), except the fact that graph-generation time was measured both
before and after simplifcation. The simplifcation techniques presented here are based on
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both exploitation similarity and extended exploitation similarity. It can be seen that our
proposed techniques reduce the computation time dramatically.
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Figure 5.11 VA analysis: original e-graph recovered from simplifed e-graph

The experiments conducted need further comment. It can be seen that the graph generation time after simplifcation is close to the time needed for generating e-graphs with one
exploitation on each host. This is because similar exploitations can be represented using
a single abstract node within abstracted e-graphs. In these experiments, we have assumed
that all exploitations are remote-to-root exploitations with the same set of pre-conditions
and post-conditions. The graph-generation time remains constant although the number of
exploitations increases.
As can be seen from the abstraction process, extra computing time is needed in fnding
exploitations that can be abstracted. This, however, does not seriously affect our simplifcation approach for several reasons. First, since exploitations are abstracted before
the graph-building process, the mapping relation between exploitations is kept as a priori
knowledge and the abstraction complexity is separated from the graph-generation com-
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plexity. Second, the similarity knowledge can be accumulated as new vulnerabilities are
found or the network topologies change. Third, the size of current vulnerability databases
does not introduce unreasonable computational overhead. For example, the most prevalent
CVE has about 7000 entries.

Graph Generation Time (Seconds)
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3.50E-01
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After Sim plification

2.00E-01
1.50E-01
1.00E-01
5.00E-02
0.00E+00
1

6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96
Number of Exploitations

Figure 5.12 Comparison of graph-generation time before and after simplifcation

5.2.3.2 Space Effcienc y
The second effcienc y objective we specifed was memory allocation needed. Although the storage of e-graphs can be dependent upon specifc data structures and may
vary, we discuss some general cases using a worst-case analysis. In general, two aspects
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of information need to be taken into account in processing simplifed e-graphs - memory
requirements for storing abstracted e-graphs and for mapping between exploitations.
1) Memory for storing abstracted e-graphs. Using the proposed simplifcation technique, the size of e-graphs can be reduced signifcantly , especially for those built for the
cluster environments. However, since it is possible that e-graphs cannot be simplifed at
all, the worst case time needed for storing abstracted e-graphs is O(|E||G|) where |E| is
the number of exploitations and |G| is the number of edges in original e-graphs (refer to
Section 3.2 in Chapter III). This complexity is the same as that of the original e-graphs.
2) Memory needed for mapping between exploitations. Because the relationship between exploitations is related to the topology of e-graphs, this complexity can also be represented using |E| and |G|, where |E| is the number of exploitations and |G| is the number
of edges in original e-graphs. The worst case space complexity here is O(|E|2 +|G|). This
complexity is due to the following. First, because the number of abstracted nodes is at most
|E|, the complexity to store correspondences between abstracted and non-abstracted exploitation is O(|E|2 ). This is needed in order to recover the original nodes from abstracted
ones. Second, the complexity to recover edges is O(|G|).
We have shown space complexity before and after simplifed e-graphs are generated.
In addition, space complexity might also be an issue during the generation process of egraphs. Research in graph-based modeling using model checking techniques shows that
space needed for processing attack graphs [36, 66, 72] might be a serious bottleneck.
However this is mitigated by the monotonicity assumption used (the complexity is basi-
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cally linear as shown in Chapter IV). We also expect that the model-checking approach
will beneft from our simplifcation techniques.

5.2.4 Discussion
We have presented a technique to simplify e-graphs by exploring similarities between
exploitations in a cluster-computing environment. It should be noted the technique proposed here is an abstraction technique. Compared with other graph-reduction techniques
such as graph categorization proposed by Noel et al. at George Mason University [51],
this approach has several advantages. First, the most complex graph-generation process
is simplifed. This is because the input for the graph-simplifcation tools has been signif cantly reduced. Second, our approach is suitable for a network environment with multiple
similar hosts, such as found in a cluster. Third, this process can be fully automated. On the
other hand, the graph categorization technique uses pre-defned rules to collapse the graph
structure and often needs user interaction in order to control the level the graph should be
reduced to [51].
System administrators may need to (partially) recover the original e-graphs from abstracted ones for analysis purposes, e.g., fnding partial attack paths. In our approach, only
information related to nodes need to be preserved. Information related to edges can be
deduced from simplifed e-graphs because similar nodes have the same connection with
other nodes.

169
It should also be noted that the abstraction technique is dependent on the network
topology and specifc exploitations discovered. While the cluster environment provides us
an optimal test bed for our proposed techniques, we are aware that some exploitation in
certain environments cannot be fully abstracted (for example, in a network where all exploitations have different pre-conditions and post-conditions). In the worst case, when no
exploitation can be abstracted, the effcienc y for the traditional graph-generation process
cannot be improved.

5.3

Analyses Related to Simplifed E-Graphs
In Chapter IV, we have analyzed factors that affect the topologies of e-graphs. We

have also showed how attack scenarios can be analyzed using e-graphs. In this section, we
show how to perform a similar analysis using simplifed e-graphs.

5.3.1 Graph Topology Analysis
In Chapter IV, we have shown that different factors, such as the number/type of exploitations, network topology, deployment of security products, defnition of initial states
and goal states, may affect the topology of e-graphs. Since the graph-simplifcation process is, in itself, a topology-changing process, these factors may or may not affect topologies of simplifed e-graphs. We use experimental results to show this based on the available
exploitations being modeled. For clarity purposes, we omit CVE IDs for exploitations being modeled.
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As showed in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.15, two e-graphs are created using a different
number of exploitations. Nodes other than S0 and Sf , are denoted using a state number,
a host number and a specifc exploitation number. It is obvious that these two e-graphs
represent different numbers of exploitations.

S0

s1: H1, e_1

s4: Server, e_s1

s2: H1, e_2

s5: Server, e_s2

s3: H1, e_3

s6: Server, e_s3

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.13 Topological analysis: e-graph #1 before simplifcation

Suppose exploitations at the same level of an e-graph (e.g., e 1, e 2, e 3, and e 4)
have the same set of pre-conditions and post-conditions, the corresponding nodes can be
abstracted into one single node. The results are shown in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.16,
respectively. It can be seen that the topologies of resulting e-graphs after simplifcation
are the same. However, if exploitations at the same level are not the same (in terms of definitions 1 and 3), e-graphs after simplifcation will not be the same. One extreme example
is that an e-graph can not be simplifed at all. The effect is, once the available exploitations change, the topologies of “simplifed” graphs also change (remain the same as the
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original e-graphs). The available number of exploitations can, but not necessarily, changes
the topology of abstracted e-graphs.

S0

s1: H1, e_1_2_3

s2: Server, e_s1_s2_s3

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.14 Topological analysis: e-graph #1 after simplifcation

As showed in the above examples, similar analyses can be conducted on other factors
affecting topology of e-graphs, including the type of exploitations, network topology, deployment of security products, and defnition of initial states and fnal states. Within each
category, we can show examples that a specifc factor can (or cannot) change the topology
of simplifed e-graphs. The point is that these analyses should be based on our defned
simplifcation process - more specifcally , whether there exist exploitation similarities and
host similarities.

5.3.2 Using Simplifed E-graphs f or Attack Scenario Analysis
We have shown that simplifcation techniques based on domain knowledge can be
used to effectively reduce the complexity of e-graphs. In order to make the simplifcation
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approach useful, it is necessary to show attack scenario analyses (as shown in Chapter
IV) can still be performed on simplifed e-graphs. This goal can always be achieved by
restoring original e-graphs from simplifed e-graphs, but this is not a good approach due
to the extra computational and memory costs incurred. In this section, we use experimental results to show how attack scenario analyses can be performed directly on simplifed
e-graphs without recovering the original ones. A way to achieve this is to modify the
representation of nodes and edges. Again, for clarity purposes, we omit CVE IDs for the
exploitations being modeled.

S0

s3: H1, e_3

s7: Server, e_s3

s4: H1, e_4

s1: H1, e_1

s8: Server, e_s4

s5: Server, e_s1

s2: H1, e_2

s6: Server, e_s2

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.15 Topological analysis: e-graph #2 before simplifcation

S0

s1: H1, e_1_2_3_4

s2: Server, e_s1_s2_s3_s4

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.16 Topological analysis: e-graph #2 after simplifcation
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5.3.2.1 Length of Attack Paths
As discussed before, the number of branches can be a good estimate of the diffculty
of the attack process. This parameter can be calculated by enumerating distinctive paths
inside e-graphs. The calculation can be accomplished using a breadth-frst search algorithm.
The number of branches within the original e-graphs cannot be directly enumerated
from simplifed e-graphs without additional information. However, the enumeration can
be executed by marking nodes with the number of branches at specifc points (nodes). We
use an example to show how this approach works.
Figure 5.17 shows a simplifed e-graph. This graph is the same as the one shown in
Figure 5.7, except that each node is denoted with a state ID and a number of branches. For
example, node “s 1: 2” means that there are two branches at this state. In other words, this
node is abstracted from two original exploitations. Obviously some nodes, such as IN IT
and GOAL states, have only one branch. (Note that the e-graph before simplifcation is
shown in Figure 5.5.) Another simplifed e-graph is shown in Figure 5.18. This graph
corresponds to Figure 5.8.
Using the number of branches, it is easy to execute an attack path enumeration using an
updated breadth-frst search algorithm. This algorithm, Enumerate path sim graph(E),
can be briefy sho wn as follows.
We use the example in Figure 5.18 to show how this algorithm works. There are 4
distinct paths in this graph.
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s_3: 2

s_4: 2

s_2: 2

s_13: 2
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s_15: 2

s_14: 2
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s_17: 2
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s_18: 1

s_19: 2

GoalState: 1

Figure 5.17 Using compact e-graphs to calculate the number of branches: example 1

InitState: 1

s_1: 16

s_2: 16

s_5: 1

s_3: 2

s_4: 2

GoalState: 1

Figure 5.18 Using compact e-graphs to calculate the number of branches: example 2
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Input: Simplifed e-graph EG;
Output: Number of paths.
Enumerate each distinctive path within abstracted e-graph EG using a breadth-frst
search algorithm. Suppose the result is P = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pn );
T OT AL N U M =0;
for all pi 2 P do
Multiply the numbers of branches of each node within pi . Suppose the result is
NUM;
T OT AL N U M = T OT AL N U M + N U M ;
end for
return T OT AL N U M .
Figure 5.19 Algorithm: Enumerate path sim graph(EG)
The calculation of the total number of branches is 16 + 16 × 16 + 16 × 16 × 2 × 2 +
16 × 2 × 2 = 1360. A similar calculation can be executed with the e-graph shown in
Figure 5.17. The results shows 1360 different branches from the IN IT state to GOAL
state, which means there are 1360 different paths for an attacker to follow. As can be
seen from these examples, enumeration of paths of simplifed e-graphs is relatively easy
in terms of computational cost.

5.3.2.2

Number of Branches

As stated in the previous chapter, the length of attack paths can be a good indication of
the diffculty of attacks. Three parameters, length of shortest path, length of longest path,
average length of all paths, can all be used. As can be seen from the graph-simplifcation
process, the frst two parameters remain the same after simplifcation. This is because we
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only abstract nodes at the same level of e-graphs. In other words, the depth of e-graphs
does not change after simplifcation.
The third parameter, average length of attack paths, can be calculated by referencing
the number of branches related to each attack path provided by the algorithm shown in
Section 5.3.2.1.
After the calculation of parameters based on lengths of attack paths using simplifed egraphs, we can either compare security levels, or group attackers according to their strategies.

5.3.2.3 Cost/Beneft Analysis
In Chapter IV, a cost/beneft analysis was suggested by assigning cost/beneft values to
individual nodes. For example, in the e-graph shown in Figure 5.20, values of individual
nodes indicate costs (in terms of hundreds of dollars) needed to remove corresponding
exploitations. Three parameters, the minimum cost, the maximum cost, and average cost
for all paths, can be calculated.
In order to perform a similar analysis based on simplifed e-graphs, costs for abstract
exploitations can be derived from corresponding ones in the original e-graphs. For example, Figure 5.21 shows a simplifed e-graph based on the one shown in Figure 5.20. It can
be seen that abstracted nodes also have cost values. These values are derived by averaging
costs related to original exploitations. For example, node “s 1 2 : 2.5” means the node
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was derived from node s1 and s2. The cost related to node “s 1 2” is the average cost to
remove exploitations denoted by node s1 and s2 ((2 + 3)/2 = 2.5).

S0

s1: 2

s2: 3

s3: 4

s4: 4

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.20 Cost/beneft analysis: e-graph before simplifcation

Based on simplifed e-graphs, one parameter, the average cost of all paths can be calculated directly. However, the other two parameters, the minimum and maximum cost
cannot be derived from simplifed e-graphs. This is because the cost information related
to individual attack paths is missing. However, according to our observations, if two exploitations are similar based on our defnitions, costs related to them are very likely to
be the same. For example, in Figure 5.20, nodes s3 and s4 have the same cost of 4. In
this case, the cost information is not lost after graph is simplifed. This means values of
minimum and maximum costs are very likely to be derived from simplifed e-graphs.
Another way to preserve the values of minimum/maximum costs is by controlling the
simplifcation process. We have shown that e-graphs can be simplifed based on host
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similarity and exploitation similarity. A similar defnition, cost similarity, can also be
described.
Defnition 4: Cost Similarity. Two exploitations share the same cost similarity if the
costs of removing them are the same.
According to this defnition, nodes s1 and s2 in Figure 5.20 should not be abstracted
into one single node. Instead the simplifed graph should be the one shown in Figure 5.22.
Here Defnition 4 can be viewed as an additional restriction over the graph-simplifcation
process in addition to defnitions 1 and 3. It is apparent that, by combining Defnition 4
with Defnition 1 (exploitation similarity) and/or with Defnition 3 (extended exploitation
similarity), values of the three parameters (minimum cost, maximum cost, and average
cost) can all be preserved in simplifed e-graphs. Based on these values, the security levels
of networked systems can be compared (for additional detail, refer to Chapter IV).

S0

s_1_2: 2.5

s_3_4: 4

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.21 Cost/beneft analysis: e-graph simplifed based on exploitation similarity
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S0

s1: 2

s2: 3

s_3_4: 4

Sf: Goal Reached.

Figure 5.22 Cost/beneft analysis: e-graph simplifed based on two similarities
5.3.2.4 Detection of Attacks
In Chapter IV, we have shown that e-graphs can not only be used to show exploitations, but also be used to refne deployments of security products. After the graph simplifcation process, the information of whether individual exploitations are detectable might
be missing. This is because an abstract node may correspond to both detectable and undetectable exploitations.
However, according to our observations, if one exploitation is detectable, then another similar exploitation (according to Defnition 1 or Defnition 3) is very likely to be
detected. This is because similar exploitations have a similar set of pre-conditions and
post-conditions. An underlying meaning of similarity defnitions 1 and 3 is that, similar
exploitations relate to the similar vulnerabilities running on the same platform. Based on
our observations of all CVE data (currently has more than 7000 entries) and vulnerability
scanners (e.g., STAT scanner, Nessus), we never found a counter-example to this conclusion. This means that detection information may not be lost after the graph-simplifcation
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process. Analyses such as detectable path analysis, or deployment of IDS products, can
be performed directly on simplifed e-graphs.

5.3.3 Discussion
We have shown that analyses useful to system administrators can be performed using
simplifed e-graphs. It can be seen that some analyses, such as those related to the number
of branches, the length of attack paths, and detection analysis, can be performed directly
on simplifed graphs. Other analyses, such as cost/beneft analysis and uncertainty analysis, may require the changing of the simplifcation process. The identifcation of critical
vulnerabilities may need to be executed from original e-graphs. It is clear that e-graph
can not only facilitate the compact representation of attack scenarios, but also improve the
effcienc y of most analyses related to vulnerability mitigation strategies.

5.4

Summary
In this chapter, we have shown how e-graphs can be simplifed based on domain-

specifc knowledge. The basic idea is that similar exploitations can be abstracted into
single nodes within e-graphs without losing important attack information. The most distinctive advantage of our approach is that, the most complex step in the modeling approach,
the graph-generation process, can be greatly simplifed. We then used a typical VA process to simulate common activities performed within a corporate domain. Vulnerabilities
mitigation strategies are provided and simplifed e-graphs at different VA stages are pro-
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vided. We have also used experimental results to demonstrate how in-depth topological
and scenario analyses can be performed based on simplifed e-graphs. It is clear that the
graph simplifcation techniques are a promising approach with enhanced performance in
providing security solutions.
As an intermediate step for abstracting exploitation graphs, our technique still needs
refnement. Currently, our abstraction works on abstracting nodes on the same layer from
the original e-graphs. However, our approach still works effciently in reducing the graph
size. This is because e-graphs are usually fat (as can be seen from previous e-graph examples), which means the width of a graph is much more than the depth of the graph.
More research is needed in order to fnd whether it is possible to abstract nodes existing on different layers. More research is also needed in order to explore the similarities
between different pre-conditions and post-conditions. If these objectives can be met, egraphs might be abstracted more effciently .

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS, INDUSTRIAL OBSERVATIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
Conclusions and major contributions of this dissertation are summarized in this chapter. Observations and comments in employing graph-based techniques in the industrial
domain are presented. Finally, possible extensions of this work are discussed.

6.1

Summary and Conclusions
In this dissertation, we defned a process to address challenges in analyzing attack

scenarios and mitigating vulnerabilities in networked environments, with an emphasis in
the high performance cluster computing domain. Known system vulnerability data, system confguration data, and vulnerability scanner results were systematically combined
to create exploitation graphs (e-graphs) which were used to represent attack scenarios.
The modeling process consists of three primary steps. The frst step is the creation of
a knowledge base of vulnerability graphs (v-graphs) from known system vulnerabilities.
The second step involves the association of multiple v-graphs to create an e-graph specifc
to a system being modeled. This step also includes the use of graph algorithms for network
vulnerability analysis. The third step focuses on devising graph-simplifcation techniques
182
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when the sizes of e-graphs are very large. Experiments in a cluster computing environment demonstrated the usefulness of the approach to model attack scenarios and provide
a more in-depth vulnerability analysis for networked systems. Major contributions of this
research work are summarized below.
First, a template was designed to represent vulnerability information related to operating system, applications, user privileges and access ranges. Vulnerability data were represented using pre-conditions and post-conditions. When new vulnerabilities are discovered,
system administrators can use the template to constantly renew data in a vulnerability base.
Each entry in the vulnerability base was referred to as a vulnerability graph (v-graph).
Second, techniques were developed to correlate individual v-graphs to create e-graphs
that are tailored to a network environment. Tradeoffs in defning nodes and edges within
e-graphs have been evaluated. Network topology information and security policies (e.g.,
fre wall rules) were encoded during the modeling process. A monotonicity assumption
was used during the modeling process to reduce computational costs.
Third, a set of experiments were designed to test the modeling approach in a cluster
computing environment consisting of one server node and eight internal computing nodes.
Experimental results showed that the proposed techniques can be used to evaluate vulnerability mitigation solutions, e.g., identifying critical vulnerabilities and evaluating fre wall
policies. Controlled experiments have been executed to test scalability issues for the same
cluster where each node has up to 100 vulnerabilities. Experimental results showed that
the computational costs are basically polynomial to the number of vulnerabilities and num-
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ber of hosts based on the monotonicity assumption. The proposed approach can be easily
extended to model mid-sized network (e.g., with tens of computing nodes) with reasonable
time and memory complexity.
Fourth, a detailed analysis of factors that affect the topology of e-graphs was conducted. These factors include the number and type of exploitations, network topology,
security products deployed, and the defnition of initial states and goal states. This information can be useful in predicting graph structures, in analyzing attack scenarios and in
devising optimized network topologies.
Fifth, a detailed analysis of attack scenarios based on e-graphs was presented. Graph
algorithms, such as minimum cut and breadth-frst search algorithms, have been applied
to fnd security solutions useful to system administrators. In addition, several parameters,
such as the number of branches and the number of attack paths were presented to facilitate
the analyses. A cost/beneft analysis and detection of vulnerabilities were also presented
based on resulting e-graphs. This information can be used in penetration tests and to aid
red team work in the security community.
Sixth, in order to manage the size of resulting e-graphs, effcient graph-simplifcation
techniques were proposed based on host and exploitation similarity. The most distinctive
feature of these techniques is that, the most complex graph-generation process is simplifed
with reasonable memory requirements. Experimental results showed that these techniques
can not only reduce the sizes of e-graphs substantially, but also preserve most information
needed for useful attack scenario analysis.
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We have shown the usefulness of the graph-based modeling approach in this dissertation. As a general approach for system administrators, the proposed techniques can be
used in, but is not limited to, the cluster-computing environment. The long-term goal
of this research is to reduce the work load of system administrators and to provide fnegrained qualitative and quantitative vulnerability analyses for corporate networks.

6.2

Industrial Observations
As a promising method in identifying and mitigating critical vulnerabilities, the graph-

based modeling technique has been recently adopted in some commercial products, such
R
as Skybox View developed by Skybox°
Security, Inc.1 , and C5 Attack Predicator (AP)

developed by Secure Elements2 .
Aimed at discovering a relatively small number of critical vulnerabilities within a corR
View uses an attack simulation engine to simulate all possiporate network, the Skybox°

ble attack scenarios based on vulnerability and network information. A visual representation of attack scenario is built. Based on the simulated attack scenarios, all vulnerabilities
are classifed into three categories: directly exposed (the vulnerability has an immediate
risk associated with it), indirectly exposed (the vulnerability can only be exploited after a
directly exposed vulnerability has been exploited) and mitigated (the vulnerability cannot
be exploited by enforcing existing security policies). Critical vulnerabilities are then iden1

For more information, refer to http://www.skyboxsecurity.com/products/index.html.

2

For more information, refer to http://www.secure-elements.com/products/c5ap/.
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tifed based on the risk evaluation against business assets [74]. The C5 Attack Predictor is
developed based on similar ideas. It simulates attack scenario based on vulnerabilities and
network information. The results can also be represented using graphs showing all attack
paths between a given attack and victim machine pair. Predictive and “what-if” analyses
can be performed based on the attack scenarios [17].
These implementations share some similarities with what has been proposed in this
dissertation. However we provide much wider and deeper analysis on attack scenarios and
our experiments are mainly focused on the domain of high-performance computing. In addition, we provided vulnerability base and graph-simplifcation techniques. The research
shown in this dissertation has the potential to be further adopted by the security industry.

6.3

Comments from the Industry Domain
In order to validate the proposed e-graph approach, we have been working closely with

security professionals from the industry. Below is part of a critical report regarding the
functionality and commercialization aspects of this research (provided by Ronda Henning
at Harris Corp.).
“The problem of vulnerability analysis for enterprise networks is well known. Each device in the network can literally have thousands of vulnerabilities associated with it when
all applications and operating system vulnerabilities are considered. As such, prioritizing
expenditures of corporate resources to correct problems is an overwhelming task to the
average system security administrator.”
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“Exploitation graphs provide a promising technique to improve vulnerability comprehension. The use of a standards-based vulnerability taxonomy such as the Common Vulnerability Environment (CVE) and the incorporation of a commercial vulnerability scanning tool, Harris’ STAT product, demonstrate that exploitation graphs can augment and
integrate existing commercial capabilities into a more meaningful common operational
picture of the vulnerability landscape. As such, exploitation graphs show promise as a
commercially viable product enhancement capability. In this mode, exploitation graphs
can function as a working aid to the security administrator in an enterprise vulnerability
remediation program.”
“The DoD and civil agencies such as the FAA and the National Weather Service are
early adopters of High Performance Cluster technologies. As such, exploitation graphs
applied to HPC enabled enterprises should become a technology of high interest to the
Government sector as well as commercial entities involved in large scale HPC cluster
environments such as the pharmaceutical and transportation industries.”
From these comments, it is obvious that the e-graph approach has the potential to be integrated with current VA tools (e.g., STAT scanner), and to help mitigate vulnerabilities in
corporate and governmental networks (e.g., high-performance computing environments).

6.4

Future Work
Based on the current e-graph approach, several future research tasks are possible.

First, the template used to build the vulnerability base can be improved. The current
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schema only shows information that can facilitate the modeling of limited attack scenarios.
In order to model all possible attack scenarios, a more inclusive template is needed. In
terms of pre-conditions and post-conditions, this template should represent intrinsic logical
connection between vulnerabilities so that different exploitations can be better correlated.
An ideal template should not only represent information with different granularities, but
also accommodate vulnerability gathered from different sources. This work can also help
a better categorization of vulnerabilities listed in popular databases, such as the CVE [10]
and CERT advisories [6].
Second, there are extensions possible with the correlation techniques. Currently the
correlation technique is similar to that used by a Rule-Based System (RBS). If we represent
each v-graph using if-then-else clauses, it may be possible to represent an e-graph using
conjunctions and disjunctions of clauses. Representing this way, it is possible that more
exploitations can be correlated and therefore, more deductions can be executed on attack
scenarios. Tradeoffs on using different representation techniques need to be considered
and evaluated.
Third, research on more simplifcation techniques is needed. We have developed
graph-simplifcation techniques based on the idea that different exploitations may lead
to the same system changes in terms of pre-conditions and post-conditions. From the
viewpoint of e-graphs, currently only exploitations existing in the same layer can be abstracted. In order represent attack scenarios more compactly, it may be meaningful to
collapse all exploitations related to a host or hosts within a computational domain. It may
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also be desirable to introduce operations (e.g., aggregation operations [51]) that involve
user interactions.
Fourth, more useful analysis can be done using e-graphs. In this dissertation we only
showed some relatively straightforward analyses on simulated attack scenarios. As discussed before, more deductions can be done using the graph structures. For example,
probabilities can be introduced into nodes and edges. A simple implementation is that, a
probability value can be added to each edge in an e-graph. This value represents the probability in performing an exploitation after another one is executed successfully. Using this
model, it is possible to answer questions such as “what is the probability that exploitation
ej will occur in x steps if exploitation ei is implemented?”. Along this line of research,
more complex probability models, such as Markov models [85], could also be introduced
to facilitate complicated attack scenario analysis.
Fifth, a better user interface is needed in order for the proposed techniques to be used
by system administrators. An ideal interface should consist of various functionalities,
including the adding, editing and removing of most current vulnerabilities, view attack
scenarios from different angles, zooming in and out the graph structures, and simulating
changes on security policies and network topologies.

6.5

Publications Based on This Work

A list of publications based on this work is presented below.
• W. Li, and R. Vaughn, “Building Compact Exploitation Graphs for a Cluster Computing Environment,” Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics
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Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, New York, June 15-17, 2005, IEEE
SMC, IEEE Computer Society and National Security Agency, pp. 50-57.
• W. Li, and R. Vaughn, “Using Exploitation Graphs to Model Network Exploitations,” Symposium on Risk Management and Cyber-Informatics (RMCI ’05): Proceedings of the 9th World Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Volume X, Orlando, Florida, July 11-13, 2005, International Institute of Informatics and Systemics, pp. 404-409.
• W. Li, and R. Vaughn, “An Approach to Model Network Exploitations Using Exploitation Graphs,” Military, Government, and Aerospace Simulation Symposium:
Proceedings of the 2005 Spring Simulation Multiconference (SMC’05), San Diego,
California, April 3-7, 2005, The Society for Modeling and Simulation International,
pp. 237-244.
A list of submitted papers based on this work is also presented below.
• W. Li, and R. Vaughn, “An Approach to Model Network Exploitations Using Exploitation Graphs,” submitted to Simulation: Transactions of The Society for Modeling and Simulation International.
• W. Li, and R. Vaughn, “Modeling and Simulating System Exploitations through
Exploitation Graphs for Security Engineering,” submitted to the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-39).
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